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
5th SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)

1st SPECIAL FORCES

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OPERATIONAL REPORT
ON LESSONS LEARNED
(RCS CSG73-28 (R1))
FOR PERIOD ENDING 30 APRIL 1966

DOWNGRADED AND/OR EXEMPTED;
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⑥ Lessons Learned, [HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)] 1ST SPECIAL FORCES ~~SECRET~~ ⑧

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10 May 1966

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SUBJECT: Command Operational Report. [REDACTED] learned (RCS CSFRO-28
[REDACTED]) for period ending 30 April 1966.

THRU:

⑪ 10 May 66

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⑫ 164p.

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ACSFOR
Washington, D. C. 20310

Section I. Significant Organization or Unit Activities.

1. General:

During the reporting period, several highly significant events occurred. Those ranged in scope from the much publicized NVA attack on A Shau to the less publicized but equally significant actions in II, III and IV Corps. The attack on A Shau illustrated that the enemy forces would accept heavy casualties to gain a psychological advantage or to destroy forces that have been detrimental to NVA's freedom of movement. It also pointed out the vulnerability of remote installations when ground fog and low cloud level hampers resupply and air support operations. The attack on Camp Khe Sanh, 4 January 1966, was the first reported use of 120mm mortars by the enemy in RVN. Also during this reporting period, there was an increase in CIDG operations in support of IMAF operations.

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a. The attack on Camp A Shau was well planned. The NVA forces capitalized on the bad weather conditions that hindered tactical air support and reinforcement and resupply attempts to relieve the defense. Camp A Shau is located near the three major infiltration routes leading from Laos, east into the A Shau-Aloui Valley. The camp and its operations conducted prior to the attack were continuously harassed by Viet Cong elements. Interrogation of two NVA defectors and continuous overflights detecting numerous freshly dug weapons positions confirmed information received that a large enemy buildup existed and an attack was imminent. The Commanding Officer, 5th SFGA, deployed a reaction (Mike) force from Nha Trang, as the initial element to reinforce Camp A Shau prior to the attack. The attack began in the early hours of 9 March. The camp received a heavy concentration of 81mm mortar fire and a probe on the southern portion of the camp by an estimated force of two NVA companies. The initial mortar barrage was very accurate, causing heavy damage and a temporary loss of communications. Due to extremely poor weather conditions which prevailed during the two-day attack, additional reinforcements from Hue/Phu Bai could not be deployed. Heavy bombings, aerial resupply and evacuation aircraft flew constantly under heavy ground fire in support of the camp. Upon the request of the detachment commander, airstrikes were made on the camp perimeter which dispersed the enemy massing for an assault. Under constant and intense fire, the defensive positions reduced to rubble and ammunition nearly exhausted, the defensive capability deteriorated rapidly. The personnel were ordered to evacuate the camp. III MAF committed sixteen helicopters to conduct the evacuation. Poor visibility and continuous enemy ground fire prevented complete evacuation. Remaining personnel began escape and evasion action. On 12 March, the last evading US and CIDG personnel of the scattered groups were picked up by rescue aircraft and returned to the Hue/Phu Bai area (Incl 15).

b. A significant CIDG combat operation which demonstrates the success to be achieved from rapid exploitation of battlefield intelligence was exemplified when Camp Buon Ea Yang (A-233), Darlac Province, II CTZ, conducted an operation on 18 March 1966, in which a VC Company Commander was KIA and several documents were CIA. Subsequent analysis of the documents indicated the location of four VC Companies approximately 22 kilometers ESE of the Camp at BQ200052. Operation "Le Hai 21" was planned on the basis of the captured information and departed Buon Ea Yang at 191300 March. At 201000 March "Operation Le Hai 21" made contact with a VC Battalion located at the coordinates taken from the document. The operation fought a delaying action, calling in air strikes until reinforcements arrived at 201630. On 21 March artillery fire was adjusted on the VC positions and by 211945 March friendly forces had overrun the VC Battalion. Results of the action

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were 180 VC KIA (122 KBA). Friendly losses were 1 USASF KIA, 2 USASF WIA, 9 CIDG KIA, 1 Interpreter KIA and 8 CIDG WIA (Incl 17).

c. Briefings were conducted for numerous visitors to include Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor, General Harold K. Johnson, and Senator Stuart Symington. These briefings contributed materially to the overall understanding of the Special Forces role in the counterinsurgency environment (Incl 11).

2. Intelligence.

a. Consistent with the Source Control Program which was promulgated by HQ USMACV in December 1965, major effort is being applied to increased control of intelligence nets and to the registering of all agents and informants. The goal of the program is to reduce duplication, especially regarding the agent handlers, to eliminate "paper mills", and to exercise more control over each net by recording source background data and officially registering each agent or informant. However, three particular problems have been experienced which are impeding the progress of this program. First, the ILDB supervise the agent handlers and have expressed firm reluctance to provide the necessary information. Second, the program places an administrative burden on the "A" Detachment Commander for which he has no facility. Third, the classification of the implementing directive (SECRET/NOFORN) precludes storage of the document at the "A" Detachment camp sites. In an attempt to eliminate these problems, SMIAT representatives have been attached to each "C" Detachment. Their mission is primarily to advise in the implementation of the Source Control Program and further, to advise subordinate commanders on the establishment of intelligence nets and the handling of agents. The efforts of the SMIAT personnel have and will be of paramount importance in establishing an effective Source Control Program.

b. In February, OB Officers were assigned to each "C" Detachment and in March to the Group Headquarters. Their efforts have aided materially in improving the quality and quantity of intelligence reporting. The Group Headquarters has initiated a Daily Intelligence Summary to the "C" Detachments as a means of increasing feedback and of keeping commanders informed on other CTZ intelligence. "C" Detachments now forward weekly intelligence summaries.

c. Comprehensive studies are being made on all camp sites for forwarding to HQ USMACV as a vehicle to assist in planning for contingency operations; special emphasis is being placed on the more isolated camps in

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I and II CTZ due to the forthcoming monsoon season. Similarly, studies are being prepared on War Zone "C" and "D" and other VC "involute" areas in preparation of future offensive operations.

d. Considerable emphasis was placed upon administration and document security during the past quarter. The purposes were two fold: First, to revamp the system and align this Headquarters with implementing directives from HQ USARV; second, to prepare the Group for the AGI which was conducted on 19 - 21 March. The filing system was overhauled completely to facilitate ready reference and a new, more secure, document logging system has been effected. The system employs one document per log sheet. The log sheet also serves as a destruction certificate by stamping it with proper instructions. Thus, the possibility of administrative error caused when transferring the log entry from the DA Form 455 to DA Form 546 is eliminated. Consistent with USARV Regulation 380-5, a new briefing/debriefing system has been employed, which more thoroughly insures that each individual understands his obligation regarding the dissemination of classified information.

3. Operations and Training.

a. CIDG Program: The CIDG program is continuing to prove its value as a stabilizing force in the complex war effort in Vietnam. It has proven to be a dollar-saving economy of force measure designed to establish GVN control in rural areas in addition to the assigned offensive missions. USASF Detachments are advising over 75,000 CIDG and RF/PT troops with an overall 5th Special Forces Group strength of 2,292. Throughout the quarter the kill ratio of known VC KIA to U.S. KIA has been 71.6:1. Despite the increased actions of NVA forces the VC/CIDG kill ratio has remained 4.3:1 for the quarter.

b. Significant CIDG Actions.

(1) The most significant operation has been mentioned previously: The battle of A Chau. Others worthy of mention are the 120mm mortar attack on Camp Khe Sanh, I Corps and Operation "Goodyear" conducted in Tay Ninh Province in II Corps (Incl 22).

(2) Other operations of significance are the successful operations conducted by Camp Dak Pek, and Camp Buon Ea Yang in II Corps. A company size patrol moved south of Dak Pek to the abandoned CIDG camp of Dak Sut, this being the first time that friendly forces had entered the area since the camp was overrun and lost in August 1965. A PRC-10 and substantial quantities of ammunition were discovered at the old camp site,

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indicating that after taking the camp the VC moved out and did not return. In another successful operation a combat patrol attacked a IVA/VMC bivouac area which resulted in 4 VC KIA, an undetermined number wounded; 2 81mm mortars, 2 small arms, and several documents were captured. Operations conducted from camp Buon Ea Yang resulted in 5 contacts with the VC. Ambush and stay behind tactics resulted in 16 VC KIA. After translation of a document found on the body of a VC Company Commander indicating the location of a VC unit, an operation was conducted. Upon reaching the objective an estimated VC battalion was encountered. The CIDG companies maneuvered into position and brought fire on the entrenched VC unit. Air strikes were conducted against the VC positions and upon arrival of reinforcements the CIDG continued the attack. Under this added pressure the VC broke contact and withdrew. Results of this operation were 130 VC KIA (confirmed). As a result of information obtained, subsequent operations resulted in 38 VC KIA, 5 VCC and large quantities of equipment and documents captured. Significant operations in IV Corps were the 2 VC battalion size attacks on Camp Tuyen Khon's FOB on 29 Jan, and 10 April (Incl 25 & 26) resulting in 269 VC KIA (confirmed), and the surrender of an ~~capture~~ VC platoon at Tinh Bien on 1 March (Incl 27).

c. Increases and Gains.

(1) Since 1 January, 8 new camps have been established, and three closed. A "B" Detachment, B-24 was established at Kontum, and assumed control of all operational "A" detachments in Kontum Province. B-25 was established at Pleiku and assumed control of all operational "A" detachments in Pleiku Province. A "B" detachment was also established at Quang Ngai in I Corps and assumed operational control of all "A" detachments in Quang Ngai Province. The advance party of a "B" detachment arrived at Kiep Hoa in III Corps, and are presently making an assessment of Duc Hve District, and planning for the movement of the remainder of the detachment. New camps were opened at Thuong Duc, Quang Nam Province; Ba Don, Tay Ninh Province; Go Da Ha, Tay Ninh Province; Ba Chuc, Chau Doc Province; and Don Phuc, Kien Phong Province. An "A" detachment arrived at I Corps and is slated to open the proposed camp at Minh Long in June. Three "A" detachments are presently deployed with other detachments in III Corps in order to gain additional experience and information prior to deployment to proposed new camps. Camps that have been closed are A Shau on 10 March 66 in Thua Thien Province, I Corps. Kannack, Binh Dinh Province, was closed on 8 January 66. Bao Loc, Lam Dong Province, was closed on 5 January 1966, and was relocated at Tan Rai. On 15 February MACV Subsector Team 25 assumed the subsector advisory mission for Hoai

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Nhon district, releasing the "A" detachment at Bong Son from the mission. With exception of one "A" detachment at Tien Phuoc in I Corps all "A" detachments have been replaced with PCS detachments. The CIDG program has decreased in strength during the last quarter. The total number of companies has increased from 215 at the end of last quarter to 218 at present. This represents a decrease in troop strength from 30,400 on 1 January to 28,694 at the end of the reporting period. This troop strength is spread over the entire country at 87 separate locations.

d. CIDG Losses.

The most significant loss of CIDG forces occurred during the attack on Camp A Shau. Casualties reported from Camp A Shau resulted in 191 CIDG/MIKE FORCE MIA of which 115 are believed KIA. There have been no other significant losses during the reporting period.

e. Joint RVAF/CIDG Operations.

Joint RVAF/CIDG operations are continuing to prove their value. Several successful joint operations have been conducted in I, II, and III Corps since last reporting period.

(1) I Corps RVAF/CIDG joint operations included providing FOB's from CIDG camps for "TIGERFOOT" projects and USMC Force Recon units. USMC helicopters from III MAF provided support in evacuating friendly forces at the battle of A Shau and resupplying into Camp Tien Phuoc until an airstrip was established. CIDG personnel were used as guides during Operations Orange and Virginia.

(2) In II Corps Camp Alei Djereng, Pleiku Province, operating north of the camp with elements of the 1st Cavalry Division on 14 January, encountered four EVA troops capturing one. Vanh Canh, operating jointly with an NOK Division, opened the road between Quin Nhon and Vanh Canh on 19 February. Other joint operations have been conducted with the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division along national Route 19 in the Mang Yang pass area with the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in the Tong Tre-Le Moi area.

(3) In III Corps area, two companies from the Mike Force in conjunction with elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, U.S. 1st Infantry Division, and 10th ARVN Division participated in Operation Silver City in War Zone "D" from 9-21 March. The two companies of the Mike Force, operating as an independent task force, made the first major contact of the

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operation on 13 March. During the area search operation they discovered a major political headquarters and fifteen houses. While a thirty man force was destroying this installation, it made contact with an estimated company of VC. One printing press, 10 tons of printing paper, 750 pounds of rice, and 15 buildings were destroyed.

f. Co-equal Sector/Subsector Role.

(1) There are no significant changes in the overall mission, which was reported on in the last Quarterly Command Report.

(2) Presently there are 37 "A" detachments in the Subsector role, and 7 "B" detachments in the Sector Role, this represents an increase of 2 "A" detachments in the Subsector role and 1 "B" detachment in the Sector role.

g. Mike Force.

(1) There is no change in the mission of the Mike Force since the last reporting period.

(2) The Detachment C-1 Mike Force located in Da Nang participated in the reinforcement of Camp A Shau. They were also deployed to reinforce threatened CIDG camps at Tra Bong, Ba To, and Khe Sanh and to provide initial camp security for the newly established sites at Thoung Duc and Tien Phuoc.

(3) During March, elements of the Detachment C-2 Mike Force at Pleiku were deployed to Bong Son, Poley Kleng and Buon Ea Yang. On 6 January, two Mike Force companies from Pleiku in II Corps arrived to reinforce an operation in an effort to clear the area between camp Dong Tre and District headquarters. The Mike Force company deployed at Bong Son was used primarily for internal security of the camp due to an inadequate strike force. An additional company reinforced CIDG at the new camp site of Poley Kleng. One company was deployed at Buon Ea Yang with initial mission of a reserve force for a CIDG operation. The company was committed with elements of camps An Lac and Lac Thien CIDG force to assault a VC base area to the east of Buon Ea Yang. This mission was accomplished with excellent results.

(4) In February, A-503 organized a Mike Force battalion at Nha Trang with an authorized strength of 594. The Nha Trang Mike Force company (149 personnel), 7 USASF and 6 interpreters were deployed at A Shau

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on 7 March to reinforce CIDG against an impending NVA attack. The NVA attack occurred on 9 March and continued for two days. The brunt of the assault was borne by the Mike Force and USASF within the camp.

(5) The Mike Force status in III Corps remains unchanged since last reporting period.

(6) The Detachment C-4 Mike Force was formed during this reporting period and was located at Don Phuc, Kien Phong Province. The USSF advisors were taken from IV Corps assets instead of the original plan of utilizing a new PCS team. On 1 February the Mike Force advisors moved into Don Phuc and in the latter part of the month received their first recruits. The present strength of the Mike Force is slightly more than 200 with additional recruits expected. All training is being conducted by the advisors at Don Phuc. The Mike Force has been deployed for short periods of time at Kinh Quan II and Phu Quoc Island.

h. Training.

(1) LLDB Class #6 started during the first quarter with 19 officers and 89 EM attending. The EM Basic Course graduated during the quarter, with all 89 EM graduating. The EM are presently undergoing specialist training and will complete the course on 23 May 1966. The LLDB Officer course is also scheduled to end on the same date. Instruction presented ranged from good to excellent. The Demo Specialist Course now being presented will increase the demolition capability of the "A" Detachments. The instructors in this committee are motivated, plan lessons carefully, and use training aids to the maximum extent.

(2) Two CIDG Leadership Classes graduated during the period. Class #13 started with 153 students of which 107 graduated and 45 received certificates of attendance. Class #14 started with 140 students attending and 140 graduated. Of class #14, 95 students were graduated as platoon leaders, and 45 as squad leaders. Class #14 was the first to receive the 5 week course. Class #15 commenced on 18 April 66 with 121 students attending and are now in the second week of training. USSF instructors taught all classes in tactics to class #13, with LLDB instructors observing. This block of instruction in prior classes was poorly planned and executed. It is to be noted that the tactics subjects taught during Class #14 by the LLDB instructors has greatly improved. The technique of instruction presented by the USSF during this phase of instruction has been copied by the tactics committee, whereas, training aids are being used to fullest extent and the practical exercise portion of these classes has become more realistic.

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(3) Two Combat Recon Platoon Classes graduated during the period. Class #11 started with 68 students and 67 graduated. One student was dropped due to sickness. Class #12 started with 139 students and 139 graduated. This was the first class that was increased to four platoons and increased from four to five weeks. Class #13 which began on 25 April 66 consisted of one platoon from each Corp area.

(4) A Basic Training Course for LLDB EM started on 29 April with 79 trainees. The course is six weeks long and upon successful completion, trainees will be enrolled in the LLDB Basic Course and Specialist Course.

i. Project Delta.

(1) Due to increased operational missions, the US personnel of Project Delta have been increased from 72 officers and men to 100 officers and men. The US element now parallels the Vietnamese Organizational Structure.

(2) In the past two operations, two different concepts of employment were introduced into Project Delta operations. The first concept was the infiltration of CIDG (Roadrunner) Teams in enemy areas of control. These teams, consisting of three to five lightly armed VII personnel in civilian clothing, walk roads and trails observing enemy activities. The second concept was the employment of the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion in search and destroy operations within the Tactical Areas of Responsibility of Project Delta.

(3) During the month of January Project Delta presented a short training program to members of the US 1st Infantry Division. A similar type program is scheduled for members of the 173rd Airborne Brigade in May. The USAF Air Liaison Officer and Forward Air Controller (and OLB aircraft) originally attached to the Project on a test basis were permanently assigned in February following operations in II and III Corps. The US Army 171st Aviation Airlift Platoon (10 HULB Helicopters) originally placed under OPCON of Project Delta has been returned to OPCON of the 5th SFG (Abn). Helicopters of the unit are attached to Delta as required. (Incl 22)

j. FULRO.

There were no FULRO activities during this reporting period. The 5th Special Forces Group Commander published a FULRO Policy Letter which is enclosed as Inclosure 8.

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4. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations.

a. During this quarter, the 5th Special Forces Group has initiated and completed actions in the fields of civil affairs and psychological operations (CA/PSYOP) that will have a far reaching impact on the effectiveness of future Special Forces operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). The training of USASF, VNSF, CIDG and civilian personnel, the implementation of new programs and techniques, providing practical CA/PSYOP guidance, and the distribution of PSYOP equipment, gives Special Forces personnel and their counterparts a foundation and direction in their CA/PSYOP programs that will enable them to significantly improve the overall effectiveness of their counterinsurgency operations.

b. The major contribution in the field of civil affairs/civic action during this period was the completion of The 5th Special Forces Group Civic Action Guide for Vietnam. The vast amount of information available on civic action, Revolutionary Development and the organization of the RVN was screened and compiled in a simple reference that provides Special Forces personnel with 110 pages of detailed, practical and logical information. This guide explains the Special Forces approach to CA and gives detachment personnel the necessary information to assist their counterparts in planning and implementing highly effective CA programs at district, village and hamlet levels. This guide meets a need which has long existed in the field of CA.

c. During the last quarter, an evaluation was made of the employment of CIDG CA/PSYOP Teams in an effort to develop within the CIDG an additional and effective means of conducting civic action and psychological operations. As a result of the successful employment of these units, the 5th Special Forces Group and its counterpart Headquarters developed a TO&E which authorizes one team for each CIDG camp (App. 2 to Incl 13). A joint memorandum was published which requires each CIDG camp to organize, train and employ a minimum of one CA/PSYOP Team (App. 1 to Incl 13). Montagnard CIDG personnel for these teams attend a 10 week course of instruction at the Montagnard Training Center in Pleiku. To date, 140 CIDG Montagnards have graduated from the course. In July, the Vietnamese Political Warfare School will present a six week training course for the Vietnamese CIDG members of these teams. This program will give Special Forces over 70 teams that have CA/PSYOPS as their primary mission. As these teams develop better skills, techniques and methods of operation, they will have a tremendous impact on the CA/PSYOP programs in detachment operational areas.

d. A school was conducted by the 5th Special Forces Group, 24 thru

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28 January for 42 USASF Non-Commissioned Officer's who were assigned to CA/PSYOP positions throughout the Group. The course was designed to give the NCO's a practical understanding of civic action and PSYOP activities at the "A" Detachment level (App. 3 to Incl 13). Action has been initiated through personnel requisitioning channels to insure that NCO's assigned to CA/PSYOP in the future are selected and trained at Fort Bragg before arriving in the RVN. US personnel trained in CA and PSYOP can make definite contributions to these programs in the RVN, however, consistent and effective CA/PSYOP, particularly PSYOP, must be developed and implemented in conjunction with trained Vietnamese. Recognizing this fact, coordination has been made with the Vietnamese Political Warfare School to conduct a six week CA/PSYOP course for VNSF personnel.

e. During the four month reporting period ending 30 April 1966, 4,261 civic action projects were completed in Special Forces operational areas. Included in this figure is the construction and/or repair of 47 schools, 50 dispensaries, 118 wells, 97 bridges, and 46 roads. Other projects include provision of relief supplies for over 18,385 refugees which moved into detachment operational areas, numerous medical patrols and other projects designed to gain the support of local civilians. USASF and VNSF Medics, and Special Forces trained Village Health Workers treated 230,497 patients in camp dispensaries and on medical patrols.

f. Special Forces has taken steps to improve the agricultural production of Montagnards who live in detachment operational areas. Realizing the impact that improved methods and techniques of agriculture can have in the highlands, Special Forces detachments encourage and assist the CIDG and local people to attend agriculture training courses. In the past four months 46 CIDG Montagnards graduated from the Montagnard Training Center and 90 civilians from "A" Detachment operational areas graduated from the Agriculture Training Center at Pleiku. Many Special Forces Camps have experimental garden plots which they use to introduce the people to a variety of vegetables, improved farm techniques and new farm tools. As an example, Camp Buon Ea Yang developed three garden plots and assisted over 1,000 relocatees in clearing and planting 947 hectares of land. To provide the people of the highlands with a much needed source of food, the 5th Special Forces Group organized, and is presently conducting a two week course of instruction at Nha Trang in the techniques of building fish ponds and raising fish. Forty CIDG personnel and hamlet chiefs from the highlands have graduated from the course during this quarter.

g. The 5th Special Forces Group PSYOP activities continued to increase in effectiveness and intensity. During the quarter, 23 million

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leaflets and over 185,000 publications such as bulletins, magazines, posters and newspapers were distributed in Special Forces operational areas. The Camp Tien Bien CA/PSYOP NCO and his counterpart produced a bi-monthly newspaper designed specifically for the VC. It is called "The Truth". In January five VC returned to GVN control carrying a copy of the newspaper. Portable loudspeakers, tape recorders and mimeograph machines are being distributed to all detachments to improve the capability of Special Forces personnel and their counterparts to carry out more timely and effective propaganda in the local villages and hamlets.

h. The CIDG Motivation Team was expanded in April from 40 cadre to 55 cadre, thereby increasing its training capability. Organized into 12 five man units, it is now capable of training 680 men per month. During this quarter a total of 1,047 CIDG, 101 PF soldiers and five local officials received motivational training.

i. The Motivation and Indoctrination Program, employing highly skilled cadre, is only one approach used by Special Forces to motivate CIDG troops. Special Forces has initiated an information program in each CIDG camp. This program requires the camp commander to present information periods twice a week to the CIDG. Lesson plans for each period are prepared by USASF and VNSF Headquarters and distributed in English and Vietnamese. This program, in which the Camp Commander talks directly to the troops, conveys the commander's interest in the welfare of the CIDG troops, improves their loyalty and awareness, and increases their dependability in combat. Appendix 4 to Inclosure 13 is the joint memorandum establishing the program and Appendix 5 to Inclosure 13 is an example of one of the lesson plans.

j. Appendix 1 thru 4 of Inclosure 14 provide typical examples of how Special Forces integrates civil affairs and psychological operations during all four phases of its operations.

5. Personnel Administrative Activities.

a. Authorized Personnel Changes.

(1) The Troop Unit Change Request (TUCR) of 6 November 1965, requesting an increase in strength of 88 personnel to support the expansion of the operational mission of the Studies and Operations Group (SOG) was disapproved in January 1966. A Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) was submitted to Hqs USAFV requesting an increase of 15 officers and 72 enlisted men to SOG. In addition this MTOE requested authorization of an Airmobile Company consisting of 13 officers, 15 warrant officers, and

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87 enlisted men. Headquarters, USAFV, forwarded this MTOE to COMUSMACV on 2 March 1966 recommending approval.

(2) This headquarters is in the process of forwarding to Hq USAFV an MTOE requesting an increase in strength of 149 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 466 enlisted men. This increase is in addition to that cited in subparagraph 5a(1) above, and is broken down as follows:

	<u>CURRENT AUTHORIZATION</u>			<u>PROPOSED AUTHORIZATION</u>		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
HQ CO	59	4	203	71	7	276
CO A	80	0	278	110	0	321
CO B	87	0	272	110	0	321
CO C	85	0	275	110	0	321
CO D	85	0	276	110	0	321
CO E	4	3	191	4	3	194
Sp Op Unit 1				23	0	146
Sp Op Unit 2				11	0	61
	<u>400</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>1495</u>	<u>549</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>1961</u>

(3) This necessary increase has been directed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by COMUSMACV.

b. Inclosure 2 shows the attrition rate for the first quarter of 1966. These figures are valid; however, to evaluate the kill ratio of USAF personnel for the first quarter of 1966 with the like period for 1965 one must consider the increased USAF exposure rate in cognizance with the recent escalation of combat activity. The following figures provide an accurate comparison of the two quarters:

	<u>ASSIGNED STRENGTH</u>	<u>USAF KIA</u>	<u>% OF ASSIGNED STR</u>
31 March 1965	1338	5	.004%
31 March 1966	2164	22	.007%

c. On 1 January 1966 we had 9 "A" Detachments TDY to the Group from the 1st Special Forces Group in Okinawa. Eight of these teams have been replaced with PCS teams from Fort Bragg. The remaining TDY team will be replaced with a PCS team in May 1966. During the third quarter FY 66 a total of 3 "B" Detachments and 18 "A" Detachments have been received in PCS packets from Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

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d. Critical MOS shortages have been made up with the exception of MOS 05C2P (Radio Teletype Operator) which continues in short supply. Although this technical skill shortage has not affected the operational ability of the group to date, it could very well impede the expansion plans of the future.

6. Logistical Activities.

a. General.

(1) Logistical activities increased significantly during the period 1 Jan thru 30 Apr 66. The Logistical Support Center continued to provide overall logistical support to the Special Forces operational detachments and the CIDG spread out in an ever increasing number of locations throughout the Republic of Vietnam. The Logistical Support Center continued to operate with approximately 75 US personnel, 40 Phillipino maintenance technicians and slightly more than 300 indigenous helpers.

(2) During the reporting period the flexibility of the Special Forces supply system was tested by a significant buildup in the number of Special Forces detachments including an additional C detachment. The tonnage of supplies and equipment distributed by air to the operational detachments in the field increased 30%.

(3) Plans continued for decentralizing the supply system down to the C detachment level for support of the operational detachments in each Corps area. A 15 day level of selected fast moving items will be provided to each C detachment with first priority going to Detachment C-4 in Can Tho as soon as additional warehouse facilities are completed. Stockage levels at the Logistical Support Center are being raised 50% in anticipation of this decentralization.

(4) Because of the difficulties encountered in obtaining replenishment of Class V due to a shortage of LST support, plans were effected for moving the CIDG ammunition stocks to Cam Rahn Bay from Okinawa with a target date of 1 July.

b. Air Movement.

(1) The total tonnage hauled by Air movements during the first quarter 1966 was slightly more than 23 million pounds or an increase of 73%. A new record in the amount of cargo moved in one month by LSC was set in March - 9.3 million pounds.

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(2) During the reporting period a total of 6 emergency re-supply missions were effected by aerial delivery of emergency supplies to detachment in the field within 5 hours after receipt of the request.

(3) CV-2B Caribou aircraft were provided to the C detachments in order to provide them with the increased capability of shuttling supplies from their locations. A commensurate increase in the use of C-130's with their larger hauling capacity was utilized in hauling cargo to the C detachments. Approximately 20% of the total cargo hauled was airdropped or lolexed and the balance airlanded, with first priority going to newly established camps.

(4) Testing of the CV-7 Buffalo which assisted the Air Movements Section in hauling supplies was completed during the reporting period. The CV-7 was considered a valuable asset for Special Forces logistical support operations.

c. Supply. The supply branch of the Logistical Support Center continued to improve its operating capability in order to meet the increased demands placed upon its staff in conjunction with the buildup. The physical plant of the stock records section was expanded. New offices were built for the Supply Officer, the Food Service Officer and the hand receipt section. A customer service area was added in order to provide a working area to personnel with supply problems. Security of the supply storage area was improved by the completion of a fence around the entire area, the initiation of a pass system for individuals desiring to enter the area, and the addition of sentry dogs during the hours of darkness.

d. Maintenance.

(1) During the reporting period ~~the~~ number of Philippino maintenance technicians was increased from 78 to 132 in order to satisfy the demands of the programmed expansion. These additional personnel will provide up to a 3rd echelon capability to the B detachment to which they are assigned and will provide the B detachment and the attached A detachments the maintenance support required for continuous operations.

(2) In conjunction with the additional maintenance technicians, repair parts are being provided to the C and B detachments in order to keep the various makes and models of equipment utilized in the CIDG program operational. These parts are now on order and a separate warehouse is going to be constructed at the Logistical Support Center for stockage.

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(3) The weapons repair facility was expanded providing a depot maintenance capability for the weapons used in the CIDG program.

(4) During the period a total of 858 minor and 107 major repairs were accomplished by the maintenance section at the Logistical Support Center. Due to the increasing number of items to be maintained, work has begun to enlarge the shop facilities.

e. Construction: Construction activities also expanded in conjunction with the buildup. 13 construction projects were completed and another 8 initiated at the Group Headquarters in Nha Trang alone while all C Detachments have also been increasing their physical facilities. An additional 12 A detachments and 4 B detachments were provided with the necessary construction materials for their new installations. During the opening of Xom Cat in War Zone D, approximately 350,000 pounds of supplies consisting of mostly construction materials were delivered by air in the first week.

f. Food Service:

(1) A menu printed in Vietnamese was provided to the operational detachments as a guide for requesting indigenous "A" type rations. The menu was based on a daily diet of 2,800 to 3,000 calories a day for indigenous personnel.

(2) Electric freezers are being issued to operational detachments in remote locations for storage of frozen foods because freezer compartments of refrigerators are too small for bulk storage of frozen provisions for US Personnel. A 500 cubic foot freezer has been placed at Camp Goodman in Saigon for storage of frozen commissary items that are purchased by detachment personnel and are awaiting shipment to the field. A 2¹/₂ ton refrigerator truck has been placed on request for Camp Goodman. This truck will be utilized to transport frozen items to the aircraft and will reduce spoilage in the event a flight is cancelled. Additional 150 cu ft refrigerators have been placed on request and will be distributed to "B" and "C" team level for the storage of frozen foods in support of the "A" detachments.

(3) A total of 125 kerosene three burner stoves at \$14.50 each have been ordered to replace butane gas stoves now used by all "A" detachments because of the short supply of butane gas. All butane gas stoves will be redistributed to "B" and "C" detachments in order to reduce the shuttling of butane bottles back and forth by aircraft.

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(4) A ranch type corral has been completed near Dien Khanh (Det A-502) in order to graze cattle for feeding the CIDG. Cattle are being procured from the Province Chief, Tuy Hoa, Phu Yen.

(5) Food Service has found that under the present TOE there is a shortage of mess personnel. A new TD has been requested to add eight additional mess personnel to the eight Group presently has in their TOE. Also a request has been added for two (553 MOS) Ration Break-down ECO's for the Class I warehouse.

(6) At present Food Service has a canned type meat under test at A-502. This meat will, if approved, be kept on hand at each "A" team. It will be issued and consumed only during emergencies and can be consumed hot or cold.

7. Aircraft Support.

a. General. The aircraft supporting the 5th Special Forces Group are three classes: Command and Control, Cargo and Special Mission. The increase in new camps and personnel has led to a greater requirement for all classes of aircraft. During the reporting period there have been marked improvements in the aircraft support received by the group, but there is still a greater need for all three classes of support as outlined below.

(1) Command and Control Aircraft. During this period the group has continued to receive 3 ULA (Otter) aircraft for Command and Control purposes. Two of these are provided at Nha Trang and one is provided to the LNO in Saigon. These aircraft also provide a small logistical capability for the transportation of sensitive or security items such as communication equipment which is usually transported to the camps in conjunction with command visits. In addition to the Otters, some of the Command requirements, especially at the "C" Detachment level, has been satisfied by the addition of the 171st Aviation Company. This company, which resulted from a combination of the 145th Aviation Plt and the 171st Aviation Plt, was placed under the operational control of the group in March 1966. It provides 20 HULB Helicopters for command purposes as well as for special missions. At the present time 4 HULBs, one per Corps area, are provided to the "C" Detachment commanders; 3 HULBs are allocated to the C-5 Detachment, and the remainder are utilized for the special mission of supporting the Delta Project operations. While the allocation of 4 helicopters to the "C" Detachments provides some relief for that level of command, there still exists a definite need for more helicopter support to the Corps areas. Subsequent helicopter

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additions to the 171st Aviation Company should help to remedy the situation, since it is projected that 2 HULBs will be allocated to each Corps area under the operational control of the "CG" Detachment commander.

(2) Cargo Aircraft.

(a) CV-2B and C-123 Aircraft: Despite continuous requests for additional CV-2B and C-123 aircraft support based on the projected build-up, the 5th SFG receives an average of 3 CV-2Bs and 4 C-123s on a daily basis. Normally each aircraft averages 3 trips daily; the CV-2B carries a payload of 5,000 lbs and the C-123 carries a payload of 10,000 lbs, which gives the Air Movements Section a daily capability of moving 165,000 lbs utilizing these direct support aircraft. Based on current commitments and projections the daily capability must reach a 300,000 lbs figure. This capability could be reached with the addition of 3 C-123 and 1 CV-2B aircraft on a daily basis, or by the commitment of 1 C-130 aircraft in direct support of the group. This latter capability would allow the LSC to establish a more decentralized supply system by giving it the opportunity to ship in bulk to C-1 at Daman, C-3 at Bien Hoa and C-4 at Can Tho. Each of the C-4 sections of these detachments is presently experiencing good local aircraft support at their locations. While the majority of the support missions flown by the CV-2Bs and C-123s are airdrop missions, they still maintain their airdrop capability and are given sufficient opportunities to accomplish airdrops monthly. During the reporting period the utilization rates in pounds by aircraft are outlined below:

JAN-APR	CV-2B (DAAF Incl)	C-123
Airland	6,369,306	7,835,284
Airdrop	287,533	2,063,787
Lolex	12,800	0
Total	6,669,639	9,919,071

(b) C-130 Aircraft: As mentioned above, utilization of the C-130 aircraft is the key to a more fluid logistical system within the 5th SFG and to meeting a daily requirement of 300,000 lbs of cargo daily from the LSC to the camps throughout Vietnam. At the present time there are approximately 16 SF locations with C-130 airfield capabilities, and several others that are in the process of being approved for this capability. It is the plan of the Engineer Teams organic to this group, to extend as many C-123 strips to a C-130 capability as the opportunity affords itself. All new construction of camp air strips by these Engineer teams is projected for a C-130 capability, where possible. The utilization figures listed below should

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indicate the exceptional overall capability of this aircraft with its allowable cargo load of 25,000-30,000 lbs. These figures are based on C-130 aircraft utilization for specific mission requirements which averaged less than one per day during the reporting period. It is conceivable that with a C-130 aircraft in direct support of the group, a normal monthly utilization figure of over 6,000,000 lbs could be easily achieved. This aircraft also has an outstanding airdrop capability, and can be utilized to drop using the standard modular platform heavy drop system, the container delivery system (12 A-22 containers; 18,000-25,000 lbs payload, using either C-13 or C-12 parachutes) or special systems such as the Parachute Low Altitude Delivery System (PLADS) and the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES). This airdrop capability would be greatly advantageous during the build-up phase of new camps, since we could airdrop large vehicles and large quantities of supplies to the new camp during the most critical phase (as experienced at Don Cat).

C-130 Utilization Figures:

JAN - MAR	Airland:	5,693,438
	Airdrop:	31,488

8. Medical.

a. Outline of Medical Activities:

(1) Medical Training Teams: Four (4), three (3) man training from the 1st SFG, Okinawa, were deployed one to each "C" Detachment. They have conducted 5 day refresher courses for USASF medics at the "A" and "B" Detachment level. At present they are conducting a 2 week basic Medical course for CIDG medics at the "A" and "B" Detachment level. Upon completion of this phase of their mission they will conduct a 6 week course of instruction for Hamlet Health Workers (Vietnamese Civilian Sub-professional Health Personnel) from a standardized PCI prepared by the Group Surgeon's Office. If this final phase of training is successful, similar courses will be produced two or three times a year by USASF medics in areas needing Hamlet Health Workers where CVN is unable to provide training. Plans are being made to request four more training teams from the 1st SFG for 6 months with the 5th SFG to carry out a mission similar to that described above.

(2) Medical Operations Section has prepared necessary PCI's and lesson plans to cover all aspects of the 5th SFG medical program. Copies of these have been made available to all "C" Detachment Surgeons and a central library is being maintained in the Group Surgeon's operations section. These

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will be periodically revised and current indexes made available to all Detachments so that medics can requisition this material as needed.

(b) Training aids applicable to medical subjects available through all military and civilian channels in country have been procured and samples distributed to all "C" Detachments with information on requisitioning additional materials. In this way it is hoped all Detachments can be kept current on aids available to them and procurement procedures.

b. Preventive Medicine Activities:

(1) The Preventive Medicine Officer has coordinated with and assisted civilian authorities in the investigation and management of several plague epidemics. Of greatest importance in this regard is the rapid dissemination of timely spot reports from USASF medics in the field to appropriate USAID and GVN Health Officials.

(2) In the local area, the Preventive Medicine Section responded to a Cholera outbreak in Nha Trang with an immunization program for indigenous personnel in the Group Headquarters and nearby Special Forces Detachments.

(3) The Veterinary Officer, TDY from the 1st SFG, responded to three reports of animal epidemics in the vicinity of CIDG camps in I, II, and IV Corps, providing information to GVN Animal Husbandry Authorities and assisting in treatment.

c. Current Activities:

(1) Medical Cross Training Program: To maintain a high level of First Aid Training and proficiency for all 5th SFG personnel. A PCI for refresher First Aid Training of non-medical personnel was distributed from the Office of the Surgeon. The course is 14 hours in length and is to be repeated at 6 month intervals by "A" and "B" Detachment medics for all assigned personnel. Emphasis on this program was directed by the Group Commander at the "C" Detachment Commanders' Conference.

(2) CIDG Dispensary and Convalescent Ward: The large number of CIDG personnel in Nha Trang and the increase in medical evacuation of CIDG personnel from camps in Southern II Corps to Nha Trang raised the requirement for a CIDG convalescent ward such as exists at the "C" Detachments. Approval has been given for a pre-fabricated building to house this 30 bed facility. Final plans are presently being made with the LLDB Surgeon

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to locate this facility in the LLDB compound in Nha Trang and to staff it jointly with LLDB and 5th SFG medics and physicians. Advanced training for CIDG medics will also be conducted here.

(3) LLDB Medical Re-organization:

(a) The Group Surgeon has rendered assistance to the LLDB Surgeon in the areas of:

1. Plans for improving the training of LLDB medics.
2. More efficient utilization of LLDB medical resources.
3. Definition of goals the LLDB medical program seeks to achieve.
4. Request for additional personnel and equipment to achieve the above.

(b) Efforts have been made to conform closely to USASF policies while taking cognizance of the LLDB limitations and to find a workable compromise between the two.

d. Medical Supply: A list of critical items has been formulated, the amounts of which will be reported monthly from the "C" Detachments to insure that adequate levels do exist in country. This will serve as a basis for initiating emergency requests out-of-country for medical supplies.

9. Signal.

a. Total traffic count continued to increase during the reporting period, however the increase per month has been gradual in comparison to the sharp rise experienced during November and December of the preceding quarter. A total of 3,423 messages were handled by the SFCB Com-Center, where as the Com-Centers at subordinate headquarters handled a total of 2,155 messages. A continuing increase is expected with the increase of A and B Detachments, increased number of Forward Operation Bases, and the improved communications capability provided by radio sets AN/PRC-64 and AN/PRC-74.

b. The AN/PRC-64 radio set has provided highly reliable communications in support of the saturation patrolling concept. This lightweight, dry cell battery operated set is providing CW communications over distances

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from 20 to 200 kilometers. The voice capability of the set has been very unreliable over distances from 0-50 kilometers. The only disadvantage noted to date, is the antenna system. Elements of the command are experimenting with a whip type antenna, which if acceptable will greatly reduce the time required to install the long wire type antenna presently utilized. It was assumed that the set would satisfy the Delta Project requirement for reliable short distance voice, and long distance CW communications, however this has proven otherwise, due to the inherent skip tendencies of the set and the time required to place in operation (15-20 minutes).

c. Sufficient AN/PRC-25 radio sets are now on hand to issue these to each operational detachment. This set has greatly improved the over all FM communications capability in support of air to ground and ground to ground operations. It has enabled the operational detachments to extend patrol actions over distances which could not be realized due to the limited range of radio sets AN/PRC-10 and HT-1A. Plans have been formulated which will eventually eliminate all AN/PRC-10 radios from the group inventory and replaced by the PRC-25.

d. The requirement for radio set AN/PRC-74 becomes more critical with the increase of Project Delta operations, increased number of Forward Operation Bases and the shortage and maintenance problems experienced with the present single side band equipment (AN/FRC-93). Project Delta does not have the capability to establish reliable communications between the Forward Operations Base and Deployed Recon Teams. At present FM is utilized through an airborne relay station. The AN/PRC-74 will provide direct voice and CW communications between the two locations over short (0-20 K's) distances. The requirement to establish FCB's to control and extend operational areas has materially increased the need for a side band set which does not require a generator power source. The AN/PRC-74 will satisfy the requirement. Further, the constant maintenance problems inherent with the commercially manufactured AN/FRC-93, and its requirement for generator power, has reduced the set's capability of providing reliable communications. This is particularly true when a camp is under attack. The radio requires a doublet or long wire antenna which are vulnerable to ground and mortar fire and will if destroyed, render the set inoperative. If each operational detachment is issued one AN/PRC-74, it can be utilized for long range communications with the base camp and a float side band set for the AN/FRC-93.

e. A Crypto Material Distribution Agency (DISMA) was established by this headquarters effective 15 April 1966. This Distribution Agency will provide the advantages listed:

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(1) A more efficient method of distribution will be effected. Prior to 15 April all Crypto Custodians were compelled to travel to Saigon each month to receipt for crypto material to support operations for the following month. This was time consuming. Couriers assigned to the DISTRA will deliver all material to the C and B Detachments which will eliminate time and afford greater security and control.

(2) In that this headquarters has one account and a number of sub accounts, the number of crypto devices authorized will be increased. This will provide a realistic maintenance float which enhances the over all maintenance capability. In the past the SFCB and each C Detachment maintained separate accounts, which reduces the number of floats authorized to each Crypto Facility.

(3) The DISTRA at this headquarters eliminates the numerous reports which each C Detachment crypto custodian was required to submit. All reports, except feeder reports, will be accomplished by the DISTRA.

(4) The procedure of establishing one account with sub accounts (B and C Detachments) places the responsibility for the material directly on the user, thus improving security and control measures.

10. CIDG Finance.

a. At the start of the third quarter 1966, the 5th Special Forces Group had received confirmation from Department of the Army that its expansion program (and the funds to support the expansion) was approved. The expansion was begun in the latter weeks of the second quarter and its effects were beginning to be felt in the financial field. The approval of the additional \$21 million eased the situation in the in-country portion of the budget especially. Along with the expansion of Special Forces was also the continuing buildup of United States and Free World forces in general. It became more apparent each day of the third quarter that costs generally were spiraling upward as the demand for food, supplies, equipment, construction materials, and services increased with the addition of each US and Free World unit. The cost of living index in one month alone rose 48% during the third quarter. Examples of the inflationary trends were felt mostly in food and construction materials with primary interest on meat and lumber, both of which have nearly tripled in cost since May 1965.

b. Too, the civilian work forces were dealing, so to speak, with United States units. United States civilian business concerns were obtaining

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the more qualified and skilled workers to their employ with better wage rates they were able to offer. As a result a study was conducted during March and a small pay increase of \$6 per month was recommended for all employees in an attempt to retain long standing employees and to attempt to compete in the labor market.

c. With regard to the rising cost of supplies and materials, money-saving methods were employed in an attempt to achieve as much dollar value as possible for each dollar spent. Supply personnel began searching in various areas of the country for sources of lumber at more reasonable prices. Cattle in herds are being purchased at a tremendous savings in meat costs rather than buying heads as needed. Although the initial outlay of funds is substantial by such a purchase, the cost per head of cattle is 1/3 of the cost previously experienced. Buyers traveled to the Delta region to purchase rice @ \$3 less a bag than local purchase prices. These are but a few of numerous instances in which cost-consciousness was applied in an effort to stem inflation. In each case however, costs were found to be still rising over the May 1965 level.

d. The recruiting of CIDG Strike Force personnel continued at an increasing pace but was falling short of the 150 man per company goal. It was decided to reduce the goal to 132 men companies and in so doing would serve a two-fold purpose, namely, (1) come in line with recruiting potentialities, and (2) align the CIDG company structure with that of the Regional Force/Popular Force structure. This latter purpose would also provide for a smoother conversion of troops from CIDG to RF/PF when the situation presented itself. As a result of the reduction of 18 men per company it necessarily followed that a corresponding decrease in funds were needed for pay and allowances and subsistence in the in-country portion and less weapons, etc., were being issued from out-of-country funds. A study was conducted on this matter during March which resulted in a message to Department of Army to withhold \$4 million from the fourth quarter authorization of funds.

e. A Department of the Army team visited the Group during January 1966 with the express purpose of determining how switchback funds were being expended, were any savings being made, and what procedures were being utilized to correctly monitor the budget. Upon inspection of the procedures, the team learned that: (1) adequate controls were established and utilized, (2) limitations were being placed on expenditure authorizations and were being monitored to insure adherence to limitations, and (3) excess of nearly \$1.5 million was expected from the in-country portion of the budget as a result

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of savings made. Permission was granted by the team to defer any commitments on excess funds until 1 April 66.

f. It is anticipated that costs will not reduce during the forth quarter and may continue to rise during the remainder of the calendar year. Continued use of management tools and an air of cost-consciousness will be applied to produce effective dollar expenditures in the CIDG program.

11. Future Plans.

a. Conversion to Regional Force: It is proposed to convert three camps on 1 July. Two of these camps are in II CTZ, Plei Do Lin and a camp to be announced at a later date. The third camp being An Phu in IV CTZ.

b. The 5th Special Forces Group is currently submitting an ~~MOE~~ which when approved will be considered adequate. There are no plans for further expansion of the CIDG program.


c. It is planned to request an increase from 249 CIDG companies authorized by the end of this fiscal year to 300 CIDG companies. This is to provide four companies per CIDG camp.

d. As large conventional units move into an area, the CIDG camps will be phased out or relocated to areas where the population has not been pacified or have not been in contact with GVN.

e. It is planned to request the Airmobile company and the Engineer Augmentation units be organic to the 5th Special Forces Group on or about 1 June.

f. Project Delta will be employed 30-45 days ahead of a planned operation as an intelligence gathering element. They will also be employed as a long range patrol for large conventional units. They will not operate in close proximity to large conventional units as a screening force.

10 Incls
a/s


WILLIAM A. MCKEAN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF-C

3 March 1966

SUBJECT: Standards of Personal Appearance

TO: See Distribution

1. It has been brought to the attention of this command that the standards of personal appearance are not being upheld by many personnel stationed in Vietnam. In a letter dated 28 Jan 66, General Westmoreland has indicated that he is disturbed, lest the overall mission undermine the basic soldierly qualities of physical fitness and military appearance.

2. I know that the Special Forces trooper adheres to the highest standards of physical fitness, personal appearance, and military conduct. Only in exceptional and isolated instances, have I seen anything to the contrary.

3. It is a command responsibility to initiate immediate corrective measures concerning any personnel found deficient in his soldierly bearing or physical fitness. I am confident our standards will remain high as we continue to fulfill our mission.

s/William A. McKean
t/WILLIAM A. MCKEAN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

"A"

INCLOSURE 1 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS
CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

TOTAL CASUALTY FIGURES FOR 1st QTR 1966

KIA	22
WIA	77
MEDEVAC TO COMUS	4
MIA	3

KIA RATIO

	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>
VO/US	74:1	51:1	76:1	71.6:1

WIA RATIO

	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>
USASF KIA/WIA	13/132	23/132	34/201	22/77
VC KIA/WIA	963/316	1153/530	2566/730	848/173

INCLOSURE 2 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS
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COMPARATIVE CIDG/VC CASUALTY FIGURES

	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>
KIA	93	396	657	230

KIA RATIO

	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>
VC/CIDG	10.3:1	2.9:1	3.9:1	4:1

INCLOSURE 3 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS
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HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF-C

20 April 1966

SUBJECT: TO&E CIDG Guerrilla Company (Light)

TO: See Distribution

1. TO&E 1-66, CIDG Guerrilla Company (Light) this headquarters, dated 1 Jan 66, is hereby superseded.
2. This new TO&E is effective upon receipt.
3. Commanders concerned will begin immediate conversion to this new organization.
4. Requests for changes or exceptions to this new TO&E will be submitted to this headquarters, ATTN: S-3, with supporting information and will not be implemented without prior approval.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl:

1. Summary of Changes
2. TO&E 1-66 (Revised)

s/William I. Parks, Jr.
t/WILLIAM I. PARKS, JR.
Captain, Infantry
Assistant Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

"A"

INCLOSURE 4 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS
CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

Summary of Changes

1. Implementing Instructions:

a. The organizational change will be initiated upon receipt of this TO&E.

b. The equipment changes will occur only upon notification that a camp has been selected for conversion to RF; but not prior to 90 days preceeding the conversion date. At that time, equipment excess to TO&E 2-66 will be turned in, and additional equipment authorized by that TO&E may then be requisitioned.*

*The following items may be requisitioned at any time:

- (1) 132 Canteens w/cover (to provide two per man).
- (2) 132 Harness, Load Bearing.
- (3) 88 Entrenching tools (to provide one per man).

2. PURPOSE: The logistical changeover, by camp, is designed to accomplish the following:

a. Authorize camps to keep their present firepower until necessary to convert.

b. To minimize and "even-out" the logistical impact on the L.S.C.

3. RECAPITULATION OF CHANGES:

a. PERSONNEL:

(1) Take wpns sqds from the 3 rifle platoons, combine them to form a Weapons Platoon.

(2) Take two personnel from the 27 now in the new Weapons Platoon, transfer them to Co Hqs.

(3) Strength should now be:

Co Hqs	11
3 Rifle Plt Hqs	15
9 Rifle Squads	81
Weapons Plt	<u>25</u>

132 Total

Incl # 1

(4) Individual Position/Title Changes

(a) Company Headquarters

- 1 delete aidman
- 2 add one cook
- 3 add one company clerk
- 4 add one driver

(b) 3 Rifle Platoon Headquarters

- 1 convert 3 riflemen/messengers to M-79 Gunners

(c) 9 Rifle Squads

- 1 delete 9 AR men, make them Asst Sqd Ldrs
- 2 delete 9 Asst AR men, make them "Rifle Team Chiefs"

(d) Weapons Platoon Organization

1 Plt Hqs

Title

A Sample
Recommended Source

- | | |
|---------------------|------------------------------|
| <u>a</u> Plat ldr | 1 of 3 wpns sqd ldrs |
| <u>b</u> Plat Sgt | 3rd of 3 mortar gunners |
| <u>c</u> Radio Oper | 1st of 6 mortar ammo bearers |

2 Mortar Section

Title

A Sample
Recommended Source

- | | |
|-------------------------------|--|
| <u>a</u> Section ldr | 2nd of 3 wpns sqd ldrs |
| <u>b</u> Squad leader (2) | 2nd and 3rd of the 3 mort gunners |
| <u>c</u> Mortar gunner (2) | 2 of 3 asst mort gunners |
| <u>d</u> Asst mort gunner (2) | 1 old asst mort gunner
2nd of 6 mort ammo bearers |
| <u>e</u> Ammo Bearer (4) | Last 4 of 6 mortar ammo bearers |

Incl # 1

3 Machine Gun Section

<u>Title</u>	<u>A Sample Recommended Source</u>
<u>a</u> Section ldr	3rd of 3 wpns sqd ldrs
<u>b</u> Squad ldr (2)	2 old machine gunners
<u>c</u> Machine gunner (2)	3rd of 3 assigned 1 of 3 asst machine gunners
<u>d</u> Asst machine gunner(2)	2 of 3 assigned
<u>e</u> Ammo bearer (4)	4 of 6 assigned

Note: The last two m.g. ammo bearers are to be transferred to Co Hqs.

4. EQUIPMENT CHANGES (upon notification of conversion but not prior to 90 days preceding).

a. Delete

Vest, carrying, magazine, SMG	23
LMG	1
BAR	9
Mortar, 60mm	1
Carbine, M-1	51
SMG	23
Magazine, SMG	161
Pouch, magazine, SIG	46
Bag, ammo, 60mm mortar	2
Binoculars	6
Cookpot.	11
Magazine, BAR	72
Magazine, carbine, 15 rd	98
Pouch, magazine carbine	42

Incl # 1

b. Add

Launcher, Grenade M-79	3
Carbine, M-2	37
Pistol, Cal .45	4
Rifle, M-1	38
Launcher, Grenade M-7	11
Bayonet, M-5	38
Bayonet, Carbine, M-4	6
Canteen w/cover*	132
Machete w/sheath	2
Magazine, Pistol, Cal .45	33
Pouch, Magazine, pistol	11
Shovel, entrenching, w/cover*	88
Harness, load bearing*	132

*May be requisitioned at any time.

CIDG GUERRILLA COMPANY (LIGHT)

Designation: CIDG Guerrilla Company _____ (Light)

Section I. General:

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Organization - - - - -	1
Equipment - - - - -	2

II. Organization (Personnel):

Distribution - - - - -	3
Recapitulation - - - - -	4
Remarks- - - - -	5

III. Equipment:

Distribution - - - - -	5
Recapitulation - - - - -	8
Remarks- - - - -	9

SECTION I

GENERAL

ORGANIZATION

1. MISSION:

- a. Conduct harassment and interception along border corridors against Viet Cong infiltrators from Laos, Cambodia and North of the 17th Parallel into the Republic of Vietnam.
- b. Harass and conduct raids against Viet Cong secret zones and bases.
- c. Harass and intercept the Viet Cong on their inland commo-liaison routes connecting one zone to another.
- d. Collect intelligence information on the areas mentioned in a and b above.
- e. Participate in special operations prescribed by the Joint General Staff.

2. ASSIGNMENT: Based on geographical areas as directed by Headquarters Vietnamese Special Forces High Command in conjunction with HQ, 5th SF GP (Abn), 1st SF.

3 CAPABILITIES: a. At full strength, this unit has the following capabilities:

- (1) Conduct raids, ambushes, and combat and intelligence patrols.
- (2) Search and seizure operations on a limited scale.
- (3) Small scale conventional combat operations.
- (4) Conduct of basic psychological operations; i.e., distribution of leaflets, face-to-face meetings, assistance in all types of civic action programs, etc.
- (5) Production of intelligence for its own use and in response to the commanders EEL.

b. As noted in the remarks section, additional equipment provides this unit with the capability of establishing reconnaissance and surveillance screens (CIDG Border Surveillance Mission).

c. The unit is capable of defending itself and its installations.

4. MOBILITY. Mobility of this unit is dependent upon outside sources as no vehicles are organic.

5. APPLICABILITY. This TOE will be utilized by all detachments under the operational control of Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st SF, in organizing units under the CIDG Program. Units will be commanded by Vietnamese Special Forces.

EQUIPMENT

1. This table is the authority to requisition and issue in accordance with procedures directed by Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

2. Individual allowance for all grades are listed in paragraph 05 of Section III.

SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

INDEX

<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LT</u>	<u>MSG1C</u>	<u>MSG</u>	<u>CPL1C</u>	<u>CPL</u>	<u>PFC</u>	<u>NOTE</u>
01		Headquarters	11							
	01	Company CO	1	1						03/01
	02	Company XO	1		1					03
	03	1st Sgt	1			1				02
	04	Supply Clerk	1						1	02
	05	Armorer	1				1			04
	06	Cook	1					1		02
	07	OW Radio Operator	2				1	1		02
	08	SWB Operator	1					1		02
	09	Co Clerk	1						1	02
	10	Driver	1						1	04
02		Rifle Platoon (3)	15							
	01	Platoon Leader	3			3				03
	02	Platoon Sgt	3				3			03
	03	Platoon Aidman	3					3		02
	04	Radio Operator	3					1	2	02
	05	M-79 Gunner	3					3		08
03		Rifle Squads (9)	81							
	01	Squad Leader	9				9			03
	02	Asst Squad Leader	9					9		02
	03	BAR Gunner	9					9		05
	04	Asst BAR Gunner	9						9	04

<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LT</u>	<u>MSG1C</u>	<u>MSG</u>	<u>OPL1C</u>	<u>OPL</u>	<u>PD</u>	<u>NOTE</u>
	05	Rifleman Team Chief	9						9	03
	06	Rifleman	36						36	03 {5) 04 {27) 05 { }
04		Weapon Platoon	3							
	01	Platoon Leader	1			1				03
	02	Platoon Sgt	1				1			03
	03	Radio Operator	1						1	02
05		Mortar Section	11							
	01	Section Leader	1				1			02
	02	Squad Leader	2				2			02
	03	Mortar Gunner	2					2		01
	04	Asst Gunner	2						2	07
	05	Ammo Bearer	4						4	02
06		Machine Gun Section	11							
	01	Section Leader	1				1			02
	02	Squad Leader	2				2			02
	03	Machine Gunner	2					2		01
	04	Asst Gunner	2						2	06
	05	Ammo Bearer	4						4	02
		Recapitulation	132	1	1	5	21	32	72	

NOTES:

01 Pistol, Cal .45

02 Carbine, M-1

03 Carbine, M-2

04 Rifle, M-1

05 BAR

06 Light Machine Gun

07 60mm Mortar

08 M-79 Grenade Launcher

09 M-7 Grenade Launcher

	OO HDS.	TOTAL RIFLE PLATE	TOTAL RIFLE PLATE	TOTAL
Bag, ammo, .60mm Mortar			4	4
Binoculars, 6X30	2			2
Carbine, Cal. 30 M-1	7	15	15	37
Carbine, Cal. 30 M-2	2	33	2	37
Compass, Lensatic	2	3	3	8
Cookpot, W/coover 8"	2	12	4	18
Kit, medical, Company size	1			1
Kit, medical, Platoon size		3		3
Knife, Bayonet, Carbine	9	60	25	94
Knife, Bayonet, Rifle	2	36		38
Launcher, Grenade, M-7	2	9		11
Launcher, Grenade, M-79		3		3
Machete, W/sheath	3	24	20	47
Machine Gun, Cal. 30, light			2	2
Magazine, Bar; Cal .30			144	144
Magazine, Carbine, 15rd	63	336	119	518
Magazine, pistol, Cal .45	3		12	15
Mortar, 60mm			2	2
Panels, Air/Ground Recognition set	2			2
Pistol, Cal .45, W/holster	1		4	5
Pouch, magazine, pistol, Cal .45	1		4	5
Pouch, magazine, carbine	27	144	51	222
Radio, HT-1	1	6	3	10
Radio, TR-20	1			1
Rifle, Automatic, Browning		9		9
Rifle, M-1, Cal .30	2	36		38

Belt, Pistol	132*
Blanket, wool	132**
Boots, bata, pr	264
Bowl, metal, individual	132
Canteen with cup & cover	264
Cap, camouflage	132
Hammock	132
Harness, load bearing	132
Jacket camouflage	132
Jacket, fatigue	132
Jacket, Field	132***
Packet, first aid, individual	132
Poncho	132
Rucksack, local purchase	132
Suit, black (coat & trousers)	132
Sweater, wool OD	132***
Trousers, camouflage	132
Trousers, fatigue	132

* Substitute 9 belts, ammo, AR, for personnel armed with BAR's.

** Double allowance authorized in Regions where climatic conditions warrant issue.

***Allowance authorized only in region where climatic conditions warrant issue.

<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>ALLOWANCES</u>
Bag, ammo, 60mm mortar	4
Belt, pistol	132
Binoculars, 6X30	2
Blanket, wool	132
Boots, bata, pair	264
Bowl, metal, individual	132
Canteen, w/cup and cover	264
Cap, camouflage	132
Carbine, cal .30 M-1	37
Carbine, cal .30 M-2	37
Compass, Lensatic	8
Cookpot, local purchase	18
Hammock	132
Harness, Load bearing	132
Jacket, fatigue	132
Kit, medical, . company size	1
Kit, medical, platoon size	3
Knife, bayonet, carbine	94
Knife, bayonet, M-1 rifle	38
Launcher, Grenade, M-7	11
Launcher, Grenade, M-79	3
LMG, Cal. 30	2
Machete, w/sheath	47
Magazine, AR	144
Magazine, carbine Cal. 30 15 rd	518

DESCRIPTIONALLIQUANCES

Magazine, pistol	15
Mortar, 60mm	2
Packet, first aid individual	132
Panels, air/ground recognition set	2
Pistol, Cal .45 w/holster	5
Poncho	132
Pouch, magazine, carbine	222
pouch, magazine, pistol	5
Radio, HT-1	10
Radio, TR-20	1
Rifle, auto, cal .30	9
Rucksack, local purchase	132
Shovel entrenching w/carrier	132
Suit black (coat and trousers)	132
Sweater, wool OD	132
Trousers, camouflage	132
Trousers, fatigue	132

20 April 1966




TABLE OF ORGANIZATION)
AND EQUIPMENT
NR. 2-66

2 Jan 66
TOE 2-66

CIDG NUNG "MIKE FORCE"

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II. Organization (Personnel):	
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Remarks - - - - -	5
III. Equipment:	
Distribution - - - - -	5
Recapitulation - - - - -	8

SECTION I

GENERAL

ORGANIZATION

1. MISSION: The NUNG CIDG "MIKE FORCE" is a multi-purpose reaction force which will be located in each of the four Corps areas, and an additional unit will be located at Nha Trang. The missions of these forces are:

- a. Constitute a "C" Team reserve.
- b. Conduct raids, ambushes and combat patrols.
- c. Be prepared to reinforce CIDG camps under attack.
- d. Search and seizure operations.
- e. Conduct small scale conventional combat operations.

2. ASSIGNMENT: Based upon geographical areas as directed by Headquarters 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces. It is anticipated that each force will operate in its own respective corps area, however, CO, 5th SFGA is authorized to employ each unit anywhere in the Republic of South Vietnam according to the tactical situation, provided necessary coordination with II LDB High Command and MACV Headquarters can be made. Normally, each "C" detachment commander will employ this reaction force as a reserve in it's Corps Area. CO, 5th SFG has capability to reinforce any Corps Area when the situation threatens.

INCLOSURE 5 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

2 Jan 66

EQUIPMENT

1. This table is the authority requisition and issue in accordance with procedures directed by Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

2. Individual allowances for all grades are listed in paragraph 09 of Section III.

3. Allowances of equipment authorized herein may be decreased or omitted at the discretion of the USSF Detachment Commander. Equipment in excess to the authorized allowance will not be requisitioned without approval of this Headquarters.

SECTION II. ORGANIZATION
TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LT</u>	<u>MSG</u>	<u>SGT</u>	<u>CPL</u>	<u>PFC</u>	<u>PVT</u>	<u>RANK</u>
01		Co Headquarters								
	01	Company Cmdr	1	1						01
	02	Exec Officer	1	1						
	03	Radio Opr	2				2			
	04	Rifle Grenadier	1					1		
	05	Company Medic	1			1				
02		3 Rifle Plat Hqs								
	01	Plat Leader	3	3						
	02	Plat Sgt	3		3					
	03	Radio Opr	3				3			
	04	Plat Medic	3				3			

SECTION II. TOE 2-66(Cont'd)

2 Jan 66

<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LT</u>	<u>MSG</u>	<u>SGT</u>	<u>CPL</u>	<u>PFC</u>	<u>PVT</u>	<u>RMK</u>
03		9 Rifle Squads								
	01	Squad Leader	9			9				
	02	Asst Sqd Ldr	9			9				03
	03	AR Gunner	18				18			02
	04	Rifleman	63				18	18	27	
04		3 Wpns Sqd (Rifle Plat)								
	01	Squad Leader	3			3				
	02	Gunner LMG	6				6			04
	03	Asst Gunner	6				6			
	04	Ammo Bearer	12					12		
	05	Grenadier	3					3		05
05		Hqs Wpns Plat								
	01	Plat Leader	1	1						
	02	Radio Opr	1				1			
	03	Plat Medic	1				1			
	04	Gunner 3.5	1					1		06
	05	Asst Gunner	1						1	
06		3 Weapons Squads								
	01	Sqd Ldr (Gunner)	3			3				
	02	Asst Gunner (60mm)	3			3				
	03	Ammo Preparer	3				3			
	04	Ammo Bearer	18						18	
07		1 Recon Platoon								
	01	Plat Leader	1	1						
	02	Squad Ldr	3			3				
	03	Chief Scout	3			3				
	04	Scouts	9				9			
	05	Riflemen	3					3		

08 RECAPITULATION

	<u>STR</u>	<u>LT</u>	<u>MSG</u>	<u>SGT</u>	<u>CPL</u>	<u>PFC</u>	<u>PVT</u>
Company Commander	1	1					
Executive Officer	1	1					
Medic	5			1	4		
Radio Opr	6				6		
Rifle Grenadier	1					1	
Rifle Plat Ldr	3	3					
Rifle Plat Sgt	3		3				
Rifle Sqd Ldr	9			9			
Asst Rifle Sqd Ldr	9			9			
AR Gunner	18				18		
Riflemen	63				18	18	27
Wpns Sqd Ldr Rifle Plt	3			3			
LMG	6				6		
Asst LMG	6				6		
Ammo Bearer	12					12	
Grenadier	3				3		
Wpns Plat Ldr	1	1					
Mortar Sqd Ldr (Gunner)	3			3			
Asst Mortar Gunner	3			3			
Ammo Preparer	3				3		
Ammo Bearer	18					18	
Gunner 3.5	1				1		
Asst Gunner 3.5	1					1	
Recon Plat Ldr	1	1					
Sqd Ldr	3			3			
Chief Scout	3			3			
Scouts	9				9		
Riflemen	3					3	
TOTALS	198	7	3	34	74	53	27

3 drivers
authorized
t Nha-Trang

REMARKS

All personnel armed with carbine, Cal 30 unless otherwise indicated.

C0 Armed with carbine, cal 30 and .45 cal pistol

01 Armed with .45 cal Pistol

02 Armed with BAR

03 Armed with Launcher, Grenade, Carbine

04 Armed with LMG

05 Armed with M-79

06 Armed with 3.5 RM

SECTION III - EQUIPMENT

<u>PARA</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>ALLOWANCE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
01	Company Headquarters		
	Binoculars, 6 X 30	1	
	Camera, 35mm, half frame	2	
	Carbine, caliber .30	6	
	Compass, Lensatic	1	
	Cookpot with cover, 8"	1 per ea 6 men	
	Flashlight	1	
	Kit, medical, company size	1	
	Knife, bayonet, carbine	4	
	Launcher, grenade, carbine	1	
	Machette with sheath	1	
	Magazine, carbine, 15 round	42	
	Magazine, pistol, caliber .45	3	
	Panels, air/ground recognition set	1	
	Pistol, cal .45 semi-automatic w/holster	1	

SECTION III - EQUIPMENT CONTINUED

<u>PARA</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>ALLOWANCE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
	Pouch, universal	12	
	Radio, PRC-10	1	
	Radio, HT-1	1	
02	3 Rifle Platoon Headquarters		
	Binoculars, 6 X 30	3	
	Carbine, caliber .30	12	
	Compass, Lensatic	3	
	Cookpot w/cover 8"	1 per ea 6 man	
	Flashlight	3	
	Kit, medical, platoon size	3	
	Knife, bayonet carbine	12	
	Machette w/sheath	3	
	Magazine, carbine 15 rd	84	
	Pouch, universal	24	
	Radio, HT-1	6	
03	9 Rifle Squads, Rifle Platoon		
	Carbine, Cal .30	81	
	Cookpot w/cover 8"	1 per ea 6 men	
	Flashlight	9	
	Knife, bayonet, carbine	81	
	Launcher, grenade, carbine	9	
	Machette w/sheath	18	
	Magazine AR	216	
	Magazine, carbine, 15rd	567	
	Pouch, universal	162	
	Rifle, automatic, caliber .30	18	
	Belt, rifle, automatic	18	

SECTION III TOE 2-66 (Cont'd)

<u>PARA</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>ALLOWANCES</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
04	Weapons Squad per Rifle Platoon(s)		
	Binoculars, 6 X 30	3	
	Carbine, cal .30	21	
	Compass, Lensatic	3	
	Cookpot w/cover 8"	1	per ea 6 men
	Flashlight	3	
	LMG, cal. .30	6	
	Launcher, grenade M-79	3	
	Magazine, carbine, 15rd	147	
	Pouch, universal	42	
05	Weapons Platoon Headquarters		
	Binoculars, 6 X 30	1	
	Carbine, cal. .30	3	
	Compass, lensatic	1	
	Flashlight	1	
	Kit, Medical, platoon size	1	
	Launcher rocket, 3.5	1	
	Magazine, carbine, 15rd	21	
	Pouch, universal	6	
	Radio, HT-1	1	
06	Weapons Squad, weapons Platoon		
	Carbine, Cal .30	27	
	Cookpot w/cover 8"	1	per ea 6 men
	Compass, Lensatic	3	
	Flashlight	3	
	Knife, Bayonet carbine	27	

SECTION III TOE 2-66 (Cont'd)

<u>PARA</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>ALLOWANCES</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
06	Machette w/sheath	6	
	Magazine, carbine, 15rd	189	
	Mortar, 60 mm	3	
	Pouch, universal	54	
07	Reconnaissance Platoon Headquarters		
	Binoculars, 6 X 30	1	
	Carbine, caliber .30	1	
	Magazine, Carbine, 15rd	7	
	Pouch, universal	2	
	Radio, HT-1	2	
08	3 Reconnaissance Squads		
	Binoculars, 6 X 30	3	
	Compass, Lensatic	3	
	Cookpot w/cover 8"	1 per ea 6 men	
	Carbine, Caliber 30	18	
	Machette w/sheath	6	
	Magazine, carbine, 15rd	126	
	Pouch, universal	36	
	Radio HT-1	3	

NOTE:

1. 1 Cookpot w/cover 8" authorized per each 6 men.
2. 60mm Mortar ammo bearers, authorized mortar carrying jackets.
3. 1 entrenching tool authorized per each 3 men.
4. Recon Platoon authorized Steel helmets.
5. Each MIKE Force authorized 6 2½ ton trucks.

09 RECAPITULATION - COMPANY SIZE UNIT

<u>Description</u>	<u>Allowance</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Belt, Black w/buckle	198	


SECTION III TOE 2-66 (Cont'd)

<u>Description</u>	<u>Allowance</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Belt, Pistol	180	
Belt, automatic rifle	18	
Binoculars, 6 X 30	12	
Blanket, Indigenous	198	
Boot, Bata	396	
Bowl, metal, individual	198	
Camera, 35mm half frame	2	
Canteen w/cup and cover	198	
Hat, camouflage	198	
Carbine, cal. .30	170	
Compass, lensatic	14	
Cookpot w/cover 8"	32 per company	
Flashlight	20	
Hammock, Indigenous	198	
Harness, field	198	
Jacket, camouflage	396	
Kit, medical, company size	1	
Kit, medical, platoon size	4	
Knife, bayonet, carbine	170	
Launcher, grenade, carbine	10	
Launcher, grenade, M-79	9	
LMG. Cal. .30	6	
Machette w/sheath	34	
Magazine, AR	216	
Magazine, carbine, 15rd	1183	
Magazine, Pistol, cal. .45	3	
Mortar, 60mm	3	
Packet, first aid, individual	198	


SECTION III TOE 2-66 (Cont'd)

<u>Description</u>	<u>Allowance</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Panels, Air Ground recognition set	1	
Pistol, cal .45	5	
Pouch, universal	298	
Radio, HT-1	13	
Radio PRC-10	1	
Rifle BAR .30 cal	18	
Rucksack, Indigenous	198	
Trousers, camouflage	396	
Trousers, Fatigue	198	


MIKE FORCE



RIFLE PLATOON




WEAPONS PLATOON



PLAT HQS
5
1 OFF 4 EM

• (60MM MORTAR SQUAD)
2
9 EM

RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON



PLAT HQS
1
1 OFF

• (RECON SQUAD)
6
6 EM

COMPANY COMMO

CO HQS 1 PRC-10 (AIR-GROUND)
1 HP-1

WPNS PLATOON

1 HP-1

RIFLE PLATOON

1 HP-1 (WPNS SQUAD LDR)
1 HP-1 (CO WPNS)

RECON PLATOON

1 HP-1 (CO RECON)
1 HP-1 (RECON SQUAD)

TOTAL: 1 PRC-10
13 HP-1

WPNS SQUAD LDR
1 HP-1

3 RECON SQUADS
3 HP-1

CIDG COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON (APACHE)

	Page
Section I. General - - - - -	1
Section II. Organization (Personnel) - - - - -	2
Section III. Equipment - - - - -	3

SECTION I
GENERAL

1. MISSION:
 - a. Perform reconnaissance and psychological operations in the villages and hamlets within the operational area of each CIDG camp.
 - b. Perform reconnaissance missions within Viet Cong dominated areas.
 - c. Provide direction for artillery and air strikes on the Viet Cong positions.
 - d. Act as guides for other friendly forces.
 - e. Mark and secure Landing Zone and Drop Zone and staging areas.
 - f. Conduct limited TARGET/bomb assessments.
 - g. Employ stay - behind patrol.

2. ASSIGNMENT: One Combat Reconnaissance Platoon to each CIDG camp.

3. EQUIPMENT:
 - a. This table is the authority to requisition and issue in accordance with procedures directed by Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces, Vietnam.

b. Individual allowances for all grades are listed in section III.

c. Allowances of equipment authorized herein may be decreased or omitted at the discretion of the United States Army Special Forces Detachment Commander. Equipment excess to the authorized allowance will not be requisitioned without approval of Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces, Vietnam.

INCLOSURE 6 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CS-GPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT
SECTION II - ORGANIZATION

INDEX

<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LT</u>	<u>MSG-1</u>	<u>MSG</u>	<u>CPL-1</u>	<u>CPL</u>	<u>PVT-1</u>	<u>RMK</u>
01		Headquarters	2							
	01	Plt Ldr	1	1						
	02	Asst Plt Ldr	1		1					
02		Recon Sqds (4)	32							
	01	Sqd Ldr	4			4				
	02	Asst Sqd Ldr	4				4			
	03	Senior Rifleman	8					8		01
	04	Rifleman	16						16	02

RECAPITULATION

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LT</u>	<u>MSG-1</u>	<u>MSG</u>	<u>CPL-1</u>	<u>CPL</u>	<u>PVT-1</u>
Plt Leader	1	1					
Asst Plt Ldr	1		1				
Squad Ldr	4			4			
Asst Sqd Ldr	4				4		
Senior Rifleman	8					8	
Rifleman	16						16
TOTALS	34	1	1	4	4	8	16

NOTE: (1) All personnel armed with carbine, caliber 30, M2 unless otherwise indicated. (2) Weapons authorization may be altered to meet the requirements of the specific camp.


REMARK

01 Armed with rifle, caliber 30, M1D (scope).

02 Two men in each squad armed with Browning Automatic Rifle.

SECTION II

CIDG COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON T O & E



SECTION III - EQUIPMENT

<u>PARA</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>ALLOWANCE</u>
01	Platoon Headquarters	
	Binoculars, 6X30	2
	Carbine, cal 30, M2	2
	Compass, Lensatic	2
	Cookpot, with cover, 8"	1
	Flashlight	2
	Knife, bayonet, carbine	2
	Launcher, grenade, carbine	2
	Magazine, carbine, 15 rd	14
	Panels, Air/ground recognition set	1
02	Four (4) Combat Recon Squads	
	Carbine, caliber 30, M2	16
	Compass, lensatic	8
	Flashlight	72
	Knife, bayonet, carbine	16
	Launcher, grenade, carbine	8
	Magazine, BAR	96
	Magazine, carbine, 15 rd	112
	Radio, HT-1	8
	Rifle, Browning automatic	8
	Rifle, sniper, M1D	8
	Bayonet, rifle, M-1	8
03	34 Individual members	
	Belt, pistol	34 *
	Blanket, wool	34 **
	Boots, bata, pr	68

SECTION III - EQUIPMENT (Cont'd)

<u>PARA</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>ALLOWANCE</u>
03	Bowl, metal, individual	34
	Canteen, W/cup and cover	34
	Cap, camouflage	34
	Hammock	34
	Jacket, camoflage	34
	Jacket, fatigue	34
	Jacket, Field	34 ***
	Packet, first aid, individual	34
	Poncho	34
	Rucksack, local purchase	34
	Suit, black (jacket & trousers)	34
	Sweater, wool od	34 ***
	Trousers, camouflage	34
	Trousers, fatigue	34

* Substitute eight (8) belts, ammo, AR for personnel armed with rifle, auto, caliber 30.

** Double allowance authorized in regions where climatic conditions warrent issue.

*** Allowance authorized only in regions where climatic conditions warrent issue.

HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (ALBON B), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO US Forces 95240

AVSF-C

SUBJECT: Employment Concept of Engineer Advisory Teams (EMER LNO)

1. BACKGROUND:

During the month of December 1965 the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) was notified that Navy STAT Teams previously supporting the Group's construction requirements would have to be withdrawn. To adequately support a rapidly growing Special Forces program and to continue with existing plans it was considered essential that engineer support be obtained. During a 5th Special Forces Group briefing for the Chief of Staff of the Army in late December this problem of engineer support was discussed. Previous queries to USARPAC and USARPAC indicated that engineer teams and equipment comparable to Navy STAT teams were not available within existing resources in South Vietnam. The Chief of Staff immediately recognized the need for engineer support and indicated it would be made available to the Group. Engineer assets within USARPAC were again re-examined and evaluated and the 539th Engineer Detachment, 1st Special Forces Group (Abn), 1st Special Forces, located on Okinawa was selected to provide the necessary personnel for the engineer support required. COMUSMACV directed US Army Vietnam to provide the necessary construction equipment for these teams.

In January 1966 the Commanding Officers of the 1st Special Forces Group and the 539th Engineer Detachment visited Nha Trang and steps were taken to request one Engineer KA Team (Control) and four Engineer KB Teams (Advisory) consisting of a total of twenty-five people. Final arrangements were made at this time and the request was forwarded to USARPAC. The KA Team arrived in country on 15 February and the KB Teams arrived approximately two weeks later on the 27 February 1966 for a 180 day period. If this engineer team concept proves successful USARPAC left the way clear for a modified engineer detachment with an organic engineer equipment capability to be assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) on a permanent basis.

2. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

The engineer control and advisory teams attached to the 5th Special Forces for general support are organized in the following manner.

INCLOSURE 7 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

One KA Team	MOS	RANK
Staff Engineer	7010	O4
Public Works & Utilities	7020	O3
Construction Inspector	51M	E8
Construction Foreman	51M	E7
Engineer Maintenance	52B	E7
Four KB Teams		
Civil Engineer	7900	O3
Construction Foreman	51M	E7
Engineer Maintenance	52B	E7
Construction Foreman	51M	E6
Engineer Maintenance	52B	E6
Aggregate		
Six Officers		
Nineteen Enlisted Men		

The operational concept is to have the KA team operating out of the SFOB located in Nha Trang. It's mission will be to provide engineer staff support to the Group when it is needed, to provide the control element necessary to support the activities of the KB teams and to supplement them with personnel and equipment as required. The KA team will work under the Group S-3 Section on a mission type assignment to the various Corps areas. Missions will be based on priorities which originated with the commanding officer of the various C Detachments. Once received by Group these priorities are staffed with the country wide program to determine a program priority. It is this program priority that the KB team's assignments are based. Control of the KB teams is maintained at the SFOB for several reasons. The most important of which is to properly support a country wide construction program with limited personnel and equipment resources required central control. The program got underway in early March with one KB team being deployed to I Corps, two teams operating in II Corps and another team operating in IV Corps Area. Equipment procurement remains the big problem area. However, action has been initiated at all command levels to expedite delivery of requisitioned equipment. In addition a program to recover and relocate equipment already under Special Forces control has been started and should provide a working nucleus until the procured equipment arrives.

INCLOSURE 7 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

MILITARY POLICY LETTER

REMARKS MADE BY COMMANDING OFFICER, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, TO ALL INCOMING PERSONNEL

We of the 5th Special Forces Group have been assigned the task of advising and supporting the troops of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Program. These troops, who are commanded by our Vietnamese Special Forces counterparts, are a very important part of the total military forces which are struggling to rid South Vietnam of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army aggressors from the North, and to create security and stability so that South Vietnam can achieve its freedom.

The CIDG troops are a paramilitary organization and are usually recruited from their local area, where they have personal reasons for wanting to live in peace.

In the highlands many of the CIDG soldiers are Montagnard tribesmen. For many years these primitive people did not have the advantages which ethnic Vietnamese enjoyed. The dissatisfaction and frustrations, both real and imaginary, borne by the Montagnard people approximate those of minority groups in many countries.

The Government of Vietnam fully realizes its responsibilities toward these citizens, and is endeavoring to meet the legitimate demands presented by Montagnard spokesmen at Kontum and Pleiku in late 1964, after an abortive rebellion by certain dissident Montagnard elements. The Republic of Vietnam rejects the demands of the illegal, separatist organization FULRO (United Front for the Liberation of the Oppressed Race), which advocates the political separation of the highlands from the rest of Vietnam.

The position of the United States Government is to support fully the war effort of our Vietnamese allies. Providing equality for its Montagnard citizens is a stated policy of the RVN, and the United States will do everything possible to lend assistance to this effort.

Every single member of the 5th Special Forces Group must be aware of the position of our government and impress this position upon those Montagnard units which he advises. In the words of General Westmoreland, "The U.S. flatly opposes the FULRO independence movement and will be in no way associated with its members. The U.S. has not, does not and will not provide support, material or psychological, to FULRO or its representatives. The Government of the United States fully supports the Government of Vietnam and not any individual or group within it. Our interest in the Montagnard is the same as our interest in every other citizen of Vietnam -- to assist in winning the war so that all citizens of Vietnam can have peace and freedom.

INCLOSURE 8 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

"Furthermore the Montagnards should be urged to recognize that much progress has already been made toward meeting their goals.

"In conclusion the Montagnards should be told that any attempt at revolt could not succeed in face of the strength and capability of RVN Armed Forces and that any Montagnard leader who recommends such a revolt is not only foolhardy, but a traitor to his own people. The only element which would gain from such a revolt would be the V.C."

In amplification of General Westmoreland's guidance, your actions will be strictly governed by the following instructions:

1. U.S. personnel will not deal directly or indirectly with representatives of FULRO or any other Montagnard organization which claims to speak for the political interests of the Montagnard people.
2. U.S. personnel who are approached by representatives of FULRO or other organizations will immediately contact their Vietnamese counterparts or the nearest GVN official.
3. U.S. personnel should avoid whenever possible interposing themselves in issues between Montagnards and Vietnamese which constitute internal affairs of the GVN.

s/William A. McKean
t/WILLIAM A. MCKEAN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

CONFIDENTIAL

TROOP DISPOSITION LIST

HEADQUARTERS
5TH SFG (ABN), 1ST SF
EFFECTIVE 1 MAR 1965

REF	STATUS	COMMANDER	UNIT SECURE WORD	LOCATION	CAMP PHASE	PROVINCE/DISTRICT	MISSION	END
I CORPS								
-1	PCS	LT COL FACHE	HABIT	DA NANG	N/A	QUANG NAM/HOA VANG	CONTROL	N/A
-11	PCS	LT COL LIND	HANDY	QUANG NGAI	N/A	QUANG NGAI	CONTROL	N/A
-101	PCS	CAPT MOFFITT	HATCH	KHE SANH	III	QUANG TRI/HUONG HOA	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
-102	PCS	CAPT BLAIR	HAUNT	TIEN PHUOC	II	QUANG TIN/TIEN PHUOC	CIDG/SS/MP	N/A
-103	PCS	CAPT SPENCER	HAZEL	GIA VUC	III	QUANG NGAI/BA TO	CIDG	N/A
-104	PCS	CAPT CAMPION	HEAVY	HA THANH	III	QUANG NGAI/SON HA	CIDG/SS	N/A
-105	PCS	CAPT KENNITZ	HEDGE	KHAM DUC	III	QUANG TIN/HIEP DUC	CIDG/BS	N/A
-106	PCS	CAPT GATNEY	HEAVY	BA TO	III	QUANG NGAI/BA TO	CIDG/SS	N/A
-107	PCS	CAPT GREGORY	HENRY	TRA BONG	III	QUANG NGAI/TRA BONG	CIDG/SS/MP	N/A
II CORPS								
-109	PCS	CAPT MEUVER	HITCH	THUONG DUC	N/A	QUANG NAM/THUONG DUC	CIDG/SS	N/A
-113	PCS	CAPT WAZEKAS (ALTY)	HORGE	DA NANG	N/A	QUANG NAM/HOA VANG	MIKE	N/A
-110	PCS	CAPT PERRY		MINH LONG	PRESENTLY IN I CORPS, SO BE DEPLOYED 15 JUNE			
2	ICS	LT COL PATCH	FARGO	PLEIKU	N/A	PLEIKU/LE TRUNG	CONTROL	N/A
-219	PCS	CAPT DODDS	FLAKE	PLEIKU	N/A	PLEIKU/LE TRUNG	MIKE	N/A
22	PCS	MAJ GEORGE	FABLE	AN TUC	N/A	BINH DINH/AN TUC	CONTROL/CIDG	N/A
-22/LNO	PCS	MAJ GEORGE		QUI NHON	N/A	BINH DINH/TUY PHUOC	LIAISON	N/A
221	PCS	CAPT HEITEL	FLAME	CUNG SON	I	PHU YEN/SONG HOA	CIDG/SS	N/A
222	PCS	CAPT PETERS	FLANK	DONG TRE	III	PHU YEN/DONG XUAN	CIDG/SS	N/A
IB	PCS	CAPT PETERS		LE HAI	N/A	PHU YEN/DONG XUAN	SS	N/A
223	PCS	CAPT MYRICK	FLASH	VAN CANH	II	BINH DINH/TUY PHUOC	CIDG	N/A
224	PCS	CAPT GERMAN	FLASH	PHU TUC	III	PHU BOM/PHU TUC	CIDG/SS/MP	N/A

CONFIDENTIAL

INCL - 6

G. 24

DC UPGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

CONFIDENTIAL

5TH SFG (AIRN), 1ST SF
EFFECTIVE 1 MAY 1966

TRC 2 DISPOSITION LIST

DET	STATUS	COMMANDER	UNIT SECURE LOCATION WORD	CAMP PHASE	PROVINCE/DISTRICT	MISSION	ETD
A-226	PCS	CAPT KNIGHT	FLIER LAI LINH	II	PHU BON/PHU THIEN	(IDG/SS/MP	N/A
POB	PCS	CAPT KNIGHT	THU THIEN	N/A	PHU BON/PHU THIEN	IS	N/A
A-227	PCS	CAPT LEBEAU	FLING ING SON	II	BINH DINH/HOAI NHON	(IDG	N/A
A-228	PCS	CAPT THISENE	FLINT TIRE THANH	II	BINH DINH/BINH KHE	(IDG	N/A
B-23	PCS	MAJ HUSSEY	FACET VAN ME THOUT	N/A	DAR LAC/BAN ME THOUT	CONTROL	N/A
A-232	PCS	CAPT HOWLEY	FLOOD BAN BAI	I	LAM DONG/BAO LOC	IDG	N/A
A-233	PC	CAPT MIZE	FLUFF NUON EA YANG	II	DAR LAC/PHUOC AN	(IDG/SS/MP	N/A
A-234	PC	CAPT LEACH	FLUID N LAC	II	DAR LAC/LAC THIEN	(IDG/MP	N/A
A-235	PC	CAPT RICHIE	FLUTE NUON CO	I	QUANG DUC/KIEN DUC	(IDG/SS	N/A
A-236	PCS	CAPT JACKSON	FOCUS I C THIEN	II	DAR LAC/LAC THIEN	(IDG/SS/MP	N/A
A-237	PC	CAPT AFFOURNIT	FORBY LUONG SON	I	BINH THUAN/HOI DA	CDG	N/A
B-24	PC	LT COL DALLAS	FADED KONTUM	N/A	KONTUM/KONTUM	CONTROL	N/A
A-241	PC	CAPT MONROE	FORUM POLEI KLENG	I	KONTUM/KONTUM	(IDG/MP	N/A
A-242	PC	CAPT SANFORD	FOXED DAK PEK	II	KONTUM/DAK SUT	(IDG/MP	N/A
A-243	PCS	CAPT HALL	FRAME PLATEAU GI	III	KONTUM/KONTUM	(IDG/SS/MP	N/A
POB	PCS	CAPT HALL	MANG BUK	II	KONTUM/DAK TO	(IDG/MP	N/A
A-244	PCS	CAPT WEINFURTER	FRESH DAK TO	II	KONTUM/DAK TO	(IDG/MP	N/A
A-245	PCS	LT LYNN	FRISK KONTUM	I	KONTUM/KONTUM	STAGING FOR DAK SEANG CONTROL	N/A
B-25	PCS	MAJ BURNS	FANCY PLEIKU	N/A	PLEIKU/LE TRUNG	(IDG/BS/MP	N/A
A-251	PCS	CAPT KAI	FAKER PLEI DJERENG	II	PLEIKU/LE THANH	(IDG/BS/MP	N/A
A-252	PCS	CAPT BUTTERMORE	FALSE PLEI MRONG	III	PLEIKU/LE TRUNG	(IDG/BS/MP	N/A
A-253	PCS	CAPT CUNNINGHAM	FILMY DUC CO	II	PLEIKU/LE THANH	(IDG/BS/MP	N/A
A-254	PCS	CAPT WOLD	FLAKY PLEI DO LIM	III	PLEIKU/LE TRUNG	(IDG/MP	N/A
A-255	PCS	CAPT WILLOUGHBY	FLASK PLEI ME	II	PLEIKU/PHU NHON	(IDG/MP	N/A

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
5TH SFG (ABN), 1ST SF
EFFECTIVE 1 MAY 1966

TROOP DISPOSITION LIST

DET	STATUS	COMMANDER	UNIT	SECURE LOCATION	PHASE	PROVINCE/DISTRICT	MISSION	ETD
III CORPS								
C-3	PCS	LT COL DURST	MAJOR BIEN HOA	(YT00511E)	N/A	BIE HOA/TRI TAM	CONTROL	N/A
A-301	PCS	CAPT ELLIOTT	MARSH TRANG SUP	(XT167553)	N/A	TAY BINH/PHUOC BINH	CIDG TNG	N/A
A-302	PCS	CAPT DRISKO	MASER BIEN HOA	(YT00511B)	N/A	BIE HOA/TRI TAM	MIKE FORCE	N/A
A-303	PCS	CAPT KENNY	MASON XOM CAT	(XT153284)	I	BUA DUONG/PHU GIAO	CIDB	N/A
B-31	PCS	MAJ DAVID	MAGIC XUAN LOC	(YT158091)	N/A	BIEN DUONG/PHU GIAO	CONTROL/S	N/A
A-311	PCS	CAPT TRICKETT	MAVIS TANH LINH	(YT29262)	II	DIEN TUY/TANH LINH	CIDG/SS	N/A
B-32	PCS	MAJ OCHS	MALTY TAY NINH	(XT04508)	N/A	TUY NINH/PHU KHUONG	CONTROL/S/SS	N/A
A-321	PCS	CAPT POTTER	HIDAS BEN SOI	(XT093475)	III	TAY BINH/PHUOC BINH	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-322	PCS	CAPT FLORES	HIDDY SUOI DA	(XT031575)	II	TUY NINH/PHU KHUONG	CIDG	N/A
A-323	PCS	CAPT SHELTON	MILER TRANG SUP	(XT167553)	II	TUY NINH/PHUOC BINH	CIDG	N/A
A-324B	PCS	2LT HAVCK	NIMIC NUI BA DEN	(XT281581)	N/A	TAY BINH/PHU KHUONG	RADIO RELAY	N/A
A-325	PCS	CAPT DARGLE	MINUS BAU DON	(XT044036)	N/A	TAY NINH/KHIEH HANH	AA	N/A
A-326	PCS	CAPT ZAREMBA	MIRNH GO DAU HA	(XT038026)	N/A	TAY NINH/HIEV THIEH	SS	N/A
B-33	PCS	MAJ BARRON	MANBO HON QUAN	(XT758879)	N/A	NINH LONG/AN LOC	CONTROL/S/SS	N/A
A-331	PCS	CAPT GINGRAS	MODEL LOC NINH	(XU732075)	III	NINH LONG/LOC NINH	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-332	PCS	CAPT POSEY	HOLAK MINH THANH	(XT643669)	III	BINH LONG/CHON THANH	CIDG/BS	N/A
A-333A	PCS	CAPT SMITH	MOODY CHON THANH	(XT167618)	N/A	BINH LONG/CHON THANH	SS	N/A
B-34	PCS	LT COL ROY	MANOR SONG BE	(YU178112)	N/A	PHUOC LONG/PHUOC BINH	CONTROL/S/SS	N/A
A-341	PCS	CAPT STANNAGE	MAZER BU DOP	(XU974292)	II	PHUOC LONG/BU DUC	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-342	PCS	CAPT BURROUGHS	MEDIA DONG XOAI	(XT079759)	II	PHUOC LONG/DON LUAN	CIDG/SS	N/A
A-343	PCS	CAPT ANDREWS	MERCY DUC PHONG	(YU436043)	I	PHUOC LONG/DUC PHONG	CIDG/SS	N/A
B-35	PCS	MAJ RADOSIEWICZ	HIEP HOA	(XT430070)	I	HAY NGHIA/DUC HUE	SS	N/A
A-351	PCS	CAPT EILAND	XOM CAT	(XT153284)	I	NINH DUONG/PHU GIAO	N/A	N/A

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 4
 DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
 5TH SFG (ABN), 1ST SF
 EFFECTIVE 1 MAY 1966

TROOP DISPOSITION LIST

DET	STATUS	COMMANDERS	UNIT SECURE LOCATION WORD	CAMP	PHASE	PROVINCE/DISTRICT	MISSION	END
A-352	PCS	CAPT PHILLIPS	MIRKY DUC PHONG	(YU436043)	I	PHUOC LONG/DUC PHONG	N/A	N/A
A-353	PCS	1/LT WALDMAN	MITER BIEN HOA	(YTO05118)	N/A	BIEN HOA/THI TAM	N/A	N/A
A-354	PCS	1/LT ATANASOFF	MIXED BIEN HOA	(YTO05118)	N/A	BIEN HOA/THI TAM	N/A	N/A
IV CORPS								
C-4	PCS	LT COL TUTTLE	BUARD CAN THO	(WS843116)	N/A	PHONG DINH/PHONG DINH	CONTROL	N/A
B-41	PCS	MAJ YANTIS	GLANT MOC HOA	(XS030909)	N/A	KIEN TUONG/CHAU THANH	CONTROL/S	N/A
A-411	PCS	CAPT ANDERSON	GRASP HAI YEN	(VQ848818)	III	AN XUYEN/HAI YEN	SP SECTOR/CIDG/SS	N/A
A-411FOB	PC	CAPT ANDERSON	GRASP NGA BA DINH	(VQ937857)	E/A	AN XUYEN/HAI YEN	CONTROL	N/A
A-411FOB	PC	CAPT ANDERSON	GRASP CAI DOI VAM	(VQ859851)	N/A	AN XUYEN/HAI YEN	CONTROL	N/A
A-412	PC	CAPT CIRCOTI	GREEN CAI CAI	(W562073)	II	KIEN PHONG/HONG NGU	CIDG/BS	N/A
A-413	PC	CAPT JONES	GATES BINH THANH	(W5668032)	III	KIEN TUONG/TUYEN NHON	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-414	PC	CAPT BRIDGEMAN	GILES KOC HOA	(XS028899)	III	KIEN TUONG/CHAU THANH	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-414FOB	PCS	CAPT BRIDGEMAN	GILES BINH CHAU	(WS929993)	N/A	KIEN TUONG/CHAU THANH	BS	N/A
A-414FOB	PCS	CAPT BRIDGEMAN	GILES CHUA NOI	(WS952973)	N/A	KIEN TUONG/CHAU THANH	BS	N/A
A-414FOB	PCS	CAPT BRIDGEMAN	GILES CAI DOI	(WS983952)	N/A	KIEN TUONG/CHAU THANH	BS	N/A
A-414FOB	PCS	CAPT BRIDGEMAN	GILES BINH HIEP	(XS023978)	N/A	KIEN TUONG/CHAU THANH	BS	N/A
A-414FOB	PCS	CAPT BRIDGEMAN	GILES THANH TRI	(XS055994)	N/A	KIEN TUONG/CHAU THANH	BS	N/A
A-415	PCS	CAPT VAY	GREEK TUYEN NHON	(XS273773)	III	KIEN TUONG/TUYEN NHON	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-415FOB	PCS	CAPT VAY	GREEK HOI DONG CHIEN	(XS200825)	N/A	KIEN TUONG/TUYEN NHON	BS	N/A
A-416	PCS	CAPT SMITH	GLOBE KINH QUAN II	(WS974757)	I	KIEN TUONG/KIEN BINH	CIDG/SS	N/A
B-42	PCS	LT COL NEILLER	GRAND CHAU DOC	(WS131842)	N/A	CHAU DOC/CHAU PHU	CONTROL/S	N/A
A-421	PCS	CAPT POE	GLOBE HA TIEN	(VS438448)	III	KIEN GIANG/HA TIEN	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-421FOB	PCS	CAPT POE	GLOBE TRA PHO	VS533551)	N/A	KIEN GIANG/HA TIEN	BS	N/A
A-421FOB	PCS	CAPT POE	GLOBE CU DUC	(VS472497)	N/A	KIEN GIANG/HA TIEN	BS	N/A

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GROUP 4
DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
5TH SFG (ABN), 1ST SF
EFFECTIVE 1 MAY 1966

TROOP DISPOSITION LIST

DET	STATUS	COMMANDER	UNIT	SECURE LOCATION	CAMP	PROVINCE/DISTRICT	MISSION	END
			WORD		PHASE			
A-422	PCS	CAPT NEILSON	GLASS	VINH GIA	III	CHAU DOC/TINH BIEN	CIDG/BS	N/A
A-422FOB	PCS	CAPT NEILSON	GLASS	GIANG THANH	N/A	CHAU DOC/TINH BIEN	BS	N/A
A-423	PCS	CAPT HESSE	GLIDE	TINH DIEN	III	CHAU DOC/TINH BIEN	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-423FOB	PCS	CAPT HESSE	GLIDE	NHAN/HUNG	N/A	CHAU DOC/TINH BIEN	BS	N/A
A-424	PCS	CAPT MARVIN	GHOST	AN PHU	IV	CHAU DOC/AN PHU	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-424FOB	PCS	CAPT MARVIN	GHOST	PHU HIEP	N/A	CHAU DOC/AN PHU	BS	N/A
A-425	PCS	CAPT MC COY	GRUDY	AN LONG	II	KIEN PHONG/HONG NGU	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-425FOB	PCS	CAPT MC COY	GRUDY	BEN DINH	N/A	KIEN PHONG/HONG NGU	BS	N/A
A-426	PCS	CAPT THACKER	GAUGE	CAU MUON	N/A	KIEN PHONG/HONG NGU	SS	N/A
A-427	PCS	CAPT FERLON	GRAPE	TRI TON	II	CHAU DOC/TRI TON	CIDG/SS	N/A
A-428	PCS	CAPT COLLETT	GROOM	PHU QUOC	III	KIEN GIANG/PHU QUOC	CIDG/SS	N/A
A-430	PCS	CAPT TOPI	GRAIN	TAN CHAU	N/A	CHAU DOC/TAN CHAU	MIKE FORCE	N/A
				DON PHUC		KIEN PHONG/HONG NGU		
B-51	PCS	LAJ GRUENE	BEACH	SFOB	III	KHAN HOA/VINH XUONG	CIDG/TNG	N/A
B-52	PCS	LT COL WARREN	BEARD	DONG BA THIE	N/A	KHAN HOA/VINH XUONG	PROJ DELTA	N/A
B-53	PCS	CAPT KERAVOURI	BOXER	NHA TRANG	N/A	BIEN HOA/LAC THIEN	AUG MACV	N/A
A-501	PCS	CAPT EARLYWINE	BENCH	LONG THANH	N/A	KHAN HOA/VINH XUONG	CIDG	N/A
A-502	PCS	CAPT JOHNSON	BERRY	NGUYEN VAN TAN	III	KHAN HOA/DIEN KHANH	CIDG/SS	N/A
A-503	PCS	CAPT CARTER	BONUS	TRUNG DUNG	N/A	KHAN HOA/VINH XUONG	MIKE FORCE	N/A
				NHA TRANG				

MISSION ABBREVIATIONS: CIDG - Civilian Irregular Defense Group

BS - Border Surveillance
S - Sector advisor
SS - Subsector advisor
MP - Montagnard Program

RECAPITULATION: "C" DETACHMENTS - 4 PCS "B" DETACHMENTS - 14 PCS "A" DETACHMENTS - 73 PCS 1 TDY

CONFIDENTIAL

ETHNIC INFORMATION
SPECIAL FORCES STRIKE FORCE CAMPS

<u>DET</u>	<u>COMMANDER</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ETHNIC GROUP (S)</u>
C-1	Lt Col Facey	Danang	
A-113	Capt Fazekas	Danang	Nung
A-101	Capt Moffitt	Khe Sanh	VN, Bru
A-102	Capt Blair	Tien Phuoc	VN
A-103	Capt Spencer	Gia Vuc	Hroi
A-104	Capt Champion	Ha Thanh	VN, Cua
A-105	Capt Kimnitz	Kham Duc	VN
A-106	Capt Gaffney	Ba To	Hre
A-107	Capt Gregory	Tra Bong	VN, Cua
A-108	Capt O'Conner	Tien Phuoc	VN
A-109	Capt Herver	Thuong Duc	VN, Coa
A-110	Capt Perry	Minh Long	VN, Hroi
B-11	Lt Col Lind	Quang Nga	VN, Cua
C-2	Lt Col Patch	Pleiku	Nung, Rhade, VN, Jarai
A-219	Capt Dodds	Pleiku	Nung, Rhade, Jarai
B-22	Maj George	An Tuc	Jarai, Bahmar, Hre, VN
A-221	Capt Hempec	Cung Son	VN
A-222	Capt Peters	Dong Tre	Hroi, VN
A-223	Capt Myrick	Van Canh	VN
A-224	Capt German	Phu Tuc	Jarai, Bahmar
A-226	Capt Knight	Mai Linh	Jarai
A-227	Capt LaBeau	Bong Son	VN
A-228	Capt Tinseth	Vinh Thanh	VN
B-23	Maj Hussey	Ban Me Thuot	Rhade, VN
A-232	Capt Howley	Tan Rai	Koho
A-233	Capt Mize	Buon Ea Yang	Rhade, Mhong, Jarai
A-234	Capt Leach	An Lac	Koho, Ma, Chic, VN
A-235	Capt Richie	Nhon Co	Mhong, VN
A-236	Capt Jackson	Lao Thien	Rhade, Mhong, Jarai, VN
A-237	Capt Affourtit	Luong Son	Cham, VN
B-24	Lt Col Dallas	Kontum	Sedang, Bahmar, Rongao, Jeh, VN

INCLOSURE 10 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS
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<u>DET</u>	<u>COMMANDER</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ETHNIC GROUP (S)</u>
A-241	Capt Monroe	Polei Kleng	Sedang.
A-242	Capt Sanford	Dak Pek	Sedang, Halang, Jeh, VN
A-243	Capt Hall	Plateau G1	Sedang, Balmar, Mhong, VN
A-244	Capt Weinfurter	Dak To	Sedang, Balmar, Rongao, Jeh
A-245	Lt Lynn	Kon Tum	(None - Staging for Dak Seang)
B-25	Maj Burns	Fleiku	Nung, Rhade, VN
A-251	Capt Kai	Flei Djereng	Jarai, Balmar, Mhong, VN
A-252	Capt Buttermore	Flei Mrong	Jarai, Balmar, VN
A-253	Capt Cunningham	Duc Co	Jarai, VN
A-254	Capt Word	Flei Do Lim	Jarai, Balmar, VN
A-255	Capt Willoughby	Flei Me	Jarai, Balmar, Rhade, VN
B-51	Maj Gruene	Dong Ba Thin	VN
B-52	Lt Col Warren	Nha Trang	VN
A-501	Capt Earlywine	Nha Trang	VN
A-502	Capt Johnson	Trung Dung	VN
A-503	Capt Carter	Nha Trang	Nung
C-3	Lt Col Durst	Bien Hoa	None
A-301	Capt Elliot	Trang Sup	VN, Cambodian
A-302	Capt Drisco	Bien Hoa	Chinese, Cambodian, VN
A-303	Capt Kenny	Xom Cat	Cambodian, Rhade, VN
B-31	Maj David	Xuan Loc	Cambodian
A-311	Capt Trickett	Tanh Linh	VN, Thong, Cham, Cambodian
B-32	Maj Ochs	Tay Ninh	VN, Cambodian, Chinese, Montagnard
A-321	Capt Potter	Ben Soi	Cao Dai, Cambodian
A-322	Capt Flores	Suoi Da	VN, Chams, Cambodian
A-323	Capt Shelton	Trang Sup	VN, Cambodian
A-324B	Lt Hauch	Nui Ba Den	Cambodian
A-325	Capt Posey	Minh Thang	Cambodian, VN, Mont
A-333A	Capt Smith	Chon Thanh	None
B-34	Lt Col Roy	Song Be	None

<u>DET</u>	<u>COMMANDER</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>ETHNIC GROUP (S)</u>
A-341	Capt Stanage	Bu Dop	Cambodian, VN, Montagard
A-342	Capt Stienmetz	Dong Xoai	Montagnard, Cambodian
A-343	Capt Andrew	Duc Phong	Stiang, Camb, VN
B-35	Maj Radosevich	Hiep Hoa	None
*A-351	Capt Eiland	Trang Sup	None
*A-352	Capt Phillips	Duc Phong	None
**A-353	1/Lt Waldman	Bien Hoa	None
**A-354	1/Lt Atanasoff	Bien Hoa	None
C-4	Lt Col Tuttle	Can Tho	VN
B-41	Maj Yantis	Moo Hoa	None
A-411	Capt Anderson	Hai Yen	Chinese
A-412	Capt Cincotti	Cai Cai	Hoa Hao
A-413	Capt Jones	Binh Thanh Thon	Hoa, Hao, Cambodian
A-414	Capt Bridgewater	Moo Hoa	Hoa Hao
A-415	Capt Vay	Tuyen Nhon	Hoa Hao
A-416	Capt Smith	Kinh Quan II	Hoa Hao
B-42	Lt Col Neller	Chau Doc	None
A-421	Capt Poe	Ha Tien	VN, Cambodian
A-422	Capt Neilson	Vinh Gia	VN, Cambodian
A-423	Capt Blesse	Tinh Bien	Hoa Hao, VN, Cambodian
A-424	Capt Marvin	An Phu	Hoa Hao
A-425	Capt McCoy	An Long	Hoa Hao, VN
A-426	Capt Thacker	Tri Ton	None
A-427	Capt Fenlon	Phu Quoc	VN
A-428	Capt Collett	Tan Chau	Hoa Hao
A-429	Capt Collins	Ba Chuc	Cambodian
A-430	Capt Topp	Don Phuoc	Chinese, Cambodian

NOTE: *To be deployed in Duc Hue District in Hau Nghia Province in CIDG mission when area assessment is complete.

**To be deployed in Long An Province in CIDG mission as soon as area assessment is complete.

1 MAY 1966



V.I.P. BRIEFINGS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PARTY</u>	<u>TYPE VISIT</u>
2 Jan 66	Sen Symington	45 min Opn Briefing and visit D.E. Yang
3 Jan 66	Sec. of Army Resor B/G Ware Col. Blanchard Col. Gough Lt. Col. Hutcheson	45 min Opn Briefing
5 Jan 66	Sen Mondale	45 Min Opn Briefing
10 Jan 66	Gen Besson Gen Dickens	45 min Opn Briefing
12 Jan 66	B/G Kelsey	60 min Opn Briefing
15 Jan 66	DA Team	60 min Opn Briefing
16 Jan 66		Visit Camps in II CTZ
17 Jan 66	Gen Abrams D/C of S.	60 min Opn Briefing
18 Jan 66	B/G Jones USMC	45 min Opn Briefing
18 Jan 66	M/G Chawang, Thailand Young Haroon, Thailand 13 Doctors	45 min Opn & CA Briefing
21 Jan 66	Sen Miller	60 min Opn Briefing
26 Jan 66	B/G Pearson ADC 101st Abn	45 min Opn Briefing
28 Jan 66	Col Terry	60 min Opn & Sig Briefing
30 Jan 66	B/G Seith Cmdt of Cadets USAFA	60 min Opn Briefing
31 Jan 66	Lt Gen Engler	45 min Opn Briefing
5 Feb 66	B/G Deane	60 min Opn Briefing
9 Feb 66	Editor, Time Magazine	60 min Opn Briefing
15 Feb 66	Maj Gen York	60 min Opn Briefing

INCLOSURE 11 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28
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<u>DATE</u>	<u>PARTY</u>	<u>TYPE VISIT</u>
21 Feb 66	Mr John Spors Editor, Army Mag.	60 Min Opn & CA Briefing
26 Feb 66	B/G Donald H McGovern	45 Min Opn Briefing
26 Feb 66	B/G Simpson	30 Min Opn Briefing
2 Mar 66	Mr Hayden Williams & Asst. Pres Asia Foundation Col Gerald H Ragadale USARV-SGS	30 Min Opn Briefing
4 Mar 66	Mr Graham Mr Katz Rand Corporation	45 Min Opn Briefing and 60 Min Discussion
6 Mar 66	B/G Zais Dep CG FFV	60 Min Opn Briefing
8 Mar 66	Col Towson G3, CONARC & Party	60 Min Opn Briefing
11 Mar 66	L/G Cusado USAF M/G Meyers USAF Col Jones USAF Col McLaughlin USAF	45 Min Opn Briefing
12 Mar 66	M/G F.A. Hansen US Army Munition CMD and Official Party	45 Min Opn Briefing
13 Mar 66	Gen John K Waters CINCUSARPAC and Official Party	30 Min Opn Briefing
16 Mar 66	M/Gen Steger USARPAC Surgeon	60 Min Opn & Med Briefing
19 Mar 66	B/Gen Patterson Chief Mil History, DA	30 Min Opn Briefing
28 Mar 66	M/G Harry Critz Dep CG, Arty School	45 Min Opn Briefing

31 Mar 66	B/C Frank D Miller D/C of S, Plans & Opns, USARV	45 Min Opn Briefing
5 Apr 66	B/Gen Byrnes and Staff, 4th Inf Div	30 Min Opn Briefing
6 Apr 66	Dr T.P. Cheatham Dep. Dir TAC War Program Officer of Sec of Defense	120 Min Opn and R&D Briefing
7 Apr 66	B/Gen Davidson AC of S J-2 USARPAC	60 Min Opn Briefing
19 Apr 66	B/Gen James L. Collins, Jr Spec Asst COMUSMACV Ch Rural Construction Div J-3	30 Min Intel Briefing
19 Apr 66	B/Gen Friedman CG, USASC, Nha Trang	60 Min Opn Briefing
21 Apr 66	Gen Harold K. Johnson C of S	45 Min Opn Briefing
21 Apr 66	B/Gen Alvin E. Cowan New Dir of JRATA	120 Min Opn Briefing
27 Apr 66	Col M.W. Lunallius 7th PSYOP Group	30 Min Opns & PO
28 Apr 66	Col J.R. Maedler OSD LNO to COMUSMACV	30 Min Opn Briefing
28 Apr 66	Eric Severeid CBS News	45 Min Opn Briefing

SUMMARY OF DELTA OPERATIONS

1. Significant Unit Activities:

a. General.

(1) During the reporting period Project Delta worked as follows:

- (a) Operational days - 59.
- (b) Training days - 35.
- (c) Troop movement days - 17.

b. Personnel.

(1) During the quarter there was a 100% turnover in the Delta Reconnaissance Section. Principle causes being combat casualties, sickness, and rotation of personnel.

(2) By direction of CO, 5th SFG, a TUCR has been submitted to meet expanding requirements of Project Delta. Implementation of this TUCR will allow the US portion of Project Delta to parallel the current Vietnamese organization.

(3) The 2nd Plat, 171st Aviation Company, originally placed under operational control of Project Delta was recalled by the 5th SFG and placed under their OPCON with Delta drawing support as required.

(4) The USAF ALO/FAC team originally attached to the project has continued to operate successfully. The USAF OLE aircraft is now tentatively available to Project Delta on mission request basis only.

c. Training: The following programs were conducted:

(1) Refresher training for Vietnamese Recon Teams and the four Airborne Ranger Companies. This training ended with local operations in the Nha Trang area.

(2) Newly assigned American personnel attended a 10 day training program designed to prepare them for assignment with the Recon Section. The course further served to eliminate those not having the mental or physical stamina needed to perform the Delta mission.

INCLOSURE 12 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

(3) Training was conducted for CIDG personnel selected to operate as Recon Team members. Subjects stressed were combat movement, reaction firing and field craft.

(4) Training for newly assigned Vietnamese Delta Recon Personnel.

(5) Training for CIDG personnel already assigned to the project to operate under the concept of patrols made up entirely of CIDG personnel. Subjects stressed were navigation, information collecting, and principles of evasion and escape.

d. Movements - All movements during the reporting period were conducted by tactical aircraft.

e. Combat Operations.

(1) Two new concepts have been developed to enhance the Delta Reconnaissance effort.

(a) Employment of CIDG (Roadrunner) Teams into areas of population and heavy trail nets. These teams are outfitted as local Viet Cong, infiltrated first light and exfiltrated last light. Debriefings are conducted immediately after exfiltration and spot reports submitted to appropriate headquarters.

(b) Employment of the attached reaction force (91st Airborne Ranger Bn) in search and destroy and reconnaissance in force type operations within Delta's assigned TAOR.

(2) Five reconnaissance operations were conducted. Reconnaissance teams were committed to find targets, verify intelligence and conduct air strikes on, or guide reaction forces to, targets discovered. Recon operations were:

OPERATION	DATE	CORPS AREA	TEAM CONTROL
1-66	7 Jan - 17 Jan	III	US Team
2-66	26 Jan - 1 Feb	II	US Team
3-66	6 Mar - 11 Mar	II	VN Team
4-66	13 Mar - 31 Mar	I	VN Team
5-66	13 Apr - 30 Apr	I	VN Team

(3) The USAF ALO/FAC Team flew 294 hours, conducted 24 air strikes, comprising 174 sorties in direct support of Delta operations.

f. Research and Development. There is a definite need for the development of the following items:

(1) Beacon. An electronic system to mark a target or a team's location. Compact, weight less than 2 pounds, range greater than 5 kilometers, to give a location accurate to 25 meters. The beacon system should not require special aircraft or highly qualified technicians to operate it. The USAF Red Chief Beacon System tested in Vietnam in the summer of 1965 does not meet this criteria.

(2) Uniform. A light weight, camouflage pattern uniform for use in Southeast Asia. Uniform material should be porous, allowing body heat to escape and air to circulate.

(3) Balloon. A light weight (one and one half to two pounds) balloon marking kit for use in marking targets and locations in the jungle. Ideally, the kit would contain three to four balloons and a unit to inflate the balloons.

(4) Rifle w/Silencer. A small light weight rifle with silencer. Range need be no greater than 50-100 meters and can safely be employed behind enemy lines by small Recon units. Present weapons of this type have proven far from adequate, making too much noise and being inaccurate.

2. Commanders Recommendations.

see above

a. Conceptual employment of Project Delta.

(1) In the past Delta has often been given the mission of supporting Division operations. This has often developed into Delta's being employed as a flank security element or being assigned a screening mission. The result has been that Delta's efforts were largely dissipated and did little to reflect the overall value that can be garnered from the employment of Delta.

(2) Recommend that Delta be assigned mission no lower than Corps level, assigned TACR's by Corps and have Corps assets available.

3. Problem Areas and Recommendations.

a. Delta Recon Section has had a 100% turnover of personnel in the past three months. Principle causes being combat casualties, sickness and rotation of personnel.

b. Recommend that the Delta Recon Section be authorized a 20% overhead. This will enable the Recon Section to have enough personnel available to meet mission requirements and train new personnel.

HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF

30 April 1966

SUBJECT: CA Success Stories

Attached as Appendix 1 through 5 are Civil Action Success Stories which cover the reporting period.

5 Appendicies
as

INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned
(RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF

24 March 1966

SUBJECT: CIDG CA/PSYOP Team

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. PURPOSE.

This memorandum prescribes policy concerning the organization, training and employment of a CIDG Civic Action/Psychological Operations Team in each CIDG camp. This unit is designed to give the CIDG an additional capability to conduct civic action, propaganda and intelligence activities.

2. GENERAL.

An examination of the existing CIDG organization at the "A" Detachment level has revealed a need for a CIDG organization to implement civic action, psychological operations, and collect information designed to extend GVN influence and control. Previously, except in isolated cases, there has not been a CIDG organization with these capabilities.

3. MISSION.

a. Conduct propaganda activities within the operational area to gain civilian support and reduce the effectiveness of the VC.

b. Implement actions within the operational area to improve the conditions of the populace and win their support.

c. Collect information concerning VC activities, conditions existing in hamlets, and the attitude of the population.

4. APPLICATION.

Each CIDG camp will organize, train, and employ a minimum of one (1) CIDG CA/PSYOP Team.

APPENDIX 1 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

AVSF

24 March 1966

SUBJECT: CIDG CA/PSYOP Team

5. ORGANIZATION.

The situation and requirements in each "A" Detachment operational area are different; therefore, modifications to the suggested organization may be necessary. As a guide the unit should consist of the following CIDG personnel:

- | | |
|-----------------------------|-------|
| a. Team Leader | 1 per |
| b. Asst Team Leader | 1 per |
| c. Medical Specialists | 2 per |
| d. Civic Action Specialists | 2 per |
| e. Propaganda Specialists | 2 per |
| f. Survey Specialists | 2 per |
| g. Intelligence Specialists | 2 per |

6. PERSONNEL

Because of the importance of their duties and their daily contact with civilians, CIDG personnel selected for this unit should be of the highest possible caliber, and meet the following requirements:

- a. Have a desire to participate in the program.
- b. Be indigenous to the area.
- c. Be literate, if possible.
- d. Have leadership qualities.
- e. A personality that enables him to get along with people, outgoing and friendly.
- f. A good speaker.
- g. CA personnel should have skills that can be used in the area.

APPENDIX 1 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

AVSF
SUBJECT: CIDG CA/PSYOP Team

24 March 1966

7. TRAINING.

a. CIDG Team members will be trained by VNSF and USASF in each camp.

b. Additional instruction will be made available to CIDG personnel at the Montagnard Training Center, Pleiku and the Rural Construction Cadre Training Center, Vung Tau.

c. In each province there are Vietnamese agencies and personnel that are capable of providing various instruction to CIDG:

(1) Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) - propaganda instruction.

(2) Province Agriculture and Animal Husbandry Schools - latest agriculture methods and animal husbandry.

d. The 5th SFGA and LLDB Headquarters will provide additional information to subordinate detachments concerning training and employment.

s/William A. McKean
t/WILLIAM A. McKEAN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

CO, Det C-1, ATTN: CA/PSYOP Officer
CO, Det C-2, ATTN: CA/PSYOP Officer
CO, Det C-3, ATTN: CA/PSYOP Officer
CO, Det C-4, ATTN: CA/PSYOP Officer

APPENDIX 1 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

CIDG CIVIC ACTION/PSYOP TEAM

Section I.	General	1
Section II.	Organization (Personnel)	2
Section III.	Equipment.	3

SECTION I GENERAL

1. MISSION.

- a. Conduct propaganda activities within the operational area designed to gain civilian support and reduce the effectiveness of the VC.
- b. Implement actions within the operational area to improve conditions of the people and win their support.
- c. Collect information concerning VC activities, population attitudes, desires, and conditions in an effort to identify the VC infrastructure, assist in establishing friendly infrastructure and extend GVN influence and control.

2. ASSIGNMENT. One Civic Action/PSYOP Team for each CIDG camp.

3. EQUIPMENT.

- a. This table is the authority to requisition and issue in accordance with procedures directed by Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, Vietnam.
- b. Individual allowances for all grades are listed in Section III.
- c. Equipment excess to the authorized allowance will not be requisitioned without approval of Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, Vietnam.

APPENDIX 2 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

SECTION II

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LT</u>	<u>MSG-1</u>	<u>MSG</u>	<u>CPL-1</u>	<u>CPL</u>	<u>PVT-1</u>	<u>RMK</u>
01	01	Team Ldr	1		1					
	02	Asst Team Ldr	1			1				
	03	Medic	2				2			
	04	Civic Action	2				2			
	05	PSYOP	2				2			
	06	Intel	2				2			
	07	Survey	2				2			

RECAPITULATION

<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>STR</u>	<u>LT</u>	<u>MSG-1</u>	<u>MSG</u>	<u>CPL-1</u>	<u>CPL</u>	<u>PVT-1</u>	<u>RMK</u>
Team Ldr	1		1					
Asst Team Ldr	1			1				
Medic	2				2			
Civic Action	2				2			
PSYOP	2				2			
Intel	2				2			
Survey	2				2			
TOTALS	12	0	1	1	10	0	0	

NOTE: All personnel armed with carbines, caliber 30, and pistol,
caliber 45 unless otherwise indicated.


APPENDIX 2 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons
 Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

SECTION III - EQUIPMENT

<u>PARA</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>ALLOWANCE</u>
01	Team	
	Binocular, 6X30	1
	Carbine, Cal 30, M2	12
	Pistol, Cal 45	12
	Compass, lensatic	2
	Flashlight	2
	Knife, bayonet, carbine	12
	Launcher, grenade, carbine	4
	Loudspeaker, portable, non-standard	1
	Magazine, carbine, 15 rd	84
02	12 Individual members	
	Belt, pistol	12
	Blanket, wool	12
	Boots, Bata, pr	24
	Bowl, metal, individual	12
	Canteen, W/cup and cover	12
	Cap, camouflage	12
	Hammock	12
	Jacket, camouflage	12
	Jacket, fatigue	12
	Jacket, field	12
	Packet, first aid, individual	12

APPENDIX 2 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

CIDG CA/PSYOP TEAM TOE



Off - 0 EM - 12

Team Leader	1
Asst Team Leader	1
Medical Specialist	2
Civic Action Specialist	2
PSYOP Specialist	2
Intelligence Specialist	2
Survey Specialist	2

APPENDIX 2 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

SECTION III - EQUIPMENT

<u>PARA</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>	<u>ALLOWANCE</u>
	Poncho	12
	Rucksack, local purchase	12
	Suit, black (jacket and trousers)	12
	Trousers, camouflage	12
	Trousers, fatigue	12

APPENDIX 2 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES

CIVIL AFFAIRS/PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SCHOOL

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>INSTRUCTOR</u>
25 Jan	0800-0815	Opening Remarks	Col McKean
	0815-0830	Outline of Course	Maj Patton
	0830-0925	Introduction to CA	Maj Patton
	0930-0950	Introduction into GVN Organizations	Lt Snetzer
	1000-1050	GVN Programs and Funds	Maj King
	1100-1150	Pacification Concepts	LtCol Henderson
	1400-1450	Sources of CA Support	Lt Snetzer
	1500-1700	Health and Sanitation	Dr. Phiegengill (USAID)
26 Jan	0800-0850	Education	Dr. Hall (USAID)
	0900-0950	Agriculture	Dr. Bell (USAID)
	1000-1050	Resources Control	Mr. Brauten (USAID)
	1100-1150	Public Works	USAID
	1400-1450	Refugees	Mr. Hughes (USAID)
	1500-1550	Planning the CA Program	Capt Patton
	1600-1650	Implementing the CA Program	Capt Patton
27 Jan	0800-0850	Introduction to Psy Ops	Maj David
	0900-0950	US Psy Ops Policies and Programs	LtCol Hendricks
	1010-1100	GVN Psy Ops Organization	Maj Leach
	1110-1200	Propaganda Support	Capt Staples
	1400-1450	VIS	Mr. Fourt
	1500-1550	Montagnards	Mr. Smith
	1600-1650	Chieu Hoi	Mr. Burns
28 Jan	0800-0850	Psy Ops Planning and Reporting	Lt Dimmitt
	0900-0950	Psy Ops in Combat Operations	Maj David
	1010-1100	Field Expedients	Lt Dimmitt
	1110-1200	Discussion of Techniques	Maj David
	1400-1450	CA/Psy Ops in the Sub-Sector Role	Lt Kalunki
	1500-1700	CA/Psy Ops Discussion	

APPENDIX 3 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF

25 April 1966

SUBJECT: CIDG Information Program

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. During the past few months it has become evident that there is a need for a well planned and consistent information program to be directed toward the CIDG. Every opportunity must be made to improve the morale and fighting potential of the CIDG troops, give them a better understanding of VC/NVA objectives and techniques, and the role of the CIDG in this war.

2. A well planned program in which the Camp Commander talks directly to his troops, will convey the Commander's interest in the welfare of the CIDG troops, improve their loyalty, and increase their dependability in combat.

3. General Quang, Commanding General LLDB High Command, has issued the attached memorandum to all LLDB detachment commanders. This memorandum requires Camp Commanders to give two information talks to their troops each week. In support of this program, the LLDB High Command will forward detailed lesson plans to each Camp Commander.

4. The importance of this program in improving the morale, awareness, loyalty and combat effectiveness of the CIDG troops cannot be over-emphasized. It is my desire that detachment commanders at all echelons give maximum encouragement and support to their counterparts in implementing this program.

1 Incl
MIP for CIDG

s/William A. McKean
t/WILLIAM A. MCKEAN
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION
"A"

APPENDIX 4 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

Department of Defense
General Staff
Republic of Vietnam Military Forces

Vietnamese Special Forces
Political Warfare Group
Rehabilitation Section

MEMORANDUM: Political Motivation and Indoctrination Plan for CIDG

1. OBJECTIVE.

The Political Motivation and Indoctrination Plan is aimed at forging a high patriotism, heightening a good conscience in responsibility and honor, motivating the anti-communist spirit, consolidating confidence in the final victory, nourishing a good esprit de corps and developing a self-disciplined spirit in order to accomplish the mission of destroying the communist and developing the country.

2. ORGANIZATION OF THE EDUCATION.

a. Every week, each camp will organize two meetings under the title "The Commander Speaks to the CIDG". Each session will last from one to two hours. It is preferable that the camp commander speak to the CIDG, unless operational commitments or other important reasons prevent it.

b. The lesson plans will be written, published and distributed by the Political Indoctrination and Training Office of the LLDB High Command.

3. LESSON PLANS.

a. Lesson plans will be composed to two categories:

(1) Normal Lesson Plans.

(2) Special Lesson Plans.

APPENDIX 4 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966
Incl 1

MEMO: Political Motivation and Indoctrination Plan for CIDG (cont)

(a) The normal lesson plans will be composed of articles concerning the normal knowledge of politics which is necessary for all military men. This type of lesson plan will be distributed to camps monthly.

(b) The special lesson plans will be composed of the subjects other than normal knowledge of politics, such as special events and important policies, and the directives of the Army and government leaders. This type of lesson plan will be published and distributed to all units as required by the situation.

b. All the Lesson Plans will be printed and distributed down to the CIDG Company level.

4. METHOD OF INSTRUCTION.

a. The camp commander studies the lesson plan in advance, and prepares some humorous or meaningful short stories to stimulate and gain the attention of the listeners prior to presenting the main subject.

b. After finishing the explanation of the subject, the camp commander will reserve 10 to 15 minutes for the CIDG to freely express their ideas and to ask questions concerning the lesson. It is advisable to encourage the CIDG to stand-up and give the answers to the questions asked by their friends in order to create an atmosphere of competition and acquire the attention of all in solving problems.

c. After that the camp commander will rephrase and complete the answers given, and then give the correct answers.

d. In case there are no questions, the speaker will ask questions aimed at:

(1) Obtaining the attention and stimulating the enthusiasm of the listeners.

(2) Reminding the listeners of the main objective of the lesson.

e. Prior to ending the session, distribute the lesson plans to the CIDG company commanders so they can review the lessons within their Companies, and can read them to the CIDG so they can take notes on the main topics of the lesson (usually summarized in the review questions).

APPENDIX 4 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

MEMO: Political Motivation and Indoctrination Plan for CIDG (cont)

5. EXAMINATION AND CONTROL.

a. All "C" and "D" Detachments have the mission of controlling and organizing an examination for the political motivation and indoctrination program at the CIDG camps.

b. During visits to camps, commanders should unexpectedly ask a certain number of CIDG about the lessons already presented as a means of testing the efficiency of the political indoctrination training of that camp.

6. REPORT.

a. To allow the camp commanders to select the lessons most appropriate to the actual situations in their areas, they may start with any one of the lessons received. (example: the camp may use lesson 5 before lesson 1).

b. Monthly, it is necessary to report only the lessons used.

c. Commanders will report the lessons and the number of lessons actually taught during the month, even if the number is lower than the number required, and give the reason why it was not possible to fulfill the instructional requirement.

d. Political indoctrination is a very important mission, no less than the mission of killing the VC bandits in operations. All commanders have the responsibility to urge their subordinate units to push on eagerly in the indoctrination so as to attain the expected result.

APPENDIX 4 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSCPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

THE DECEPTIVE TRICKS OF VC PROPAGANDA

INTRODUCTION:

One of the techniques of the VC is the technique of preparing the population for the struggle. In order to bring the political struggle to success to facilitate the seizure of power in a certain country, the communists create a favorable situation by applying the following principles:

Put the government in a state of total lack of power; unable to administer the country.

Place the population in a state of blindness, unable to understand the situation by distributing all kinds of false rumors to misrepresent all plans and policies of that nation.

Put the people in a state of confusion with all kinds of events and rumors, just creating a wavering opinion.

In order to attain the abovementioned objective, the International Communist Party in general, and the Viet Cong in Vietnam in particular, systematically employ all kinds of deceptive tricks in their propaganda.

I. CONTENTS OF THE VC PROPAGANDA:

The VC propaganda themes may be divided into two categories:

(a) The propaganda having the character of establishing a communist ideology, that is to use the propaganda means to sow communism into the heart of the people. They heighten the role of the communist party, praise the communist leader of the North to guide the people into believing that there are only the Viet Cong and Ho-Chi-Minh who may really bring food and clothing to the people. That is the reason why, as we all see, that the press in the North is no more than the official bulletins of the Party, aiming to publicize the concept, ways and lines of the Party.

(b) The propaganda having the character of attacking our regime. The VC propaganda, on the one part heightens their regime in the North, and on the other tries to disclose our shortcomings, by digging on all fields of activity of our government so as to uncover some unjust points that the administration has not had the time to solve. They will publicize them to the public, by using the method of transforming the fact so as to guide the population into an incorrect judgement of the government policy.

II. VC TRICKS IN PROPAGANDA:

(a) Deceiving the public opinion: While they were stepping-up their aggression on the territory of the South, they did not cease to claim peace. While they are stubbornly refusing all proposals for negotiation, they attempt to visualize the United States as the most terrible war-monger. While they are incessantly terrorizing, and killing savagely the innocent people by assassination, by explosives, they falsely accuse the Americans of employing CBR warfare. While the communist Party of the North is just a lackey of the Russo-Chinese International Communist Party, they claimed themselves extravagantly as the real compatriots and at the same time treated all the nationalist parties as the traitors during the resistance against the French, and as the lackeys of the Americans after the calendar year of 1954.

(b) Transforming the fact: Viet Cong may unshamefully misrepresent all facts in order to create confusion and misunderstanding within our internal organizations, to make the population misunderstand the government.

Example: Each time they know that our troops open an operation in a certain area or hamlet, the VC prior to their withdrawal, will burn all the houses in the area and spread the rumors within the population that the government troops destroyed and burned the village of the people, thus creating suspicion among the population towards the Army.

Recently, we have a campaign of defoliation, using airplanes to spread a certain chemical aimed at defoliating the trees and bushes along the communication roads so as to clear the VC hideouts. But Viet Cong propagandize that the American is using poisonous chemicals to kill the population, attempting to create the hatred among the mass towards our allied nation.

(c) Exploiting and blowing-up: VC avail themselves of certain unjust facts and some obscure situations of an underdeveloped nation just recuperating its independance, as our country, that the government can not completely solve yet. They exploit and blow-up those facts so as to create discontent and hatred among the people.

Example: The VC attempt to create an impression among the population; the image of our government policy through certain corruptions and errors of some of our cadres.

(d) Spreading of false information using face to face propaganda to divide our unity, to create confusion among the population.

APPENDIX 5 TO INCLOSURE 13, TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

Example: Exploiting the unstable political situation after the revolution of the first of November, VC spread the rumors about the coming coups d'etat so as to create an atmosphere of insecurity among the government authorities as well as among the population to deviate the anti-communist spirit from the people.

Recently, seeing that the political situation of the South is relatively stable, the VC have turned their aim towards our economical field. They incessantly spread news about rising of cost of living, about the shortage of supply of rice, about the scarcity of milk so that the people will always be in fear of lacking provisions, thus creating a suspicion about the goodwill of the government towards the population.

A better typical example: During the years of 1956 and 1957, when the campaign for the breeding of tilapia fish was on the highest degree of success, people in all parts of the country were eager to build the fish ponds. Seeing this, the VC started a propaganda campaign saying that eating tilapia fish will cause leprosy. The VC propaganda was so effective that very few people dared to breed tilapia fish, because the fish could not be sold to anybody.

III. VC PROCEDURES IN PROPAGANDA:

(a) Utilizing all means available: For the Viet Cong as well as for all the communist countries, they are ready to spend enormous amounts of money to realize their propaganda goals. They utilize all means and ways to influence the people everywhere by their own argument in propaganda.

(b) VC utilize the propaganda in all fields of activity, from the highest political doctrine to the specialized problems such as literature, poetry, philosophy, and even in mathematics; from the grandiose matters down to the smallest affairs in daily life. In all they attempt to put in some political ideas of communism. They bring their propaganda into all classes of the society, especially the adolescents, they attempt to indoctrinate them and transform them into completely blind persons ready to die for the Party and for the leader.

(c) Using the technique of incessant repetition in propaganda: The VC propaganda is not only very wide spread, but they also apply the technique of incessant repetition. Their principle in propaganda is that although the story is completely false, if we repeat it many times, talk and re-talk a hundred times, then the population may accept it as true. On this point they are right because they did strike exactly at the psychology of the masses. We may utilize an old story as an example, that is the story of "Tang Sam a murderer".

APPENDIX 5 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

In the Spring and Autumn epoch, in China, there was a man named Tang Sam, a celebrated sage and pious son. One day, while Tang Sam's mother was busy weaving, there was one individual who stepped in and told her: Tang Sam murder! The mother did not believe. A moment later, another man came in and told her: Tang Sam murder! The mother still didn't believe but started doubting. Later on a third individual came in and told: Tang Sam murder! This time Tang Sam's mother immediately quit the weaving frame, jumped out of the window and fled away.

That is the common psychology of the people. Tang Sam's mother had a perfect confidence in her son. Thus by repetition of the same saying she was convinced by the invented story.

Following the statements of the VC prisoners of war recently captured by our Army, we may disclose certain effects of the VC incessant repetition procedures in propaganda. Almost all of the VC prisoners of war declared that, prior to their departure from the North they really believed that their mission in the South was to liberate their native territory from the aggression of the US. The propaganda themes of the Hanoi press and broadcasting stations are incessantly repeated days and nights without tiring that: The South Vietnam is suffering from the aggression of the US. This theme makes the people believe as a fact. And what is the real fact, I believe that all of us are well aware of that.

The American came to assist us only after the aggression of the VC started attempting to conquer South Vietnam. The presence of the American on our soil is just to assist us in our efforts against the invasion of the Viet Cong, the advance soldiers of the Russo-China campaign aimed at conquering the whole world.

(d) Moreover, the VC utilize the technique of turning round and round in their propaganda, aiming to keep the people from discovering the propaganda agent as a communist cadre.

Example: They utilize the revolutionaries, although not belonging to the communist party, but out of their innocence exploited by the communists. They use the reputation of these revolutionaries to cover the authentic identity of the communists. They let those revolutionaries carry out the propaganda, by unconsciousness or by persuasion, so as to facilitate the appeal of the people.

(e) Finally, VC utilizing the propaganda to strike directly to the most cherished aspiration and ambition of the population. Example: All people love peace. Through the VC with their aggression into South Vietnam, the Chinese communists with their aggression into Nepal and India, the Russians with their savage crushing of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 are the people most loudly proclaimed as the best peace lovers! In the struggle of the South Vietnam, who are the people trying by all means to avoid peace conference? Perhaps no one within us isn't aware of the illnature of the VC (always proclaim peace while watching every opportunity to ambush their opponents) did unhesitantly believe the

APPENDIX 5 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operation Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

treacherous propaganda of the Viet Cong. A certain number of the peace movements, directed by the communists, have been organized with the objective of no more that duping the people.

IV. PROPAGANDA AND TERROR:

According to the Viet Cong, propaganda and terror must always advance in parallel. The terrorism is aimed at creating an atmosphere of confusion and wavering among the people, and then utilizing the propaganda to appease or conquer. Their way of propaganda is to always have a character of autocracy and strongly oppressive. When they want to crush down the will of the people, internally or externally, they will initiate the whole campaign of press, conferences, discussions, and face to face propaganda aimed at attacking the opponents. Externally it seems like comfort but in reality, they secretly terrorize their opponents.

V. CONCLUSION:

We have just reviewed in summary certain VC treacherous tricks and procedures often employed in their propaganda. The objective of the VC propaganda is to prepare the road, create a favorable circumstance for the political and military struggles so as to facilitate the seizure of power in South Vietnam. Aware of the VC tricks in propaganda, we may discover the false opinions and information spread by the VC aimed at duping the people. We may discover also the deformed and blown-up information so as not to be booby-trapped by the VC.

If we know perfectly all the VC tricks and always keep ourself in a state of precaution and on guard, so the enemy is absolutely defeated, because all of the enemy heterodox doctrines which have succeeded to win over a certain number of people are due only to their tricks of propaganda.

VI. REVIEW QUESTIONS:

What is the objective of the VC propaganda ?

The VC propaganda themes may be divided into how many categories ?

State some of the VC tricks in propaganda ?

State some propaganda procedures utilized by the VC ?

Is the word and deed of the VC ever the same ?

Is it true that every communist cadre is a propaganda cadre ?

APPENDIX 5 TO INCLOSURE 13 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

HEADQUARTERS
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF

30 April 1966

SUBJECT: PO Success Stories

Attached as Appendix 1 through 4 are Psychological Operations Success Stories which cover the reporting period.

4 Appendicies
a/s

INCLOSURE 14 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS
CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

DETACHMENT A-233
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO US Forces 96297

AVSFB

8 February 1966

SUBJECT: Success Story, Camp Buon Ea Yang

TO: Commanding Officer
Detachment C-2
5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF
APO US Forces 96295

1. GENERAL: The establishment of Camp Buon Ea Yang was commenced on 13 March 1965 by Det A-233 which was then located at Buon Mi Ga. The area of the new camp was chosen because of its proximity to Ban Me Thuot and to Highway 21. The physical location was a hill overlooking a small valley at the southern edge of the Darlac Plateau. The hill was densely vegetated and was occupied as an FOB for Camp Buon Ea Yang.

2. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: The proposed camp was to be set up in conjunction with the new Phuoc An District Headquarters. The District Headquarters moved on 28 March. The Detachment moved by convoy from Buon Mi Ga on 25-28 April and occupied Camp Buon Ea Yang. During the move the convoy was ambushed several times resulting in 1 USASF WIA, 5 CIDG KIA, 16 CIDG WIA. The convoy was ambushed on the last time when they were 3 kilometers from the camp. VC losses were 32 KIA during the move.

The clearing of the vegetation around the camp was accomplished with the help of refugees who moved with the detachment and was completed in June. The refugees were settled in three villages; Buon Ea Yang II, Buon Knier I, and Buon Knier II.

The Detachment assumed a mission of sub-sector advisor on 1 May 65. The months of May, June, July, August and September were concerned primarily in Phase I and II operations. The camp was officially opened on 15 November. The operational area was extended in December.

3. ACCOMPLISHMENTS: Since April the kill rate is 338 VC KIA; 190 CIA. A total of 52 operations were conducted during the period from April to December. In the summer months contact could be made by moving 2 kilometers from camp. In August the camp was mortared from a hill 1 kilometer from camp. By December the camp had pushed the VC (to the edge of the operational area, broken the VC) units from

APPENDIX 1 TO INCLOSURE 14 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

AVSFB

8 February 1966

SUBJECT: Success Story, Camp Buon Ea Yang

battalion-sized units down to six man groups. An intelligence net was in existence that informed the detachment of practically all VC movement in the area and some outside of the operational area. With the assistance of USAID, IVS, Province Officials and the District Chief, the people from Buon Mi Ga area were taken off of refugee status, started rebuilding better villages and have become self-sufficient. A total of 354 families from Vietnamese LDC's who were VC supporters and many who had members of their families in VC units were relocated in Phouc An and started a new village under the supervision of USASF and District Officials. Three schools have been built and over 500 children will be in attendance when teachers for the last school become available. In an area plagued by FULRO problems, Buon Ea Yang with 946 Rhade CIDG has had no problems. The District Chief has moved PF units into four local villages and the old villages are being reoccupied as VC pressure diminishes in the area. The best accomplishment is the friendship and willingness to help fight the VC on the part of the people in the operational area.

4. CONCLUSION: The success of Camp Buon Ea Yang resides on four facts; aggressive patrolling, concurrent operations, an outstanding LLDB Camp Commander, and the successful enlisting of villager support.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS: The Detachment in a sub-sector role should at all times keep in mind that the RF/PF must be developed at the same time as CIDG forces to insure that when the transfer of the camp takes place, the District will be prepared.

6. FOLLOW UP: Future operations will feature concurrent operations in different parts of the operational area, joint operations with RF, and saturation patrolling to include small unit ambushes. There will be an increased effort in the sub-sector role to bring District into preparation for Phase IV.

s/Ola L. Mize
t/Ola L. MIZE
Capt Inf
Commanding

APPENDIX 1 TO INCLOSURE 14 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

DETACHMENT B-24
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO US Forces 96499

AVSFB

9 March 1966

SUBJECT: Success Story at Plateau Gi

TO: Commanding Officer
Detachment C-2
5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF
APO US Forces 96295

1. From time to time a group of refugees arrives at the Special Forces Camp at Plateau Gi. The size of the group varies from a few families to a large village with several hundred people. Sometimes they are simply passing through to Kontum, and other times they come to this area for security which will allow them to lead normal peaceful lives.
2. This is the story of a medium sized group of eighty-three people who came from the I Corps border to settle at Plateau Gi. They arrived late in January and were temporarily housed in the district dispensary. The refugees stayed in that one building until the CA/PSYOP NCO at Plateau Gi, SFC Maiberger, could persuade the District CA/PSYOP representative to relocate these people.
3. Finally, Captain Dickson went to the District Chief and demanded action. The USASF "A" Detachment Commander remembered vividly that a similar situation had arisen only a month earlier with the inaction of the district officials resulting in the previous group moving on to another area. This time however, the District Chief showed initiative and gave his S-5 representative the go ahead. The signal to act was all 2/Lt Qui needed and he immediately began working on plans for a new village with SFC Maiberger. These two, the refugees themselves and the Plateau Gi CA/PSYOP Team set to work the next day.
4. The village site was selected so as to be near District Headquarters, water and tillable land. The villagers and the CA/PSYOP Team began to clear the area and lay out the basic design of the village.

APPENDIX 2 TO INCLOSURE 14 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

AVSFB

9 March 1966

SUBJECT: Success Story at Plateau Gi

5. Within a week, construction of the houses, breastworks and the clearing of fields of fire had progressed to the point where the progress slowed for lack of enough people. At this time, Captain Dickson sent in a platoon of CIDG to assist. In another week the basic village was almost complete to include thirteen large houses and five small ones, a double fence of saplings with barbed wire tying the trees together, foxholes at each corner of the hamlet and another at the gate, and the woods cleared out to seventy-five meters.

6. The people had been living in the new hamlet for two days when SFC Maiberger began his sanitation and education program. First he had the people dig two slit trenches for latrines and showed them how they were to be used. He made sure there was a thorough understanding of the need for sanitation and then checked each day to make sure they were using it. If they did not use the latrine, he and Lt Qui would lecture the whole village for an hour to reemphasize their objectives. The education program had to do with animal husbandry. Pigs, chickens and goats were added to the refugee's herd of cattle and water buffalo. Grazing areas were established so as not to coincide with the hamlet water supply. The pigs were put into pens and the preferred feed was explained to the people. The chickens were established in coops made by the CA/PSYOP Team and the people were taught how to collect the eggs from the nonfertilized hens and how to start a breeding industry with the others. The goats were provided to keep the area between the two fences closely cropped and to try and teach the Montagnards to use the milk to improve their nutrition.

7. The final aspect of building the hamlet was to improve its defenses and to train some of the men as Popular Force. To accomplish this facet, Captain Dickson had SFC Anderson make a complete survey of the defense system of the village. They then got the villagers to clear avenues of approach and establish defensive and communication trenches.

8. Of course, the life of this hamlet is not static. SFC Maiberger and Captain Dickson continue to monitor the project and make sure the people continue to learn new things and do not forget what they have already taught.

9. The people are very grateful to 2/Lt Qui and Detachment A-243. The entire village turns out to welcome anyone mentioned above and several celebrations have been held in their honor. Thus, this is a good

APPENDIX 2 TO INCLOSURE 14 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

AVSFB

9 March 1966

SUBJECT: Success Story at Plateau Gi

example of how the people can be taught to help themselves and accept the ideas which will improve their life.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/John H. Jackson
t/JOHN H. JACKSON
Captain, Infantry
Adjutant

APPENDIX 2 TO INCLOSURE 14 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

DETACHMENT A-424
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO US Forces 96215

AVSFD

15 March 1966

SUBJECT: Success Story, Camp An Phu

TO: Commanding Officer
Detachment C-4
5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF
APO US Forces 96215

1. The following success story demonstrates the effective coordination which is characteristic of Phase IV Detachments. The demonstrated ability of local officials to react on short notice to meet the immediate needs of the population clearly indicates the progress which has been attained in this area.

2. At approximately 1230 hours on 4 February 1966, a fire was noticed in one of the shops in Phuoc Hung Market. Since the majority of houses in the area are thatch, the fire spread rapidly and a state of panic gripped the people.

3. Detachment members quickly organized bucket brigades, rushed water pumps into action and began tearing thatch from houses to form fire breaks. Shortly after the outbreak of fire the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) Hung Xuan teams began broadcasting instructions to control the people and dispell panic. Throughout the fire, the District Chief was in command of the situation, directing fire fighting and evacuation efforts.

4. By 1345 hours the fire was under control and relief supplies were prepared for distribution at District Headquarters. Special Forces supplied some supplies while others were provided from district stocks. Additional relief supplies were requested from Province through both Vietnamese and US channels.

5. At 1600 hours the District Chief proclaimed the organization of the An Phu District Aid and Help Committee to assist victims of the fire. The first meeting was held immediately.

APPENDIX 3 TO INCLOSURE 14 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

AVSFD

15 March 1966

SUBJECT: Success Story, Camp An Phu

6. By 1700 hours the 128 families who were victims of the fire had been assembled at District headquarters. The District Chief spoke to the people at this time, assuring them that he and his staff would do everything possible to assist them and restore as many of the necessities of life as possible. His remarks were well received as evidenced by the spirit of cooperation and demonstration of good will, among the people. The District Chief's remarks were followed by those of the Deputy Province Chief. Initial relief supplies consisting of blankets, ponchos, mosquito nets, bulgar wheat, cooking oil and dry milk were distributed to the families.

7. The following morning additional relief supplies arrived from Province. The "D" Detachment S-5 and USAID Province Representative accompanied the supplies. Further distribution was completed that morning.

8. Of great significance was the Aid and Help Committees ability to organize assistance from surrounding villages. Each of the 11 villages in the district voluntarily provided their proportionate share of supplies and labor. The labor consisted of the village youth organizations, popular force troops and CIDG troops. Temporary housing for all victims was completed within one week.

9. Detachment medics assisted the District Health Workers in treating injuries. There was no major health or sanitation problem due to preventive measures taken by the health workers. The entire area was sprayed with DDT, trash recepticals were provided and the clean-up campaign was conducted in short order. Water barrels, hose, and pumps were provided in the temporary housing area by the district government.

10. In conclusion, the local Vietnamese Government was capable of meeting this relatively large scale disaster with only minor assistance from US Agencies. The ability of the government to meet the needs of the population, and the corresponding support of the government by the people are clear signs of an effective full scope counterinsurgency program.

s/Daniel Marvin
t/DANIEL MARVIN
Capt QMC
Commanding

APPENDIX 3 TO INCLOSURE 14 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

DETACHMENT A-234
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO US Forces 96297

AVSFB

11 April 1966

SUBJECT: Success Story

THRU: Commanding Officer
Detachment B-23
5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF
APO US Forces 96297

TO: Commanding Officer
Detachment C-2
5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF
APO US Forces 96295

1. Upon movement into our present location, we found the local inhabitants completely hostile toward the American and Vietnamese soldiers. The people were openly supporting the Viet Cong. Whenever an American entered a village, the people would run to their homes and close the doors. The children were even afraid of the Americans.

2. Realizing the problem and knowing we could not operate effectively until we gained the confidence of the people, we called a meeting. At the meeting we decided to cope with this situation by dividing it into four steps.

a. Step One: We called upon all the village chiefs and invited them to our camp for a supper and "get-acquainted" party. At this gathering we told the village chiefs we were here to help in any way we could. We promised them protection from the Viet Cong, and also explained we wanted to help them to have a better life. We planned on sending medical patrols to the villages. We also planned distribution of clothes, toys, soap, salt and food to needy families. When the party ended, we had convinced the village chiefs that we were sincere in wanting to help.

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AVSEB

SUBJECT: Success Story

11 April 1966

b. Step Two: We contacted USAID and IVS in Dalat and Ban Me Thuot and asked them for support of our program. They were very cooperative and soon we started receiving supplies. The American team also sent for CARE packages. Once the supplies were collected, we began to act.

c. Step Three: We began sending medical patrols to the villages. The camp commander went along and talked with the people explaining that we wanted to help. At first the people refused to come out of the houses, so we decided to leave the clothes, candy, and toys with the village chief. The next time we visited the villages we found a few people who would come out to see us but they were very suspicious. We continued to be friendly with them. Soon the children were accepting candy and clothes from us. Once the ice was broken it wasn't long before all the villagers were looking to our next visit.

d. Step Four: We were now ready to give the villagers protection and show them the latest techniques in agriculture so they could grow more food. We placed a squad of soldiers with an American Advisor in each village. Their mission, was to help the people during the day and concurrently provide protection at all times. We helped build houses, dig wells, and plant gardens.

3. Soon villagers were inviting us to their homes for meals and local celebrations.

4. As time passed we continued to help the villagers, and we were able to gain intelligence on the Viet Cong movements. Acting on this information we had several successful combat operations. We began pushing the Viet Cong back into the mountains and were able to pacify our local area. This convinced the people that we meant what we said about helping. The people therefore gave us more and more information.

5. Accomplishments: Today whenever we visit the villages we are greeted with smiles and laughter. The people are always willing to help us and we in turn help them in any way we can. We are also able to gather more intelligence from the people about the Viet Cong.

6. Conclusion: We found that in order to become friends with the people, it is important to first show them you are sincere in wanting their friendship. We must be willing to accept and honor their customs and habits. We must always be considerate and not openly take advantage of their kindness in offering us food and gifts.

7. The best way to make friends is to learn their language and customs and always be friendly, considerate, and helpful in any way possible.

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AVSFB

11 April 1966

SUBJECT: Success Story

8. Recommendations: I recommend that new arrivals in Vietnam attend a mandatory class on the local customs and habits of the people in the area of their assignment. This will prevent misunderstanding and possible serious results.

s/Frank J. Leach
t/FRANK J. LEACH
Captain, Arty
Commanding

APPENDIX 4 TO INCLOSURE 14 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

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AFTER ACTION REPORT--THE BATTLE FOR A SHAU

GENERAL SITUATION:

The A Shau CIDG Camp had the primary mission of border surveillance and interdiction of infiltration routes into its assigned area of operation. The Camp was located south west of HUE and approximately five kilometers east of the Laotian border at coordinates YC 494834. Because of its location near three major infiltration routes leading from Laos east into the A Shau-Aloui Valley the camp was continuously harassed by small Viet Cong elements with small arms fire prior to the large scale attack which began on 9 March 1966. The only local population that existed prior to the attack were an unknown number of secretive and hostile KATU Tribesmen who were either Viet Cong or Viet Cong sympathizers. The occupants of Camp A Shau never made friendly contact with the KATU. The weather on 9, 10, 11, and 12 March included a heavy cloud cover and ground fog during the early morning hours, with ceilings less than 2,000 feet. The attack took full advantage of bad weather conditions to hinder tactical air support, reinforcement, and resupply attempts. Elephant grass reaching 8 to 12 feet high covers most of the valley floor around the camp, therefore, observation from the ground and air is very difficult and detecting movement of even large units is practically impossible unless they are detected while moving on trails in the valley. On the east side of the airstrip and the south side of camp were old mine fields that were overgrown with dense, high grass, which could not be cut because of the danger to friendly forces.

The friendly situation prior to the attack was as follows: Patrols on 18-19 Feb and 24-25 Feb captured enemy documents that indicated Camp A Shau was under enemy reconnaissance pending an enemy attack. On 5 March a reconnaissance patrol consisting of 30 CIDG and 2 USASF was dispatched 2 kilometers south of Camp A Shau, and no contact was made. On 6 March a company size patrol was dispatched. The mission of this patrol was to move southwest of camp A Shau and be prepared to attack and destroy a suspected enemy position in this area. These positions were detected by an over-flight aircraft on 5 March 1966. This patrol was planned for a 2 day operation. In the meantime, however, 2 NVA defectors had turned themselves in at Camp A Shau and indicated that four battalions of NVA planned to attack Camp A Shau on 11 or 12 March and that heavy infiltration into the valley was continuing. Based on this information the patrol was recalled to Camp A Shau to improve the defensive posture of the camp. The patrol returned with negative enemy contact. On 6 March a reconnaissance patrol was dispatched approximately 2 kilometers northwest of Camp A Shau with the mission to reconnoiter a suspected enemy mortar position. This patrol was unable to locate the position and returned to Camp A Shau with negative contact. Since Headquarters I Corps had disapproved repeated requests to reinforce the camp, Detachment C-1 requested and received a reinforcement from the 5th SFG Mike Force in Nha Trang. On 7 March at 1640 hours one Mike Force Company consisting of 141 Mike Force, 7 USASF and 7 Interpreters arrived to improve the reconnaissance and defense capability of the camp. Patrols were initiated approximately 1 to 2 kilometers north, south, and northwest of the camp with the mission of confirming the locations of reported NVA troop positions. These patrols returned with negative contacts and negative information of any enemy activity. In conjunction with these patrols night ambush patrols were dispatched

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in all directions around the camp area and resulted in no enemy contact. During the period 4 thru 8 March daily overflight aircraft were requested and received. These overflights detected numerous weapon positions, freshly dug personnel positions, and anti-aircraft emplacements. This confirmed information received from the 2 NVA defectors that a definite buildup of a large unit was in progress. Tactical airstrikes were requested and received on these positions; however, assessments of these strikes were virtually impossible because of dense foliage and heavy ground fog. On 7 March a leaflet drop was conducted in conjunction with a loudspeaker broadcast encouraging more enemy personnel to defect with the theme that all defectors would be well treated and moved to a secure location. On the evening of 8 March the Camp's strength was as follows: 220 CIDG, 141 MIKE Force, 9 Interpreters, 41 Civilians, 6 LLDB, 17 USASF.

The sequence of events during the attack, evacuation, and escape and evasion were as follows:

On 8 March, the night before the attack, the camp commander placed the camp on general alert, since he considered an attack imminent. All personnel remained in their defensive positions. At approximately 1930 hours a squad of enemy was observed on the north end of the camp, and was fired on with mortars. At about 2300 hours the camp was alerted by digging noises heard south of the camp. At about 0130 hours a claymore mine was fired in the direction toward which wire cutting sounds were heard. Then, at approximately 0350 hours on 9 March the camp began receiving heavy 81mm mortar fire which continued until 0630 hours. A probe of about 2 NVA companies was initiated on the south wall at approximately 0430 hours. They were met with heavy fire and fell back at no loss in additional friendly casualties. The initial barrage of mortar fire was extremely accurate and caused heavy damage to the USASF team house, supply room, water storage, and contributed to the temporary loss of communications with all outside installations. Communications were reestablished through LLDB channels at approximately 0800 hours and through US channels at approximately 0920 hours. Casualties resulting from the 3 hour mortar barrage were as follows: 2 USASF KIA, 5 USASF WIA, 25 CIDG WIA, 7 Mike Force KIA, 14 MIKE Force WIA, 1 Civilian KIA, 3 Civilians WIA. After the mortar barrage stopped, sporadic sniper fire continued resulting in 1 Civilian KIA, 1 Civilian WIA, and 3 CIDG WIA. Sniper and mortar fire continued throughout the day.

At 1100 hours on 9 March an airstrike was received north and south of the camp. Because of heavy ground fog the FAC could not observe the target, so bombs were initially dropped from above the clouds and were adjusted from within the camp by sound. All airstrikes were discontinued at approximately 1500 hours due to low ceilings. At approximately 1015 hours the camp requested emergency resupply of ammunition and medical evacuation of all wounded. At 1100 hours two L-19 aircraft landed to evacuate seriously wounded personnel. However, these aircraft began receiving intense ground fire and were able to evacuate only 1 USASF (MSGT ROBERT I. GIBSON). At approximately 1300 hours an AC-47 aircraft arrived over the camp area. This aircraft was flying northwest to southeast and received intense anti-aircraft fire while flying down the

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valley. The aircraft attempted to circle east of the camp and again received heavy anti-aircraft fire from the high ground to the east. At this time the ground fire was very accurate and the aircraft crashed approximately five kilometers north of the camp. Three of the crewmen were rescued by helicopter and three were KIA. At 1415 hours a load of ammunition and medical supplies were air dropped by CV-2 just outside the camp area. It was retrieved by a party from the camp. At 1630 hours another load of ammunition was air dropped by C-123, a part falling outside the camp area. Approximately 50% of this resupply was not recovered because of heavy ground fire on the recovery team. At 1700 another resupply drop from a CV-2 aircraft landed both in and out of camp. Also about this time an H-34 helicopter landed inside the compound to evacuate casualties. It was heavily damaged by sniper fire on the approach into the camp and was unable to lift off. One more medical helicopter, an Air Force CH-3 which had been called in, evacuated 26 casualties prior to darkness. As darkness fell personnel were deployed in defensive positions in anticipation of ground assault during the night, and work continued to repair damaged defensive positions caused by mortar attacks. Those portions of the airdrops that had fallen outside of camp were retrieved. At approximately 2000 hours a flare ship arrived over the camp and provided continuous but limited illumination throughout the night.

At 0400 hours 10 March the camp again began receiving intense and extremely accurate mortar and 57mm recoilless rifle fire which battered almost all remaining buildings to rubble. This heavy fire continued throughout the entire day in varying intensity until the camp was eventually evacuated at 1730 hours. The 57mm fire rapidly destroyed approximately fifty percent of all crew served weapons. At 0500 hours a massive ground assault was initiated on the east wall from across the runway, and on the south wall, the most vulnerable side due to the tall grass. At approximately the same time defense of the southeast corner of the camp collapsed as CIDG company 141 ceased all effective resistance. The remainder of the east wall occupied by Mike Force and two Americans initiated fire against the enemy within the camp who had taken part of the east and south walls and temporarily halted their advance. Bitter hand-to-hand fighting continued for almost 3 hours until those friendly forces on the east wall were isolated from the rest of the camp, drawing heavy machine gun and small arms fire from front and rear. When the south wall was taken at about 0800 hours the retreating personnel withdrew to the vicinity of the communications bunker and the north wall. They were joined about 0830 hours by survivors from the east wall. The examples of outstanding courage, self-sacrifice, resourcefulness and leadership of the defenders were so widespread as to be commonplace.

At 0600 hours the camp had requested airstrikes and targets were hit in the immediate vicinity north and south of the camp. These strikes were effective but an assessment could not be made due to the heavy ground fire within the camp. At 0830 hours only the north wall and the communications bunker were still held. About this time the enemy initiated an assault to secure the communications bunker but was unsuccessful because of the heavy volume of fire delivered by the defenders. The one remaining 81mm mortar and 60mm mortar continued to fire but were destroyed prior to 1200 hours.

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At 0900 hours airstrikes continued and inflicted heavy casualties on the NVA entrenched in the south wall, however, no exact figures of enemy casualties could be made. The remaining USASF and Mike Force personnel, led by Captain David BLAIR, made several assaults to reoccupy the south wall but these attempts were unsuccessful.

At 1000 hours the "A" detachment commander requested the entire camp, except for the communications bunker and north wall, be bombed and strafed. Between 1000 and 1200 hours the airstrikes continued, inflicting heavy casualties, and discouraged any further assaults on the communications bunker and the north wall by the North Vietnamese forces.

At 1215 hours a CV-2 aircraft dropped another resupply of water and ammunition. However, all of this fell into the enemy controlled portion of the camp. At the same time an A1E aircraft crash landed on the airstrip, shot down by heavy anti-aircraft fire from the many AA positions in the valley. The pilot was immediately picked up by another A1E which landed on the strip.

Between 1215 and 1400 a heavy exchange of small arms fire continued, and the communications bunker sustained several near hits from a heavy caliber weapon. It should be noted that enemy 81mm mortar fire had continued uninterrupted throughout the attack.

At 1415 hours the enemy was observed to be massing on the east side of the airstrip, presumably for another assault on the east wall. (This is the wall where the front gate is located). Airstrikes were immediately called on this target, and heavy casualties were sustained by the enemy, causing them to disperse. The assault failed to materialize. However, the VC continued to pour intense fire into the camp.

From 1430 to 1630 hours the situation of the defenders deteriorated gravely. Almost all friendly crew served weapons were destroyed. Very little ammunition remained. No food and water had been available for 36 hours. No further offensive capability existed due to the strength of enemy forces entrenched in the Camp.

At 1500 hours a decision was made by III MAF Headquarters to commit Marine helicopters to support the evacuation of the garrison. The camp was therefore immediately instructed to destroy their weapons and SOI's and prepare to evacuate by helicopter at 1700 hours.

At 1700 hours all communications equipment and SOI's had been destroyed and personnel occupying the bunker withdrew under fire to the north wall and took defensive positions with the remaining force. Friendly forces on the north wall covered this withdrawal by fire.

At 1720 hours personnel were ordered to evacuate the camp by moving north to a helicopter landing zone approximately 300 meters outside the wire. All able-bodied Americans and the remainder of the Mike Force stayed behind to fight a rear guard action but the enemy laid heavy fire down in the helicopter pickup area and inflicted many casualties. The rescue element consisted of 16 H-34 helicopters in flights of 4 supported by 4 HU-1B gun ships and tactical air, which had remained over the camp area. Some of these helicopters were unable to come in, however, due to low ceiling.

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At the helicopter pickup point the Vietnamese personnel panicked and mobbed the aircraft. Abandoning their wounded and throwing down their weapons the Vietnamese personnel fled from the camp, trampling ~~the wounded~~, USASF, who was providing fire support. At the aircraft they fought to get aboard and at one point threw a wounded USASF soldier, ~~LT J. M. HAY~~, off the aircraft. One helicopter piloted by Lt Col HOUSE, the 163rd HMM Squadron Commander, was so overloaded that it could not initially take-off. All efforts to throw the panic-stricken and hysterical Vietnamese personnel off the under carriages were fruitless. By this time the tail rotor was damaged and the helicopter had to be abandoned. Due to the uncontrolled actions of the indigenous people and the mounting intensity of heavy ground fire, the rescue helicopters were only able to lift out 69 personnel that first day, including four wounded Americans. Two H-34 helicopters were destroyed during this operation. By 1745 hours all friendly personnel had left the camp who could do so and CO, Detachment C-1, declared the camp closed.

At approximately 1800 hours all personnel not evacuated began evasion and escape action. This included seven USASF personnel, one of whom was seriously wounded; forty Mike Force personnel, fifty CIDG and the crew of two downed Marine helicopters. The wounded USASF ~~(J. M. HAY)~~ died in the vicinity of the helicopter landing zone. From this time on the evasion element moved northwest and took up positions on the high ground approximately two kilometers away from the camp. At 0200 hours they moved again in a northerly direction. During this movement several men were lost because of extreme exhaustion and the difficulty of moving in the dark. On 11 March one USASF, the marine helicopter crew, and an unknown number of Mike Force and CIDG were rescued by helicopter at different times during the day. The remaining elements continued north in the hope of being seen by friendly aircraft. Their objective in the event rescue aircraft failed to materialize was the city of HUE. The remaining Americans and some scattered groups were seen by rescue aircraft and returned to HUE on 12 March. Further air reconnaissance on 13, 14, and 15 March failed to locate any more friendly personnel and was discontinued on 16 March. The total personnel still MIA are depicted in the personnel recapitulation.

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PERSONNEL RECAPITULATION

	MIKE						
	<u>CIDG</u>	<u>FORCE</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>USAST</u>	<u>LLDB</u>	<u>INTERP</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Originally in Camp	<u>210</u>	<u>143</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>434</u>
Returned	<u>109</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>186</u>
Returned Wounded	<u>52</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>101</u>
MIA	<u>101</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>248</u>
MIA Believed KIA	<u>40</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>172</u>

WEAPONS LOST (ESTIMATED)

100 Carbines

10 IMGs

5 BARs

4 Mortars - 60mm

2 Mortars - 81mm

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DONG TRE NIGHT ATTACK

Prompt exploitation of intelligence is a major factor in achieving success in counter-guerrilla warfare. The application of this maxim played an important role in achieving success in the combat operation described below:

The hamlet of Thanh Duc, Dong Xuan District, Phu Yen Province (BQ9187-53) is located approximately six kilometers north of the CIDG camp of Dong Tre. In early summer of 1965, the Popular Force platoon that was securing the hamlet was withdrawn, leaving the inhabitants easy prey for VC domination. As the hamlet is located on the fringe of a nominally pacified area and is frequently used as a patrol base by friendly forces, the Viet Cong did not choose to occupy it. Instead, they created a covert infrastructure, controlling the people through coercion and applied terror. This minimized their chances of being compromised and destroyed by friendly forces.

In early February, 1966, Intelligence agents from Camp Dong Tre reported an increase in VC activity at Thanh Duc. This activity included: (1) Organization of the farmers into a collective; (2) Formation of committees for the youth, women and aged, supervised by Communist Party members; (3) Political and propaganda lectures being conducted; (4) Defensive fortifications being built; (5) Introduction of an armed VC militia squad into Thanh Duc to provide security for the VC cadre and to guard the farmers as they worked their fields. Interrogation of captives taken during recent combat operations tended to confirm these reports. A request for more detailed information was dispatched to agents in the field.

On the afternoon of 9 February, an agent passed the following information to the S-2 Section of Camp Dong Tre: (1) The previous reports were essentially correct; (2) A seven man VC squad was staying in the hamlet, occupying three huts at night; (3) One guard was usually posted near the huts. On the basis of this report and earlier intelligence, a combat operation was planned for immediate execution.

The ILDB Camp Commander, advised by the USASF Detachment A-222 Commander, considered a night raid of company strength to be the most effective tactic. On 10 February, a CIDG Company, accompanied by ILDB and USASF advisors, moved to a point three kilometers from the hamlet. To prevent security leaks, only the CIDG company commander, the ILDB and the USASF knew the true mission of the operation. The troops were under the impression that they were reinforcements for another CIDG company on a road security operation in that area.

At 110100 February, the CIDG company commander issued the operation order to his platoon leaders. Two platoons departed immediately to occupy blocking positions on the high ground to the west of Thanh Duc, with the main force crossing the line of departure an hour later. Taking maximum advantage of all concealment afforded by the terrain, the assault element was able to reach the hamlet undetected. Under the cover of darkness, and aided by detailed intelligence, a barbed wire/punji stake barrier was silently breached and the

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VC guard dispatched. The CIDG troops swiftly deployed for their assault. The remaining six members of the VC squad were surprised and annihilated before they could react. Sweeping through the hamlet, the friendly force killed five of the Viet Cong cadre, as they attempted to escape, and captured seven others. Five weapons were seized as well as documents, military equipment and two tons of rice. The Communist Political infrastructure as well as the overt Viet Cong military force had been successfully removed from Thanh Duc. The CIDG withdrew to Camp Dong Tre - mission accomplished.

Conclusions:

1. CIDG camps can produce timely, accurate intelligence on a local level that is of immediate tactical value.
2. CIDG forces, properly trained, led and advised, have the capability of exploiting intelligence with a high degree of military efficiency.
3. A night raid, long a favorite Viet Cong tactic, can be used equally as well by friendly forces to achieve excellent success.

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BUON EA YANG AFTER ACTION REPORT

The importance of exploiting intelligence of immediate tactical value obtained from captured enemy documents is illustrated by the series of combat actions described below. Major success was achieved by utilizing information initially gained from the capture of one document and following up subsequent intelligence gathered during engagements with the Viet Cong.

On 18 March 1966, a CIDG ambush patrol from Camp Buon Ea Yang, killed a Viet Cong Company Commander and captured a number of documents he was carrying, including one that directed four VC companies to establish a training base at a given location. The following day, a two company size force of CIDG with USASF and LLDB advisors moved by foot toward the suspected enemy concentration. An assault on the objective, preceded by an intensive artillery and aerial bombardment, was launched at 211000 March and immediately encountered heavy opposition. The VC, occupying fortified positions on high ground, employed a high volume of automatic weapons and small arms fire causing the CIDG forces to withdraw to more favorable positions and await reinforcements. Contact with the enemy was continued with the CIDG counter-attacking between the numerous air strikes that were called in. At 211400 March, the friendly units were reinforced by an additional CIDG company and the VC defense began to crumble. By nightfall, the enemy had been driven from their positions and forced to flee the area. Total VC casualties were: 109 KBA, 21 KIA by ground action, with an undetermined number of VC wounded. No weapons or captives were taken, indicating that this VC unit possessed a high degree of military discipline and training. Friendly casualties were 9 CIDG and 1 interpreter KIA with 11 CIDG and 2 USASF WIA.

A search of the battlefield uncovered documents that revealed the presence of a VC battalion command post to the south in a land development center. To exploit this information, one company of CIDG each from Camp An Lac, Camp Lac Thien and the Pleiku Mike Force were alerted for a raid in strength. On 211315 March, following intensive airstrikes, this mixed unit was airlanded by helicopter on the objective. Heavy contact with an estimated company of VC was immediately established. As the VC resisted stubbornly for more than two hours before they retreated, it is apparent that these troops possessed the same high degree of discipline as those engaged in the previous day's action. A total of 33 VC were KIA and 9 were captured. Friendly losses were 1 USASF and 2 CIDG KIA with 3 CIDG WIA.

Evaluation of all intelligence acquired during these two operations and interrogation of the captives revealed the most likely infiltration routes used by the VC in their movement through this area. On the night of 30 March, a CIDG company from Camp Buon Ea Yang established an ambush on one of these routes. At 2130 hours, an estimated VC battalion entered the killing zone from the south and, at the same time, a local VC platoon moved in from the north. Both VC units were immediately taken under intense fire by automatic weapons, small arms and three claymore mines. Enemy casualties from the initial burst of fire were apparently heavy but, recovering quickly, the VC returned fire and counterattacked the friendly positions, both frontally and on one flank. These attacks were thrown back by the CIDG forces.

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Contact with the VC continued until 310100 March, with both sides using automatic weapons, small arms and mortars. 155mm artillery support and flare ships aided the outnumbered friendly force in holding back the VC. Again, the discipline of the VC was demonstrated by their evacuation of most of their dead, wounded and equipment from the battlefield. By 310115 March, all firing ceased as the VC broke contact and withdrew. First light revealed but 4 VC bodies and 1 wounded VC remaining on the scene. Numerous blood trails and other evidence of high VC losses were found. A number of rucksacks, 1 LMG mount, 1 mortar base plate and miscellaneous ammunition were captured. Friendly losses were 2 CIDG KIA and 4 WIA.

Conclusions:

1. The three combat actions described were the direct result of rapid exploitation of a captured document containing information of immediate tactical value.
2. Aggressive combat action on the part of the CIDG units involved resulted in an impressive victory and the decimation of three major VC units.
3. The VC units engaged possessed a high degree of military training discipline and morale as evidenced by:
 - a. Refusal to withdraw until their positions became untenable.
 - b. Removal of all wounded, many of their dead, and their weapons from the battlefield.
 - c. Immediate action taken when ambushed.
 - d. Utilizing suitable terrain for their base areas.

DIEN KHANH SUCCESS STORY

Diên Khanh District is located 10 kilometers west of Nha Trang, with the major area being the Dai Dien four area north of the river. Included in this area are the hamlets of Dai Dien Tay, Dai Dien Nam, Dai Dien Dong and Dai Dien Trung. It also includes the rich rice lands extending north of these villages all the way to the Hoa Gia Lu mountains. This rich area was built up during the Diem regime. Most of the homes were constructed in 1960, 1961 and 1962. Each house has a well and the homes are of cement construction. Since 1963 the rich rice harvest in this area had always gone to the VC.

For several years the people in the Diên Khanh District, had been victims of the Viet Cong who had been terrorizing them and collecting most of their rice harvest each year. At the request of the District Chief an operation was planned utilizing USASF advised CIDG troops from Detachments A-502 and A-501; their mission being to clear the rice lands in the Dai Dien four area so that the people in the hamlets would be able to harvest their rice for themselves without VC terrorism.

This operation, "Morning Star", commenced on 28 January 1966, with two CIDG companies from Detachment A-502, one Mike Company from Detachment A-501 and a blocking security force made up of one company from A-501 and one from A-502. A CP was secured by the blocking force after a few encounters with the VC and patrols were sent out sweeping the surrounding area and providing security for the rice fields at the start of the harvest. The two maneuver elements sweep parallel to each other northeast through the mountain range clearing it of VC as they moved toward the CP. During the third and fourth days of the operation the local villagers covered the rice fields like ants on sugar. From an initial hundred or so there were an estimated 1000 people working in the rice fields with many more moving back and forth between their homes and the fields carrying the freshly cut rice.

On 2 February "Operation Morning Star" was completed. One CIDG company stayed in Dai Dien Trung, providing additional security for the villages until the end of the harvest. This operation netted a total of 6 VC KIA an estimated 15 VC WIA, 2 VC CIA with their weapons, another seven Chieu Hoi turned themselves and their weapons in to District Headquarters. A VC Company training area, containing several huts, food and a make shift firing range, complete with targets was located and destroyed. A large cache of documents and medical supplies had also been found.

The most significant thing about the whole operation is not the number of VC KIA or WIA but more important that an estimated 700,000 kilos of rice was harvested in this area during the harvest period. This was the first time in several years that it had not gone to the VC. This was not merely a military defeat for the VC, but more important a psychological defeat.

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This was not only in their own ranks, as shown by the number of defectors, but also to the people of the Dai Dien four area. They had been shown that the VC were not supermen, and could be defeated and driven from their community. They had been shown that the District CIDG forces could provide a secure place for their families to live and work without fear of daily terrorist acts against them by the VC.

As the troops pulled back across the river, the gratitude of the people was shown in their faces as they lined the roads. This year the harvest had gone to them and with the help of the CIDG this can be repeated in the years to come.

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DUC CO SUCCESS STORY

Interdiction of routes of infiltration and supply is one of the main missions assigned to USASF Advised CIDG Camps. The following combat actions illustrates the effectiveness of aggressive patrolling by CIDG Forces in accomplishing this task:

Numerous intelligence reports received by Camp Duc Co, Pleiku Province, indicated that elements of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) were using the Ia Drang Valley as an infiltration route from Cambodia into South Viet Nam. In order to confirm these reports, a combat reconnaissance patrol of company strength, accompanied by USASF and LLDB advisors, was sent into the area.

On the night of 17 February, this CIDG patrol went into tactical bivouac without making contact with the enemy. At 2330 hours, listening posts reported that they had heard voices and movement to the south of the friendly positions. After maintaining noise discipline all night, the CIDG troops deployed silently at first light and launched a sudden, violent attack on the suspected enemy campsite. The assaulting force encountered an estimated reinforced NVA Squad. The enemy, totally surprised, fled in panic, carrying with them an unknown number of wounded. The bodies of three NVA soldiers lay where they had fallen. The extent of the surprise of the assault was evidenced by the amount of equipment found on the scene: One ChiCom light machine gun; three ChiCom AKA assault rifles, five Soviet Tokarev semi-automatic rifles, sixteen hand grenades, two bangalore torpedoes, thirty pounds of TNT, four cases of 12.7mm ammunition, a Chinese made radio transmitter/receiver complete with operators manual and SOI of Regimental level, and a quantity of clothing and field equipment. There were no friendly casualties during this action.

Further reconnaissance of the area confirmed that the NVA did use the Ia Drang Valley as an infiltration route for units of squad and platoon size. The patrol returned to camp on 19 February, without further contact. On the basis of their report, another combat operation in the same area was planned.

On 21 February, a company sized CIDG combat recon patrol with USASF/LLDB advisors began a screening mission to the south west of Camp Duc Co near the Cambodian border. The first contact with the enemy occurred at 25 0700 February when the forward elements of the friendly force sighted a group of 15 NVA troops moving toward them from the direction of the frontier. Undetected by the enemy, the CIDG troops deployed into hasty flank ambush positions. As the NVA unit entered the killing zone of the ambush, their ranks were enfiladed with small arms fire. Although they fought back desperately, the entire enemy patrol was killed. The attacking force lost 1 CIDG killed and 2 others wounded. Seven ChiCom AKA assault rifles, 10 hand grenades and miscellaneous field equipment was captured.

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Later that afternoon, another NVA unit of similiar size was observed but at too great a distance to be effectively engaged. An airstrike was called in and is believed to have decimated the enemy's ranks. As the enemy fled, they abandoned 16 rucksacks and miscellaneous field equipment which was recovered by the CIDG.

On 27 February, the same operation intercepted a squad sized NVA carrying party. A sharp fire fight resulted in three of the enemy killed, an unknown number wounded and 14 hand grenades captured. One CIDG was killed and one received minor wounds.

These combat actions show that:

(1) Interdiction missions assigned to CIDG Camps can be successfully accomplished by long range patrolling in reaction to sound intelligence.

(2) The CIDG soldier, properly advised and trained, is more than a match for North Vietnamese Regulars.

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VINH THANH SUCCESS STORY

1. Back Ground: During the month of October 1965, units of the 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) conducted a clearing operation in Vinh Thanh valley. Immediately following the operation Camp Vinh Thanh was constructed and occupied by a USMC detachment, ARVN detachment, and four CIDG companies. The objective being to secure the valley and its route of transportation so that government administrators could function and the populace could develop the full potential of the valley in relative safety. In February 1966 a team of government administrators and two popular force platoons returned to the valley and in conjunction with the commander of Camp Vinh Thanh began the steps necessary to organize the populace and establish firm government control. Simultaneously, CIDG forces began saturation patrolling efforts to uncover and restrict Viet Cong movement and to control and protect the population in the valley.

2. Conduct of Operations: At present, March 1966, conditions have improved to such an extent that final planning for bringing in remaining Vinh Thanh valley refugees from the Binh Khe area and locating a District Headquarters in Vinh Thanh is in progress. In the near future inhabitants of the whole valley will become more and more familiar with the legal government and the benefits it offers. A dispensary is nearing completion in the upper valley near Camp Vinh Thanh and another is soon to be started across the river from the camp. The dispensaries are AID projects and will be staffed with the necessary health workers and medicines. CIDG patrols are beginning to range deeper in efforts at literally saturating the valley with government authority and the security it offers. Much emphasis is being placed on securing the road to highway 19 so that safe travel by commercial bus and future movements of produce can be insured. Civil affairs activities are still concentrated on short term, rapid result projects that will, in the near future, also include long term projects. The key to true pacification and security of this valley lies in correctly organizing and supervising long term economic development. These efforts must of necessity be agricultural. The agricultural capacity of the valley is almost unlimited. A combination of fertile land and readily available water could make this valley one of the most productive farm areas in this part of the world. Government officials in this area are planning to organize farmers into a cooperative so that transportation can be used most effectively and top market prices obtained by selling in quantity. The newest economic opportunity seems to be in the field of vegetable growing. There is sufficient land and water in the valley to grow almost any type of vegetable. It is anticipated the market for vegetables will increase tremendously in the near future. It is planned that seed be obtained and the projected influx of new families be urged to concentrate on vegetable production as well as the usual rice crops.

3. Conclusions: If the proposed agricultural programs, civil affairs efforts, and government controls are allowed to proceed to fruition, Vinh Thanh valley will eventually be the perfect school book example of what can be done through cooperation of government and people.

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
AFTER ACTION REPORT OFM EXODUS II

The mission of Operation Exodus II was to secure an airhead and to provide a secure base for the construction of a Special Forces CIDG camp, at Kom Cat, at the junction of the Song and Dong Nai Rivers. Kom Cat is located on the southern edge of War Zone "D" and would provide Free World Forces with their first foothold on the VC secure area. In addition, a main Viet Cong infiltration route from War Zone "D" to Phuoc Tuy Province ran through the Kom Cat area. When fully operational this camp would provide a secure base from which to conduct operations into War Zone "D", while at the same time extending government influence into the War Zone. On D-Day, 12 February, the helilift of 4 companies from Bich Hoa and 4 additional CIDG companies from Phuoc Vinh, to the 3 separate landing zones (see attached overlay) went exactly as scheduled. The 6 initial objectives were secured by 1245 hours. By D-Day night, 3 Mike Force Companies and 2 companies from A-312 had established a tight perimeter around the camp site, 1 company from A-312 was in an outpost on the west side of the Song Be, and 1 company each from A-312 and A-301 were in position south of the Dong Nai Rivers. One battalion from the 173d Airborne Brigade conducted a river crossing concurrently with the heliborne assault, and operated on the western flank. On the morning of 13 February, 4ea D-4 dozers and 2 dump trucks were helilifted by C-34 helicopters to begin construction of the camp and runway. A runway which can accomodate C-123 aircraft has now been completed and camp construction is nearing completion. With the monsoon season rapidly approaching, camp construction has had to take top priority. This has limited the camp's operational capabilities. Never-the-less numerous VC way stations and a VC political headquarters have been located and destroyed in the area. The camp is yet to reach its full potential, but the greatest hurdle has been conquered. A government outpost exists on what was once Viet Cong territory, and it is in a position to hinder VC activities in War Zone "D". Another step forward has been taken in the campaign to eliminate the VC War Zones.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT ** OPERATION GOODYEAR

GENERAL SITUATION

"Goodyear" was conceived 19 December 1965 as a result of the increasing Viet Cong operations in the area of the Cau Khoi Rubber Plantation in Tay Ninh Province. The hub of the VC activity was concluded to be within the plantation cantonment area (XT341457). A platoon size Rural Force outpost adjacent to the plantation was overrun and destroyed by the Viet Cong in July 1965. Subsequently, the French proprietors were evicted and the VC seized control of the plantation and the eight adjoining hamlets. Viet Cong influence increased rapidly and at the time of "Goodyear" the VC were virtually in control of the entire plantation. Control of this area provided a way station and marshalling area along a vital route of communication for transit VC forces moving to and from Cambodia and War Zone "C". Roads leading into the area were blocked and the outlying hamlets were organized and made responsible for early warning and local security. Frequently intelligence sources reported that large VC units passed through the area. Interdiction by air or indirect fire weapons was prohibited by regulations governing the use of weapons in the plantation areas actively producing rubber. Ground action by the responsible subsectors was ineffective due to the limited number of troops available and the size of the plantation which comprises 192 square kilometers. During the first 2 weeks of December, it was noted by aerial reconnaissance flights that an increasing number of fighting trenches were being constructed throughout the area. Also noted were large signs erected over the entrances to several of the hamlets and the plantation cantonment area, bearing the National Liberation Front insignia and proclaiming the area "Liberated". Detachment B-34 at Tay Ninh formulated a plan combining Tay Ninh Sector and CIDG forces in an operation which would encircle Cau Khoi Rubber Plantation, destroying or capturing all enemy personnel, materials, and installations. The plan was approved by the Sector Commander, Major Trung, with a proposed action date of 27 December. The 25th Division Commander, Colonel Chien, approved the operational concept, but placed a hold on the implementation date. On 23 January the G-3, 25th Division sent a message giving the divisional commanders approval to conduct Operation Goodyear. A total of 8 CIDG companies, 7 Regional Force Companies, and 8 reconnaissance platoons took part in the operation which was executed on 27 January. Frequent contacts were made with small VC elements as the friendly elements closed into their encircling positions. It appeared that the VC elements were withdrawing toward the plantation cantonment area. As friendly forces closed on the main objective from all sides it appeared that an estimated VC company was trapped in the middle. By 1000 hours all but 2 of the elements were in their final blocking positions. These elements has been slowed down and were unable to close into their assigned positions until 1400 hours. Ben Soi CIDG elements made a sweep through the objective area with no resistance. The VC contained within the closing encirclement had evidently discovered the gap between the 2 elements that were late closing, and escaped to the north. In the objective area were found 600 local villagers most of which were women and children. There was a conspicuous absence of male personnel. Final statistics substantiate the success of the operation, which netted 27 confirmed VC KIA and 11 MIA; 98 structures with fortifications destroyed, 4 Chi Com rifles captured, 2 known VC captured, 18 suspects detained,

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and numerous documents and propaganda material captured. There were 2 minor friendly casualties. Tactical air support was outstanding during the operation. Seven strikes were flown by armed helicopters and 6 strikes were flown by tactical aircraft, which included A-1H, Sky Raiders, and F5 jets. The 600 personnel found in the cantonment area were processed by the Hien Thien National Police, and an estimated 250 families were resettled in government controlled areas. The presence of numerous signs bearing VC slogans posted throughout the area were further proof of the VC control of the area. Perhaps even more significant than the statistics was the psychological effect upon the local population. It was common knowledge among the local population that the Cau Khoi Plantation was VC territory. Operation "Goodyear" proved to the people that the government could and would destroy the Viet Cong on his own territory. "Goodyear" serves as an example of how a coordinated government effort can bring a, so called, VC secure area under government control.

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BEN SOI CA SUCCESS STORY

During the past three months Detachment A-321 Ben-Soi (Cao Xa) has made great strides in their civic action program, stressing self-help projects with close coordination with CVA officials.

Great emphasis has been placed on health-sanitation, education and welfare in the operation area. Health-sanitation: Bed stands were constructed for the maternity ward at Cao Xa, new blankets and mosquito nets distributed, and lime provided for painting of the wards. These items in conjunction with the cooperation of the District, S-5 Officer created much improved sanitary conditions in the hospital.

A furnace pit at the maternity ward at Binh Phong for human waste was constructed. A water storage container, new water well, equipment and brooms added greatly in improving the sanitary conditions.

Two health centers were constructed, furnished, stocked and opened during this reporting period. The center at Phuoc Tan was officially opened 29 January and the center at Thai Hoa was recently dedicated. The nurses which are working in these centers were trained by Detachment A-321. The health centers are visited periodically by the Detachment Medics, LLDB medics and a District S-5 representative to evaluate the medical program, usage of medical supplies and to conduct sick call.

Education: Detachment A-321 has the primary support for six schools in its area; Cao Xa, where tables and chairs were built, chalk boards constructed and installed, and two additional classroom erected; Soi Muoi and Tam Hap schools were painted and repaired. A class room was added to the Kom Rung school and was furnished with desks and chairs. The old well at this location was cleaned and renovated by volunteers of the community under USSF and LLDB guidance. Class rooms were also constructed and equiped at Binh Long and Thanh Dien. All of these schools received school kits, and other education supplies.

Welfare: During the month of February the vast majority of all CA activity was centered upon the Thanh Dien area where a refugee problem existed. This was a direct result of a combined airstrike and ground operation conducted in the area which destroyed approximately 100 homes, killed 15 civilians, and wounded an additional 19. This operation left approximately 1300 people temporarily homeless. Counterpart agencies were immediately contacted and with their help and cooperation this emergency situation was kept under control and mass hysteria thereby averted. A VIS loudspeaker unit was utilized to assemble the people to a designated temporary refugee center, USAID supplied money for immediate relief, and the Province and District S-5 supplied cooking utensiles. The Minister of Social Welfare authorized and provided funds for payment to the next of kin of the WIA's and the District Chief and his representatives were present to start immediate processing of claims from these people. After the immediate situation was well in hand

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a bomb disposal crew was organized and taken through the area to detonate all unexploded material, and pacification teams to process claims, pay immediate death claims, and to distribute foodstuffs purchased by the District Chief. A rural Construction Team was also sent to the area and assisted the people to re-establish their residences and for general pacification.

During the first three months of the year two-hundred and eighteen (218) families, a total of one thousand and fifty-five (1055) people moved into GVN hamlets in Detachment A-321 area.

Many of these refugees have provided valuable enemy information which in turn greatly adds to the over-all war effort. Civic action projects such as these show that winning the peoples' "Hearts and minds" is not just a useful cliché but a meaningful phrase. Working with the people, helping them to help themselves is of the utmost importance. In so doing the people at the grass roots level will realize that the Government of Vietnam is interested in them and their welfare.

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BEN SOI PO SUCCESS STORY

Starting with the Lunar Year (Tet) Celebration in January 1966, camp Ben Soi located in Tay Ninh Province, Republic of Vietnam had a continuing psychological operations program that resulted in 1,052 refugees and 57 Chieu Hoi rallies coming into the camp area during January, February, and March 1966.

Tet gave the District Chief an opportunity to get out and mix with large groups of people in all the surrounding villages. Captain Bill Holt, the USSF Detachment A-321 Commander at Ben Soi, assisted the District Chief with his talks to the villagers and with his presentation of pro-government messages. The Tet season put the people in the proper frame of mind to receive these messages. The sum total was effective face-to-face communications well received by local villagers.

The Tet season also presented an opportunity for United States and Vietnamese Special Forces personnel from Ben Soi camp to meet with the District Chief, Village Chiefs, and elders. Personal gifts were exchanged, meals partaken together, and a closer comradeship formed.

Captain Holt and his detachment, working closely with Vietnamese officials, used face-to-face communications by employing rallies, small status groups, social functions, and person-to-person contact to bind a more working relationship between the CIDG camp, and the local population.

During Tet, year books pointing out the progress of the previous year were handed out along with large numbers of leaflets covering the advantages of government programs and the drawbacks of the Viet Cong program.

With US/GVN people relations at a new high, Mad Cap patrols were increased. Weekly visits by a US Aid doctor helped the program immensely, and at present, twenty-two dispensaries and maternity wards are under the supervision of Ben Soi camp with an ever increasing workload being shifted to the Vietnamese staffs. Another result of this medical program is an increasingly effective intelligence collection system. Of late, Ben Soi camp has been able to give accurate results of airstrikes and artillery bombardments in their operational area.

Loudspeaker missions are flown over known Viet Cong areas. In this respect, Captain Holt has made excellent use of ralliers by having them make tape recordings for broadcast over the Viet Cong areas from where they originated.

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Being located in an area with predominately two religious groups, Catholic and Cao Dai, great effort has been made to insure that both groups receive equal attention. The result has been Cao Dai and Catholics working closely together.

Still another major program of Detachment A-321 is the immediate aid given all people who suffer loss due to combat operations. Sympathetic medical attention and fair reimbursement is made on the spot wherever possible. This program has cut deep into Viet Cong propaganda, since the Vietnamese Government has better means of taking care of the victims than does the Viet Cong.

Camp Ben Soi is located in an area long under Viet Cong control. An ever increasing number of people are voluntarily coming under the security of the camp due in large part to intelligently planned and executed psychological operations.

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IV CTZ SUCCESS STORY

SUBJECT: ATTACK ON TUYEN NHON FOB, 30 JANUARY 1966

1. General Situation: On 27 January 1966, Tuyen Nhon (A-415) planned an operation which required more troops than were present for duty at the base camp. In order to run the operation, a certain number of troops had to be withdrawn from the FOB, which left the FOB with the bare minimum for security. The operation was planned for 28 and 29 January, but was cancelled at the last minute because of intelligence reports which indicated a possible VC attack on the base camp or the FOB. The intelligence sergeant figured they would hit the latter. Late in the afternoon on 29 January, CIDG company 403 with 103 CIDG troops plus 2 USASF and 2 VNSF advisors, moved into position at the FOB to replace company 404. The troops were in excellent shape, well armed, and in a state of high morale. The morale was increased greatly by an aerial resupply that was received about 1830 hours. The drop contained 100 blankets for the troops, and ammunition. The company CO gave out the blankets, then put the troops in position and sent out four ambush squads of six men each. The ambush patrols were sent in four different directions from the FOB. These squads returned to the FOB about 0130 hours on 30 January, with negative contact.

2. Concept of Operation: At 0400 hours the VC attacked from the north with an estimated battalion, using 82mm and 60mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles, .50 cal machine guns, rocket launchers and a number of machine guns and small arms. The VC force was later identified as the 269th battalion. The base camp (Tuyen Nhon) was immediately notified of the situation and was asked to request a flare ship and tactical air. At 0414 hours heavy fire was also received from the northeast as the VC increased the tempo of the attack. The CIDG troops were quick to react and placed accurate and intense counter-fire on the attacking VC. Essential to this rapid reaction was the important fact that the troops all slept in their positions. The two USASF commented on the excellent fire discipline of the CIDG in the use of their BAR's and LMG's. About 0430 hours a FAC aircraft was over the FOB. At this time the FOB was receiving 57mm recoilless rifle rounds from the northeast and southeast and at least one 60mm from across the river to the rear. About thirty minutes later, at 0500, the FC-47 "Spooky" flare/gun ship arrived and placed heavy fire on the VC. The FOB marked the suspected VC mortar positions with flares for "Spooky" to take under fire. The intensity of the enemy fire was suppressed by the extremely effective air support. Approximately 0615 hours, the firing was only sporadic and the VC began breaking contact. The VC failed to penetrate the FOB's defenses, and were held off for over two hours by the defenders. Just as daylight came the outer wire and perimeter were checked. The CIDG counted 46 VC bodies around the perimeter and picked up 12 weapons, a large number of mines, grenades and ammunition. A request for a medevac chopper and a resupply was put in about 0645 hours. A lift of six helicopters, two gunships and four troop ships, bringing in reinforcements, medical and ammunition resupplies arrived at the FOB approximately 0810 hours. The FAC aircraft spotted the VC withdrawal route and directed the armed choppers into the

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area. At 0930 hours the first lift of reaction forces landed to the north-east of the FOB in order to cut off the VC. The combined FOB defense and reaction force action accounted for 78 VC KIA, two VC captured, 18 weapons seized and five sampans destroyed. The CIDG casualties were exceedingly light with one KIA, two WIA and two dependents (a woman and child) killed. This established a 78:1 kill ratio in favor of the CIDG, which is the highest ever recorded in the IV CTZ. The tremendous success in the defense of the FOB can be attributed to the excellent fighting spirit of the CIDG, outstanding leadership, the priority air drop of supplies on 291830 January and the timely arrival of the FC-47. A list of weapons captured follows:

- 1 - US M-1 rifle
- 2 - US carbines
- 1 - US Thompson SMG
- 4 - Russian 7.62 semi-automatic rifles
- 1 - Russian 7.62 LMG
- 5 - CHICOM 7.62 assault rifles
- 1 - Mossin Nagant Carbine
- 1 - Russian Grenade launcher
- 1 - CHICOM LMG
- 1 - CHICOM SMG
- 5 - Rounds 81mm mortar ammunition
- 150 - Hand grenades
- 5000 - Rounds assorted small arms ammunition

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TUYEN NHON AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. General Situation: Intelligence reports received during the month of March indicated a possible Viet Cong build-up in the Kien Tuong and Long An provincial areas of IV and III CTZ respectively. Agent reports indicated the VC were moving from Long An and Hau Nghia provinces in III CTZ, into Kien Tuong Province in IV CTZ. The VC force, which was later identified as elements of the Dong Thap 261 and Dong Thap 267 battalions, and a support unit, were reportedly preparing to attack either Tuyen Nhon district headquarters, Camp Tuyen Nhon itself, or the FOB. The attack was believed to have been a retaliatory action to revenge the VC losses suffered during the 30 January 1966 attack on the Tuyen Nhon FOB by the 269th VC Battalion.

2. Concept of Operation: On the night of 9 April 1966, the FOB, occupied by CIDG Company 402, 2 USASF and 1 VNSF advisor, came under attack by a Viet Cong force estimated between one and two battalions in strength. At 092300 April, CIDG troops manning the north wall of the FOB heard voices outside the perimeter defensive wire and placed small arms fire in the area. Their fire was immediately returned by a VC element attempting to infiltrate the FOB. Simultaneously, heavy VC fire was placed on the southeast corner of the FOB, and gradually, as the volume of VC fire increased, fire was being received from all sides. During this initial assault, the Viet Cong employed 75mm and 57mm recoilless rifles, 82mm and 60mm mortars, .50 cal anti-aircraft machineguns and 40mm AT grenade launchers against the FOB (see Appendix #1).

a. At 2301 hours, an immediate airstrike and flare ship was requested by the FOB defenders. Additional medical supplies were also requested at that time. By 2320 hours, VC small arms fire had decreased but was compensated by a heavy mortar barrage. At 2331 hours, an AC-47 "Puff Ship" and Beaver 74 (FAC) arrived over the FOB providing flare and fire support. An immediate response was received for tactical air, and a flight of F-100's were enroute to the FOB within minutes after requested. By 100011 April, the intensity of the VC assault had again increased. USASF communications with the base camp and the overhead FAC aircraft was completely lost at that time, but was re-established with the base camp at 0035 hours through VNSF channels.

b. At approximately 0030 hours, a 15 man VC suicide team successfully penetrated the FOB at the northwest corner (see Appendix #1). The VC team, equipped with a flamethrower, was successful in destroying the USASF communications bunker and several other buildings, also killing the VNSF advisor, VII radio operator and the assistant CIDG company commander. The suicide team was ejected from the FOB, leaving 4 of their dead behind but taking 3 CIDG prisoners with them.

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c. At 100035 April, a flight of F-100's arrived over the FOB and conducted bombing and strafing runs on the VC positions. A second flight of F-100's was on station at 0130 hours, and a second strike was conducted. The airstrikes were very successful and caused a temporary lull in the VC attack, but would have been more devastating had the USASF communications equipment been operative. By 0210 hours, the FOB was once again under heavy attack from three sides.

d. The defensive wire at the north wall and southeast corner were completely breached by bangalores, but the VC were unsuccessful in penetrating the FOB. The tempo of the attack began to decrease at 0300 hours, and by 0530 hours, the VC had commenced an orderly withdrawal from the battle area, to pre-prepared positions northwest of the FOB.

e. At 100410 April, ammunition, communications equipment and two additional USASF were airlanded at the FOB by helicopter. A Cobra heavy fire team (UH1-B) assumed the tactical air support mission, and the AC-47 and FAC departed the area. Contact with the withdrawing VC was temporarily lost at 0730 hours when the armed helicopters returned to Moc Hoa for fuel and ammunition. Contact was regained upon their return to the area north of the FOB (see Appendix #1). The reaction force from Camp Tuyen Nhon arrived at the FOB at 0745 hours, but failed to establish contact with the routed VC.

f. At 1125 hours, a 100 man CIDG reaction force from Moc Hoa was airlifted into LZ 11 (objective #11), accompanied by the Viking armed helicopter platoon (UH1-B's), and at 1145 hours, an additional 100 man reaction force from Tan Can was airlifted into LZ 21 (objective #21) also accompanied by a platoon of armed helicopters (see Appendix #2). The reaction force landing at LZ 21 was immediately engaged by the VC, with one platoon being pinned down by the superior VC fire. The three armed platoons of HUH1-B helicopters (Cobras, Vikings and Bandits) supporting the reaction force immediately engaged the VC, placing intense and devastating fire on the VC positions, allowing the pinned down CIDG troops to withdraw from the area.

g. The armed helicopters remained in contact with the VC until 1615 hours. In addition to the armed choppers, four airstrikes were conducted on the VC positions. Extraction of friendly troops commenced at 1605 hours, and was completed at 1645 hours. Sporadic fire was received from the VC positions until 1800 hours, at which time the armed choppers lost contact and returned to Moc Hoa. Throughout the days action, 188 VC had been reported killed.

h. On 11 April a second reaction force was mounted, supported by slick ships, one platoon of armed choppers and two armed Mohawks. The Force

INCLOSURE 26 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS
CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

was airlifted into the same area as the previous day (see Appendix #3) at 1200 hours. A sweep of the area was conducted until 1635 hours, but no contact was made with VC. Friendly dead and several lost weapons from the previous day were recovered. The operation was officially terminated at 1700 hours. The sequence of events and final battle statistics are attached as Appendix #4 and Appendix #5 respectively.

3. Conclusions:

a. Local security around the FOB and early warning systems appear to have been insufficient on the night of the attack, allowing the VC to prepare foxholes within 300 meters of the FOB.

b. The attack was triggered pre-maturely by the CIDG troops on the north wall, and the VC force was not fully deployed during the initial assault.

c. The attacking VC force executed an exceptionally well planned assault. They were heavily supported with automatic, direct and indirect fire weapons. Their failure to succeed can be attributed to a pre-mature attack; the valiant and professional manner in which the FOB defenders fought; and the exceptionally outstanding air support.


d. Air support during the battle was outstanding. TAC air missions were close, accurate and very effective. AC-47 support at the FOB proved highly effective and necessary for a sustained successful defense. Armed helicopter support was exceptionally outstanding. The Cobra armed platoon flew a total of 15 hours without rest, from 100340 to 101830 April, rendering devastating firepower on the VC. During the action air support included:

- 24 UH-1H's and UH-1D's
- 2 Chinooks
- 6 Flights of F-100's (TAC air)
- 2 AC-47 "Puff Ships" (Flare/fire support)
- 2 Armed Mohawks
- 1 FAC (Beaver 74)


5 Appendices:

a/s


INCLOSURE 26 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS
CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966



APPENDIX 1 TO INCLOSURE 26 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966




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


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 SERIES: 1701
 SHEET: 6243 III

APPENDIX 2 TO INCLOSURE 26 TO SECTION II to Operational Report
 on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966



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



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SHEETS: 1701
SHEET: 6243 III

18 83

APPENDIX 3 TO INCLOSURE 26 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on
Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (RI)) 30 April 1966



100410 Apr 66 Ammunition, communications equipment and 2 USASF air landed at FOB by Cobra (HU-1B) platoon.

100500 Apr 66 FOB reported 7 CIDG KIA, 5 WIA, 7 MIA, 1 VMSF KIA.

100503 Apr 66 Additional flareship requested by FOB.

100507 Apr 66 C-4 (Can Tho) reported choppers not available for reaction force.

100520 Apr 66 FOB reported an additional 11 CIDG wounded.

100525 Apr 66 B-41 (Moc Hoa) directed to request choppers from 7th Division for reaction force.

100645 Apr 66 FOB reported Captain Shelton (CO, Det A-415) stepped on mine while checking perimeter of FOB. Captain Shelton was picked up by gun ship at FOB and is enroute to 3rd Field Hospital.

100735 Apr 66 Gun ship at FOB location reported 2 VC KIA. Fired on VC located 1200 meters west of FOB.

100745 Apr 66 Reaction force 15 Bravo (Camp Tuyen Nhon) arrived at FOB.

100810 Apr 66 Captain Shelton confirmed as KIA.

100900 Apr 66 100 man lift authorized by 7th Division.

101100 Apr 66 100 man lift arrived at B-41 (Moc Hoa).

101145 Apr 66 Additional armed helicopter platoon arrived at B-41 (Moc Hoa).

101205 Apr 66 1st lift airlanded at LZ11.

101242 Apr 66 2nd lift airlanded at LZ21.

101307 Apr 66 Reaction force in contact with estimated VC Battalion.

101345 Apr 66 Reaction force withdrawing.

101445 Apr 66 Request for additional troop support disapproved.

101605 Apr 66 Reaction force air lifted out of operation area.

APPENDIX 4 TO INCLOSURE 26 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

092300 Apr 66 Tuyen Nhon FOB (15 Alpha) under attack by estimated VC Battalion. VC employing mortars and small arms.

092301 Apr 66 Immediate airstrike and flareship requested.

092320 Apr 66 Small arms fire decreased. Mortar barrage continues.

092331 Apr 66 AC-47 "Spooky" and Beaver 74 (FAC) arrived over FOB.

100011 Apr 66 Communications lost with FOB.

100023 Apr 66 Several fires inside FOB reported by Beaver 74 (FAC).

100035 Apr 66 Fighters (F-100's) on station at FOB.

100038 Apr 66 Communications reestablished with FOB through VNSF.

100100 Apr 66 Request for additional fighters and flareship. FOB again under heavy attack.

100102 Apr 66 Additional fighters (F-100's) and flareship enroute to FOB.

100105 Apr 66 Status of USASF at FOB unknown.

100130 Apr 66 2nd flight of fighters (F-100's) on target.

100155 Apr 66 Ammunition and communications equipment prepared for airdrop.

100210 Apr 66 USASF personnel at FOB okay. FOB now being attacked from three (3) sides.

100220 Apr 66 Beaver 74 (FAC) established contact with reaction force (15 Bravo) from Camp Tuyen Nhon (A-415).

100225 Apr 66 CV-2 enroute from C-4 (Can Tho) to B-41 (Moc Hoa) with ammunition and communications equipment for FOB.

100228 Apr 66 Beaver 74 (FAC) reported VC withdrawing north from FOB.

100237 Apr 66 Beaver 74 (FAC) reported VC firing increasing from the east of FOB.

100340 Apr 66 CV-2 and Cobras (HUL-B) arrived at B-41 (Moc Hoa).

APPENDIX 4 TO INCLOSURE 26 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

111145 Apr 66 100 man lift arrived at B-41 (Moc Hoa).
111215 Apr 66 Reaction force air landed vicinity of objectives
#11 and #21.
111300 Apr 66 Negative contact reported by reaction force.
111430 Apr 66 Reaction force reported many VC bodies found in
objective area (approximately 65).
111540 Apr 66 Friendly KIA from 10 April recovered.
111635 Apr 66 Reaction force air lifted out of objective area.
111700 Apr 66 Operation officially terminated.

APPENDIX 4 TO INCLOSURE 26 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on
Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

FINAL BATTLE STATISTICS ON VC ATTACK AGAINST CAMP TUYEN NHON FOB

VIET CONG LOSSES

a. Personnel:

93 KIA (USASF body count)
140 KIA (Cobra count)
28 KIA (Viking and Bandit count)
100 KIA (estimated)
100 WIA (estimated)

b. Equipment:

3 AK-47 Assault Rifles
3 K-50 Soviet Machineguns
1 CHICOM Flamethrower
1 CHICOM 40mm AT Grenade Launcher
Type 56
6 10 Kilo Mines
6 15 Kilo Pole Charges
40 Hand Grenades
2 Kilo Documents
15 Kilo Medical Supplies (These supplies included surgical instruments, stethoscope, intravenous kit, penicillin, morphine, and other pain killing drugs. The equipment was clean and apparently belonged to a physician).

FRIENDLY LOSSES

a. Personnel:

1 USASF KIA
2 USASF WIA
1 US WIA (door gunner)
3 VNSF KIA
23 CIDG KIA
15 CIDG WIA
3 CIDG MIA
9 CIDG Dependents KIA

b. Equipment:

1 .45 cal pistol
7 Carbines
2 BARs
2 HT-1 Radios
1 Medical Kit

APPENDIX 5 TO INCLOSURE 26 TO SECTION II, to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

VC RETURNEES

1. General Situation: During January and February 1966, there has been an increased effort at Tinh Bien (A-423), Chau Doc Province, to contact Viet Cong and local guerrilla units within the area of influence and area of interest of USASF and ILDB intelligence nets.

a. On 282200 February one platoon of Viet Cong moved to vicinity (1) (see overlay). The VC platoon leader had received instructions he could meet USASF and ILDB intelligence personnel at (2) to discuss the return of his platoon to GVN control. Due to other VC units being in the same area, the contact procedures were altered and the actual contact was made by two agents from Tinh Bien.

b. On 282220 February the two agents returned to camp Tinh Bien (3) with the VC platoon leader, where a meeting was held. The meeting began with the status of both sides being ascertained. The platoon leader identified himself as "NGUYEN PHONG CANH" and a member of C-85 support company. His unit was located on Mui Gai mountain vicinity (4). His platoon strength was 17 people. An agreement was made to surrender all weapons, munitions and documents with the condition that USASF and ILDB provide security for the families and members of the platoon upon arrival in Tinh Bien. This point was agreed upon and a plan was made for the VC platoon to come under GVN control at 012100 March. The meeting broke up at 010100 March.

2. Concept of the Operation: The plan was that the platoon leader would return to his platoon and brief his people on the results of the meeting with the USASF and ILDB and discuss the terms that were arranged at the meeting.

a. On 011845 March three platoons of CIDG from Camp Tinh Bien departed by vehicle to OP21 (5). One security squad was left there to (a) ambush any unit entering from Cambodia into Vietnam; (b) act as a reserve if needed. Two platoons dismounted at (6) and three squads were placed in position at OP 23, (7) with the mission of ambushing any VC unit enroute from Cambodia to Vietnam. Under the cover of darkness two platoons moved from their dismount point to a predesignated area, (8), where flank and rear security were established.

b. By 012030 the VC platoon had moved from (9) to (10). Contact men for the VC platoon initiated the prearranged signal of three flashes from a match or cigarette lighter. This signal was answered in turn with two flashes of a lighter. This exchange of signals was executed six times between 2030 hours and 2100 hours. During this time the remainder of the platoon moved from (10) to (11), where physical contact was made with the ILDB. The VC immediately surrendered all weapons, equipment and documents

INCLOSURE 27 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS
OSGPO-26 (R1)) 30 April 1966

to the LLDB intelligence sergeant. The 17 returnees were placed on a $\frac{3}{4}$ ton truck and transported to a prearranged pick-up point where the two platoons of CIDG were located. The time then was 012230.

c. Small arms and 4.2 inch mortar fire was arranged to cover the withdrawal of the CIDG and VC platoon. Fire was called in on the southwest portion of Nui Ta Bec from (12) to (13). The fire support was a cover to make it look as if the VC platoon had been in a firefight and had not surrendered. It was felt, by personnel who planned and executed the mission, the firing would reduce the probability of reprisals against the families of the returnees who were still in VC areas.

d. By 012400 March the CIDG forces and returnees had closed into Camp Tinh Bien. The returnees were given food, blankets, sleeping mats, mosquito nets and a place to sleep.

e. The next morning, 2 March, Sector and District representatives arrived to inspect the weapons and equipment and interview the platoon leader and other members of the platoon. A review of the documents provided the USASF and LLDB with substantial information on VC locations. An airstrike was called in on Nui Ta Bec, resulting in 4 VC KIA, 8 WIA, 14 structures destroyed and one known secondary explosion.

f. On 3 March intelligence agents contacted another member of this platoon in the vicinity of (14) and he was returned to the camp.

3. Result of Operation: As a result of this operation, the personnel and equipment returned to GVN control were:

18 Returnees (15 men, 3 women)

1 US model M1A1 SMG

1 French MAS 1916 rifle

5 Russian carbines, 1960

7 German model 98

1 US rifle, Cal .30, 1907

3 US Remington Rifles, Cal .30, 1917

2 US Winchester Rifles, Cal .30, 1917

4 Eddystone rifles, Cal .30, 1917

10 AP mines, $\frac{1}{4}$ lb charge

1 Bobby trap, 100 gram charge

1 M-26 hand grenade

1 home made grenade in cylindrical container, $\frac{1}{4}$ lb charge

1500 rounds of assorted small arms ammunition

5 SIG magazines

Assorted load-bearing equipment

2 Viet Cong flags

1 Communist Chinese Flag

Miscellaneous documents including:

Letters addressed to Sector Viet Cong Commander


Tax collection books

Documents of intelligence value to higher headquarters

1 Appendix

a/s

INCLOSURE 27 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966



MAP, VIETNAM, 1:50,000
 SERIES: L701
 SHEETS: 5942 I, 5942 II
 6042 III, 6042 IV

1. Temporary location of VC platoon
2. Location of planned initial meeting
3. Actual meeting place
4. Permanent location of VC platoon
5. OP #21
6. Dismount point
7. OP #23
8. Flank and rear security positions
9. Temporary location of VC platoon
10. Temporary location of VC platoon while enroute to rendezvous point
11. Rendezvous point with LIDB
- 12-13. Area mortared during withdrawal
14. Second meeting with additional member of VC platoon

SUBJECT: BUILD-UP VICINITY OF CAMP CAI CAI

1. Developments since 1 March to the present in the vicinity of Cai Cai Special Forces Camp, Kien Phong Province, have indicated a multi-battalion build-up in the immediate and contiguous areas. Because of the proximity of this camp to the Cambodian border, enemy activities to include Cambodian Army activities, cannot be overlooked or minimized. At present, reports indicate a VC force of at least four battalions are located within striking distance of the camp. These battalions are the 502nd and 504th which are confirmed in this area, and the 197th and 397th which are held as unconfirmed, however probable.

2. It is now confirmed that the VC in this area either have or have at their disposal, 105mm howitzers and/or British 25 pounders. This was confirmed when the examination of fragments from shells fired into the camp on 3 April 1966 revealed they were of the 87.6mm, 25 pounder variety. Dud 105mm rounds have been found within 100 meters of the camp proper. The Cambodian Army has eight British 25 pounders in their arsenal and the possibility exists that they are firing these weapons in support of VC operations or allowing the VC access to the weapons. Agent reports have continuously indicated the presence of 105's in the area. There have also been sightings of vehicular traffic, including five ton trucks, along the border in both Cambodia and South Vietnam.

3. Enemy activity during the past several months has increased sharply. Since 1 March, the camp itself has been fired upon by mortar, recoilless weapons, artillery, and small arms, on 11 occasions; two of the camp's outposts have sustained probes; and patrols from the camp have made contact with the VC forces 19 times within a five kilometer radius of the camp. These developments have begun to follow the classic pattern of events prior to a VC attack on a camp, i.e. enemy troop concentrations reported, probes on outposts, and harassing mortar fire on the camp itself.

4. It is of interest to note that the monsoon season will out into IV Corps during the latter part of April. These rains will of course bring low cloud cover and limited visibility, impairing air operations to a great extent. By the middle of June, the terrain will, for the most part, be inundated and will hardly support a ground attack. Therefore, the optimum time for an attack appears to be either the latter part of April or in May. Other intelligence reports support the probability of a monsoon offensive in IV Corps and have indicated the possible infiltration of NVA personnel in support of this.

5. Based upon the aforementioned information, the VC have the following capabilities:

a. To launch an assault on Cai Cai in multi-battalion strength

INCLOSURE 28 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

supported by mortar and artillery fire at a time of their choosing within the next 30 days.

b. To continue probes and harassments, and using artillery to inflict as many casualties as possible on the camp without committing ground forces.

c. To continue reorganization and training their forces and avoiding decisive contact.

INCLOSURE 28 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS
CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

DETACHMENT B-51
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF-E

30 April 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

TO: Commanding Officer
5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF
ATTN: AVSF-C
APO US Forces, 96240

In compliance with D.F. your Headquarters dated 14 and 16 April 1966,
subject as above the attached report is hereby submitted.

4 Appendixes

1. POI Basic Training Course
2. POI CIP Leaders Course
3. POI CRP Course
4. Student Attendance

s/Ernest K. Gruene, Jr.
t/ERNEST K. GRUENE, JR.
Major, Infantry
Commanding

INCLOSURE 29 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS
CSGPO-28 (R1)) 30 April 1966

PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION
BASIC - TRAINING COURSE
06 Weeks = 360 Hours

TRAINING	HOUR	
	DAY	NIGHT
1. PHYSICAL TRAINING (18 Hours)		
- Obstacle Course	04	
- Movement under fire	04	
- Bayonet	04	
- Hand to Hand Combat	06	
Total	18	
2. GENERAL SUBJECT (57 Hours)		
- Political Warfare	08	04
- Military parade and ceremony	13	
- Mines and Booby Traps	06	
- Map, Compass	04	
- Intelligence	02	02
- Communication	06	02
- Medical	00	04
- Maintenance	06	
Total	45	12
3. WEAPON (74 Hours)		
- M1 Rifle	02	
- Carbine	02	
- BAR (L PE)	14	06
- L.M.G.	12	04
- Grenade	04	
- M1 Reaction fire	04	
- Night firing	04	04
- Fire technique	10	
Total	60	14
4. TACTICS (115 Hours)		
- Individual Combat	04	
- Hand and arm signal, Formations	13	04
- Group Combat	08	04
- Helicopter Operation	04	04
- Squad in Night Combat	00	08
- Immediate action drill	06	06
- Ambush	06	06

APPENDIX 1 TO INCLOSURE 29 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (RL)) 30 April 1966

PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION
CIDG LEADERS COURSE
05 Weeks

SUBJECT	TRAINING HOUR		
	DAY	NIGHT	TOTAL
I GENERAL SUBJECTS	50	03	53
II TACTICS	96	48	144
III WEAPONS	46	09	55
IV COMMUNICATION	10	00	10
V DEMOLITION	10	03	13
VI MEDICAL	04	00	04
VII INTELLIGENCE	07	00	07
VIII POLITICAL WARFARE	18	00	18
IX GUERRILLA WARFARE	06	03	09
X MISCELLANEOUS			
- Examination	04	00	04
- Opening and Graduation Ceremony	04	00	04
TOTAL	255	66	321

APPENDIX 2 TO INCLOSURE 29 TO SECTION II to Operational Report on Lessons Learned (RCS CSGPO-28 (M1)) 30 April 1966

TRAINING SUBJECT	HOUR	
	DAY	NIGHT
- Patrol	09	10
- Village searching technique	04	00
- Squad attack	04	00
- Squad attack with live ammo	10	00
- Squad defense (live ammo)	02	06
Total	70	45
5. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION (14 Hours)		
- Introduction to Amphibious Operation	02	00
- DZ Selection and Reporting	02	00
- DZ Marking	02	00
- Reception from a drop	02	00
- LZ - DZ (day and night PE)	03	03
Total	11	03
6. LLDB TRAINING		
- Introduction to Unconventional Warfare and Guerrilla Warfare	02	00
- LLDB duties, Capabilities and Limitations	01	00
- VNSF Organization	02	00
- Periods of Guerrilla development	02	00
- Initial Contact	02	00
- Infiltration Phase	02	00
- Organization Phase	00	02
- Training Build-up phase	00	02
- Operation guiding period	02	00
- Survival	03	00
- Escape and Evasion	07	00
Total	27	04
7. MISCELLANEOUS		
- Examination	07	00
- Commander Time	12	00
- FTX	24	12
Total	43	12
TOTAL	270	360 90

SUBJECT		TRAINING HOUR		
I GENERAL				
A	- Use of U.S. Compass	02	00	02
	- Movement by Compass	04	03	07
	- Movement by Map	02	00	02
	- Methods of Orientation	02	00	02
	- Coordinate Reading	06	00	06
	- Road March Orientation	04	00	04
	- Location and Orientation	12	00	12
B	LEADERSHIP			
	- Duties of the Leader	01	00	01
	- Conduct of Leadership	01	00	01
	- Techniques of the Commander	02	00	02
	- Training Methods	04	00	04
C	HAND TO HAND COMBAT			
	- Weakness of Defense	01	00	01
	- Fall Positions	01	00	01
	- Judo Movements	05	00	05
	- Hand to hand Combat with knife	02	00	02
	- POW's Searching and Handling	01	00	01
	TOTAL	50	03	53
II TACTICS				
A	COMBAT INDIVIDUAL			
	- Camouflage and Concealment	03	02	05
	- Hand and Arm Signals	01	00	01
	- Movement Observation and Reporting	03	02	05
	- Scouting Agents and Messengers	03	02	05
	- Guard	02	02	04
B	COMBAT UNIT SQUAD			
	- Squad Organization	01	00	01
	- Squad Formation	02	00	02
	- Squad Ambush	04	03	07
C	PLATOON			
	- Platoon Organization	01	00	01
	- Platoon Formations	02	00	02
	- Platoon Patrol	08	03	11
	- Platoon in Defense	04	03	07
	- Platoon in Attack	04	03	07
	- Platoon Ambush	04	03	07
	- Platoon Raid	04	03	07
	- River Crossing	04	00	04
	- Immediate Action Drill	03	00	03
	- PTX	43	22	65
	Total	96	48	144

SUBJECT	TRAINING HOUR		
	DAY	NIGHT	TOTAL
III WEAPONS			
- Grenades	02	00	02
- M1 Rifle	05	03	08
- Carbine	05	03	08
- SMG Thompson and M3A1	04	00	04
- BAR	06	00	06
- IMG	06	00	06
- Mortars	15	00	15
- Transition (Reaction) Firing	03	03	06
Total	46	09	55
IV COMMUNICATIONS			
- Introduction to Commo	01	00	01
- Communication Security	01	00	01
- Radios, HT-1 and TR 20	02	00	02
- Radio, AN/PRC-10	02	00	02
- Communications Systems	04	00	04
Total	10	00	10
V DEMOLITION			
- Mines and Booby Traps	03	00	03
- VC Mine	02	00	02
- Claymore Mine	02	03	05
- Arming and Disarming Mines	03	00	03
Total	10	03	13
VI MEDICS			
- Introduction to First Aid	02	00	02
- Emergency Treatment in the Field	01	00	01
- VD	01	00	01
Total	04	00	04
VII INTELLIGENCE			
- Introduction to Intelligence	02	00	02
- Observation and Reporting Information	02	00	02
- Information Collection and Development	02	00	02
- Handling of POW's and Information	01	00	01
Total	07	00	07
VIII POLITICAL WARFARE			
			18
IX GUERRILLA WARFARE			
- Introduction to Guerrilla Warfare	02	00	02
- Counter Guerrilla Warfare	04	03	07
Total	06	03	09

GENERAL TRAINING SCHEDULE

COMBAT RECON COURSE

5 WEEKS (283 hrs for Day + 58 hrs for Night = 341 hrs)

TRAINING SUBJECTS	TRAINING HOURS		
	DAY	NIGHT	TOTAL
I GENERAL SUBJECTS			
11 - Map, Compass	40	4	44
12 - Communication	21		21
13 - Medical	12		12
14 - Intelligence	18		18
15 - Political Warfare	24		24
16 - Landing Zone and Drop Zone	8		8
17 - FAC	1		1
18 - Survival	4		4
19 - Briefing and Debriefing	2		2
Total	130	4	134
II TACTICS			
- Patrol	35	12	47
- River Crossing	8		8
- FTX	80	32	112
Total	123	44	167
III WEAPONS			
- Mortar Adjustment	18	6	24
- Individual Weapon		4	4
Total	18	10	28
MISCELLANEOUS			
- Review		04 hrs	
- Examination		04 hrs	
- Commanders time		06 hrs	
- Opening and Graduation Ceremonies		02 hrs	
Total		16 hrs	
CLASSIFIED			
- Confidential		24 hrs	
- Secret		46 hrs	
- Unclassified		271 hrs	

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SUBJECT		DAY	NIGHT	TOTAL
X	MISCELLANEOUS			
	- Examination	04	00	04
	- Opening and Graduation Ceremony	04	00	04
	Total	08	00	08

GENERAL: TOTAL

255

66

321

TRAINING SCHEDULE IN DETAIL
COMBAT PIGEON COURSE

TRAINING SUBJECTS	TRAINING HOURS		
	DAY	NIGHT	TOTAL
I GENERAL SUBJECTS			
11 - Map and Compass			
111 - Use of US Compass	04		04
112 - Movement with Compass by day and Night	04	04	08
113 - Introduction to Map	02		02
114 - Coordinate Reading	08		08
115 - Map Orientation	02		02
116 - Marginal Information	04		04
117 - Position Location, Road March Orientation	04		04
118 - Location Orientation	04		04
119 - Location by Resection and Intersection	04		04
120 - Position Determination by Contour Lines	04		04
Total	40	04	44
12 - Communication			
- AN/PRC10 Radio	12		12
- HT-1 Radio	04		04
- Field antenna for AN/PRC-10 and HT-1	03		03
- Message writing and Communication Security	02		02
Total	21	00	21
13 - Medical			
- Use of Individual Dressing	04		04
- Treatment for Shock	02		02
- Stop the Bleeding	02		02
- Fractures	02		02
- Emergency Treatment on Operation	02		02
Total	12	00	12

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14 Intelligence

- Introduction to Intelligence	02		02
- Observation and Reporting	02		02
- Information Collection from the Battlefield	02		02
- Prisoners of War and Documents	02		02
- Escape and Evasion	10		10
Total	18	00	18

15 Political Warfare

- History of Viet Nam	02		02
- History of Viet Nam Today	02		02
- Role of People in War time	02		02
- CHIEU HOA Policy	01		01
- Propaganda with People	01		01
- Our Advantage and Disadvantage (Propaganda)	01		01
- Advantage and Disadvantage of Enemy (Propaganda)	01		01
- Introduction to Guerrilla Warfare	01		01
- Responsibility of the CIDG	01		01
- Action and Tactics of the Enemy	02		02
- Enemy Propaganda and Cahin			
- Tactics	02		02
- Counterespionage and Preservation	02		02
- Why do we counter Communists	02		02
- Reason to Win Communist over to the Government	02		02
Total	24	00	24

16 Landing Zone and Drop Zone

- LZ Selection and Reporting	06		06
- DZ Selection and Reporting	02		02
Total	10	00	10

17 FAC

01		01
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18 Survival

- Locating Water	01		01
- Locating Food on Ground	02		02
- Locating Food Underwater	01		01
Total	04	00	04

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19	Briefing and Debriefing	02	04	06
	Total	130	04	134
II	TACTICS			
21	- Organization and Equipment of Recon Squad	02		02
22	- Immediate Action Drill	08		08
23	- Patrol Techniques	04		04
24	- Patrol Order Combat Patrol, Patrol Base, Patrol Reporting	21	12	33
25	- River Crossing with Expedient and Poncho	08		08
26	- FTX	80	32	112
	Total	123	44	167
III	WEAPONS			
	- Mortar Adjustment	18	06	24
	- Carbine Firing		04	04
	Total	18	10	28
IV	MISCELLANEOUS			
	- Review	04		04
	- Examination	04		04
	- Commanders Time	06		06
	- Opening and Graduation Ceremony	02		02
	Total	16	00	16
	TOTAL	283	58	341

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STUDENT ATTENDANCE FOR PERIOD 4TH QUARTER 1965 AND 1ST QUARTER 1966. (Thre 30 April 66).

COURSE	4TH QUARTER 1965		1ST QUARTER 1966	
	ATTENDED	GRADUATED	ATTENDED	GRADUATED
LEDB OFFICER	20	15	19	Note #1
LEDB NCO + PVT	112	92	89	Note #2
GIDG LEADERS	424	218	293	247 Note #3
COMBAT RECON	136	112	207	206 Note #4
COMMUNICATIONS			48	20

NOTES:

1. Class is scheduled to end 24 May 66.
2. Of the 89 students starting 89 graduated from Basic Course and are now enrolled in 6 week Special Course.
3. This course was increased from 4 to 5 weeks during 1st quarter 1966.
4. This course was increased from 4 to 5 weeks and from 2 to 4 platoons during 1st quarter 1966.

LESSONS LEARNED

ITEM: SUPPORT OF SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS IN REMOTE AREAS

DISCUSSION: During the "Battle of A SHAU" sufficient tactical and logistical support was prohibited due to extremely poor weather conditions (extended periods of low cloud cover and limited visibility) which are prevalent most of the time in the vicinity of and the surrounding areas of Camp A SHAU (YC500083) located within the A SHAU-ALOUI Valley, adjacent to the Laotian border.

These conditions placed severe limitations on the use of direct air strikes, bombing, resupply and medical evacuation efforts and the ability to place effective fire on enemy mortar positions.

The enemy employed the tactics of placing their troops and anti-aircraft weapons (50 Cal. MG) along likely avenues of approach of friendly reinforcements.

The enemy had the advantage of short and relatively secure supply lines resulting from established infiltration routes from Laos, adjacent to Special Forces camps located near the Laotian border.

OBSERVATION: Contingency plans are being established with FNAF and ARVN units to support the Special Forces effort to include:

1. The use of "Sky Spot Bombing" (an electric radar and homing device, UHF/ADF AN/PRC 41 and COMPUTER MSQ-35) to allow direct bombing on targets under extended cloud cover.
2. Airlift mobile artillery units should preplan landing zones around the periphery of the enemy axis to render support to friendly forces.
3. Establish primary and alternate voice communications system to act as relays for the camps when communications are restricted.
4. Deploy reinforcements to camps in advance of imminent attacks based on timely intelligence and weather conditions.
5. Border surveillance efforts must be increased (air and land) in order to detect the enemy massing for a large scale attack.
6. The timely reinforcement by conventional units, both ARVN and US. Ground routes for reinforcements must be planned in areas where weather conditions are likely to preclude flying.
7. A camp should not be established in an area which is well beyond reinforcement distance and capability of friendly units. This is particularly true in areas, such as A SHAU, where poor weather conditions exist most of the time.

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ITEM: Reduction of Pilferage of Sensitive Items

DISCUSSION: It has been discovered that some pilferage of sensitive items has been occurring during shipment to the operational detachments.

OBSERVATION: To reduce pilferage of supplies during shipment all items are being boxed, banded and palletized with the sensitive items enclosed in the center. Requisition voucher numbers are used to mark the boxes instead of item descriptions. Lightweight sensitive items are being sent through the mail. It is expected that the loss of such items as pistols, binoculars, and medical supplies will be appreciably reduced.

ITEM: Due Out Review System

DISCUSSION: A large number of due-outs to the operational detachments accumulated and there was no systematic method established to review and reduce the due-outs to meet an acceptable demand accommodation rate.

OBSERVATION: A 120 day due out review system was initiated. All requisitions that are over 120 days are returned to the requesting unit. If the unit determines that the item is still a valid requirement the request is resubmitted and alternate methods of obtaining the item are examined. The reviews have resulted in a 50% reduction in the number of due outs because the detachment has obtained the item by another means or the individuals on site at the time of review have decided that they no longer want the item.

ITEM: Issue of Generators

DISCUSSION: 30 KW generators were being issued to the operational detachments and were being damaged as a result of the personnel on site not knowing how to install or operate them.

OBSERVATION: All technical equipment issued to the field is now accompanied by a Phillipino technician who conducts on the spot instructions on operating and maintaining the equipment.

ITEM: Camp Openings

DISCUSSION: Unless carefully planned and programmed, detachments opening new camps can be hampered by receiving more supplies and equipment than can be efficiently cleared from the drop zone and put to use.

OBSERVATION: Detachments given the mission of opening new camps must accurately determine their requirements for barrier and construction mat-

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erials. Following this, a delivery schedule must be determined to program the supplies into the campsite at a usable rate so that supplies and equipment are recovered quickly and not left on the drop zone for long periods of time.

ITEM: Supply requests by message

DISCUSSION: Detachments submitting priority requests by message often do not furnish enough details to enable S-4 personnel to determine what is needed.

OBSERVATION: For repair parts, furnish detailed description of the part and model of end item to be repaired. For other items send enough details to enable supply personnel to determine exactly what is needed.

ITEM: During the battle of Camp A Shau in I Corps, it was determined that the Coaxial Cable lead in from the Antenna to the radio set had been cut by an unidentified individual within the camp. The cutting of the cable severed communications with higher headquarters for a period in excess of eight hours. Positive steps which can be taken to eliminate similar instances are:

1. Erect a lead pipe to a height six to seven feet above ground level and run the Coaxial Cable through it. This will prevent cutting and afford some protection against ground and mortar fire.

2. An underground or indoor type antenna should be installed for emergency use, and periodically checked for reliability.

3. The installation of dummy antennas will confuse saboteurs and enemy gun crews.

OBSERVATION: All camps have been notified to take necessary precautions to preclude the sabotage of all communication equipment and associated accessories.

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CONFIDENTIAL